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Abstract  
This thesis consists of four empirical studies that examine two types of 
information, using a unique set of fines and fund flow data, on a multi–asset setting. 
The first study finds underperformance of between 29 and 57 basis points per month 
measured as Carhart model alphas on long-term stock returns of firms after 
announcements of monetary fines. Additionally, environmental fines are perceived by 
investors to be more of a concern while social, governance and also long-term aspects 
matter somewhat less. In the second study, I extend the research on fines by examining 
the inter-link between equities and bonds using short selling ratios and bond returns. 
Analysis using a fixed-income model shows that high short selling in the context of 
fines induces negative underperformances in bond returns. In addition, the 
underperformances are more profound for portfolios with longer remaining years to 
maturity and in crisis periods. The third study examines short-term reaction of Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) spread changes and stock returns to fines. I find the CDS market 
is able to anticipate illegality news. Both markets react very differently to fines in 
different legal stages, industries and also by type of fine.  Environmental issues are also 
a key concern in both CDS and stock markets and they also react more to higher fines 
per market cap. These empirical studies show that information about fines are valuable 
for investors as on average companies with illegalities underperform relevant 
benchmarks in the short and long-term. The fourth study involves fund flows on a 
global scale in Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). I use panel data models and find that 
the explanatory power of ETF fund flows are similar to macro-economic variables in 
explaining indices returns. I also find investors could use ETF fund flows as 
information to understand market movements especially globally. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Motivation for the Thesis 
 The primary focus of this thesis is to understand new information types that can 
help investors in their decision making process in a multi-asset setting. There are three  
major categories of information such as i) market-level information which usually 
affect the whole market such as macro-economic news, ii) industry-level information 
which only affect certain companies within a sector and iii) specific firm-level 
information which only affect that specific company (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004). 
Theoretically, the link between information and price changes is what denotes market 
efficiency. Information is very vital to investors as it affects their behaviors which are 
in turn reflected in returns on assets. Thus, the reaction by investors due to the release 
of information can provide insights into market efficiency and price discovery 
(Nofsinger 2001).   
 
 There are various existing theories that intend on identifying how investors react 
to information or news. The most traditional theory is based on the expected utility 
theory where “the decision maker or investor chooses between risky or uncertain 
prospects by comparing their expected utility values”(Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1944; Mongin 1997). In short, this means that during a period of uncertainty a rational 
investor would weigh all the possibilities of his own risk perception and probability of a 
possible outcome. On the other hand, there are other contrasting theories that indicate 
that investors do not act according to their own beliefs but rather herd, which is simply 
mimicking the investment decisions of other managers. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
state that investors perceive herding as a rational behavior as they are concerned about 
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their reputation in the market. There are also other theories that are not associated with 
utility theory but rather predict that investors seek to reduce their internal conflict or 
cognitive dissonance (Nofsinger 2001). For instance, Bondt and Thaler (1985) examine 
the overreaction hypothesis and found that investors overreact to unexpected and 
dramatic news events. However, the most influential critique to the expected utility 
theory is the prospect theory which assumes instead that investors would make 
decisions more based on the probability of gain rather than loss (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979).  
  
 The theories discussed above stem more on motivating short-term reactions 
from information. There are also theories that explain information that are not 
immediately captured by the market and impact firm value more on the long-term. 
Basically, these theories argue that stock prices adjust slowly to information and thus 
returns over long horizons are necessary to be examined to understand market 
inefficiency (Fama 1998). One theory is called long-run drift, which explains large and 
persistent drifts after events where the market may react to the true value of the firm 
only over time. There is delayed stock price reaction to events with abnormal 
performance persisting for years after events such as spinoffs, dividend initiations, 
initial public offerings, short interest announcements and mergers (Barber and Lyon 
1997; Kothari and Warner 1997). For instance, Edmans (2011) captures a long-run drift 
in his analysis of the relationship between employee satisfaction and long-run stock 
returns from 1984 to 2009 and finds outperformance of 3.5% a year of the “100 Best 
Companies to Work for in America”. The drift though declines over time and becomes 
insignificant in the fifth year.  
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 The theories developed above provide various different explanations on 
understanding the way investors behave to information received. Investors receive 
information from various different sources which are usually public gained from 
announcements by the listed companies, the media including social media, annual 
reports, analyst reports from financial institutions and reports from regulators or 
governments. It is based on information received that investors use to make decisions. 
Thus, the primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the importance of information 
and the post-event investors’ reactions. The two types of information that I examine are 
fines and fund flows.  
 
 Naturally the question is then why are fines considered as a new type of 
information. This begins with corporate scandals. Corporate scandals have always been 
a major attention grabber in the news and are mostly related to Environmental, Social or 
Governance (ESG) violations. Not only are these scandals widely reported in the media 
but they have also resulted in various impacts on companies from fines, product recalls, 
resignations of senior management and damage to company reputation. These corporate 
scandals are closely related to the illegal behaviors and actions of members of 
companies that result in decisions that are not legally permissible. Baucus and Baucus 
(1997) define illegal corporate behaviors “as unlawful activities of members or agents 
of a firm, engaged in primarily for the firm's benefit” (p129).The illegal actions of the 
members of the firms are deemed to “benefit” the firm but instead they actually cause 
more harm to the company.  
 
 For example, one of the largest environmental disasters was the Gulf of Mexico 
Oil Spill by BP Plc in 2010. This massive oil disaster is considered the largest 
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accidental marine oil spill which also cost the lives of eleven people. The impact was 
also seen by an immediate drop in BP’s share price by nearly 55% after the event and 
has still not recovered to the pre-scandal price, as seen in Figure 1
1
. In 2013, BP 
initially spent $14.3 billion in response to the disaster and also $8.6 billion for 
environmental costs
2
. In addition in 2015, BP agreed to pay a record environmental fine 
of $18.7 billion to settle legal actions brought by the US and several states over the fatal 
2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Another example in 2015, CEO of Volkswagen (VW), 
Martin Winterkorn, resigned due to the emissions scandal that erupted and plagued the 
company with questions of “bad governance” standards. VW was accused of 
intentionally manipulating its emissions results by having a “defeat device” installed in 
its diesel engines. This device could detect when cars were being checked for carbon 
dioxide emissions and produced better results than actual emissions on the road. The 
announcement made by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that VW had 
violated the Clean Air Act by falsifying official emissions tests in diesel cars in the US 
from 2009 to 2015 had a major negative impact on VW stock price. It crashed nearly 
45% (from €167 to only €92) at the beginning of September right after Volkswagen 
publicly admitted to have used programmed software in Diesel cars. The share price has 
not recovered to pre-crisis prices, just as in the case of BP.  The EPA announcement 
also triggered product recalls in the US. In 2016, VW agreed to a $15 billion settlement 
for their violation but as of today the company still has to deal with countless legal 
actions. However, the scandal did not come as a surprise as it might have seemed. There 
had always been warning signs about the governance standards at VW even long before 
                                                 
1
 It is important to note this limitation that even though BP’s share price had plummeted immediately post 
the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, a potential explanation of the long-term drift drop of share price could also 
be due to the drop of the price of oil per barrel which was $94 in March 2010 and never recovered to that 
high price again (i.e.$42 in April 2016).  
2
 “BP able to see beyond Deepwater at last” available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/07/30/bp-able-to-see-beyond-deepwater-at-last/ (accessed 20
th
  
April 2017) 
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the scandal due to VW’s lax boardroom controls and corporate culture3. In 2005, VW 
had also been involved in another corruption scandal involving bribery
4
. VW is not the 
only case involving corporate governance scandals. It is evident that fines given to 
companies because of their illegal behaviors not only induce negative reactions in the 
markets but also have severe repercussions such as resignation of the CEO for VW. 
 
Figure 1 BP Share Price Performance since the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (USD) 
The figure below depicts the share price movement of BP pre and post the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill 
which happened on 20
th
 April 2010. As observed, BP’s share price has still not recovered since the 
incident. BP’s price before the incident was hovering slightly above $60 before 20th April 2010 but has 
still yet to recover (the dotted lines).  
 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
  
 The first aim of this thesis is to measure the impact of fines as information on 
stock returns but most importantly, understanding the impact on long-term stock 
returns. From the BP and VW scandal, it is evident that fines are an important indicator 
as immediately after the announcements of the fines, investors react strongly with a 
                                                 
3 “Volkswagen’s ‘uniquely awful’ governance at fault in emissions scandal” available at 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/04/volkswagens-uniquely-awful-governance-at-fault-in-emissions-
scandal.html (accessed 4th April 2017) 
4
 “Volkswagen: a history of scandals” 23rd September 2015, Financial Times” available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/22ca0e9a-6159-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2 (accessed 4th April 2017) 
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drop of share prices of these companies. Most literature only measures the short-term 
impact of illegalities. However, institutional investors are more concerned about the 
longer term impact of holding companies in their portfolios and they are focused on 
identifying investments that are orientated towards a long-term performance. The above 
examples of BP and Volkswagen show that their share prices have not recovered to pre-
crisis levels ever since and thus left shareholders with significant losses. The United 
Nations supported Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) is the world’s 
leading proponent for Responsible Investment (RI). Investors have shown clear support 
to the UNPRI as since its inception, the UNPRI has grown from 100 signatories in 2006 
to 1500 signatories in 2016 with USD 62 trillion assets under management. The UNPRI 
advocate that RI “is an approach to investing that aims to incorporate ESG factors into 
investment decisions, to better manage risk and generate sustainable, long-term 
returns”5. Investors are not only reacting to ESG issues, they also use ESG factors as an 
important information to determine risk and return especially long-term. Furthermore, 
the UNPRI has six principles to promote RI and part of the signatories’ commitment is: 
“As institutional investors, I have a duty to act in the best long-term interests of our 
beneficiaries. In this fiduciary role, I believe that ESG issues can affect the 
performance of investment portfolios (to varying degrees across companies, sectors, 
regions, asset classes and through time)
6 ”. Not only are institutional investors an 
important class of shareholders, but those institutional investors with longer investment 
horizons exhibit better sustainability footprints (Gibson  and Krueger 2017). Therefore, 
I find there is a need for understanding whether there is a longer term impact of ESG 
violations and also Long-Term (LT) violations which relate to innovation (such as 
                                                 
5
  “What is Responsible Investment?” available at https://www.unpri.org/about/what-is-responsible-
investment (accessed 19th April 2017) 
6
 “ The Six Principles” available at https://www.unpri.org/about/the-six-principles (accessed 21st April 
2017)  
 7 
 
patent disputes)  anti-competitive behavior and monopoly practices disputes in the stock 
market and in different sectors. I find that this additional issue is important to be 
examined separately as it relates to investor’s perceptions whether fines that impact the 
long-term viability of the company would be more of a concern compared to ESG 
issues. 
 
 The second aim of this thesis is to understand the inter-market link between 
asset classes especially between equity and fixed income after illegality announcements 
of companies. Considering that fines imposed on companies are based on illegal 
behaviors of companies, this then could relate investors having negative sentiments of 
companies. Short interest ratio therefore is a good indicator of the perceived “feelings” 
of investors, as they would short sell a company if investors are expecting that the 
company’s stock price would decline. Previous studies only either measure the link 
between equity sentiment using short interest ratios on equity returns, credit rating 
downgrades or changes in bond spreads. I intend to investigate the impact of fines using 
short interest ratios on the impact on fixed income returns.  
 
 The third aim of this thesis is to measure whether there is also a short-term 
reaction of fines on Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads. CDS is an insurance contract 
which basically protects a buyer against a credit event on bonds such as default. As 
previously discussed, various research has measured the short-term impact of 
illegalities on stock returns. However, when VW was fined for the emissions scandal, 
not only did the stock return drop but their CDS spreads also widened. Thus, clearly the 
impact of fines can be seen not only on stock returns but also in CDS spreads.  Fines 
would impact cash flows which could in turn increase the default risk of companies. 
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Most research that measure the impact of CDS spreads are based either on the reactions 
of earnings or ratings announcements. I find only one research by Kölbel and Busch 
(2013) that measures negative news on CDS spreads. However, their study is based 
only on overall illegalities, where as I examine the immediate impact of ESG plus LT 
fines.  
 
 My previous three aims are related to the impact of fines on different asset 
classes; stocks, fixed income and credit default swaps. Considering my main aim is to 
find information types that that would help investors in understanding performances 
better, my fourth aim of this thesis is to measure fund flows into ETFs. ETFs are 
securities that track an underlying index either comprised of stocks, bonds or 
commodities. The global ETF market has been increasing tremendously, however, I 
find only two papers that measure the relationship between fund flows and ETFs 
(Kalaycıoğlu 2004; Staer 2014), yet both those papers are based only on US data. 
Hence, there is still a gap in literature in understanding the impact of ETF fund flows on 
a global scale. Using worldwide fund flow data, I examine whether previous years ETF 
fund flows are able to predict next year’s market returns on indices thus providing 
investors with a better understanding of market movements. Additionally, considering 
that ETFs mimic the market, I also examine if ETF fund flows are able to provide better 
explanations of models (i.e. higher adjusted R-squared values) compared to macro-
economic variables that are commonly used by investors and researchers. 
1.2 Intended Original Contributions of the Thesis  
 The first intended contribution of this thesis relates specifically to fines and their 
impact on long-term stock returns. Most importantly, the findings in this chapter extend 
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current literature that mostly examines short-term reactions in the area of ESG and RI. 
Secondly, I do not rely on databases or use media to collect data on the announcement 
of fines. Instead, I have a unique hand-collected dataset comprising all fines given to 
companies in the MSCI Large Cap USA universe from 1994 to 2012, taken from the 
companies’ 10-k filings to the US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). I argue 
that this source produces a much more comprehensive dataset rather than just using 
media reports which usually only take the so-called “hyped” scandals. The results 
indicate that there are underperformances in the long-term on stocks and hence, the 
impact of illegalities is not just a short-term concern. Thirdly, not only do I investigate 
environmental, social and governance issues, I further extend the violations to even 
“long-term” issues which could relate to innovation (i.e. patents), anti-competitive 
behavior and monopoly practices.  
 
 The fourth contribution this thesis provides is its multi-asset class perspective on 
illegalities. I examine the impacts of fines not just on equities but also on fixed income 
and credit defaults swaps. This will be useful for investors as knowing the magnitude of 
the impact of fines on different asset classes will allow them to have a more holistic 
view of consequences of the illegal behaviors of companies. Traditional inter-market 
theory indicates that stocks and bonds move in the same direction at times (Murphy 
2011). Therefore my fifth contribution in this thesis is that I investigate the inter-market 
link and whether short selling in the context of fines moderates a response on fixed 
income returns. This provides a better understanding of how connected these asset 
classes are especially after fines and whether traditional inter-market theory applies.  
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 While I investigate the long-term impacts of fines in the first part of this thesis, I 
also examine and compare the short-term impact of fines on both equity returns and 
CDS spreads. This is in order to ensure that my dataset also produces similar short-term 
results as per literature that argues fines have a detrimental impact on the short-term. 
Thus, the sixth contribution of this thesis is to understand the impacts of short-term 
reactions on CDS spreads and equity returns especially on ESG and LT issues. My final 
contribution in this thesis is examining the relationship between ETF fund flows and 
index returns on a global level as well on different asset classes. The dataset I use is to 
my knowledge the first to examine global ETF fund flows of 51 countries in Europe, 
America, Asia, Israel and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and Latin America. 
 
 Finally, in thesis I use different methodologies in each of the empirical analysis. 
Firstly, I use a time-series method to measure long-term performances using CAPM, 
Fama-French and Carhart models. Secondly, for the fixed income analysis, I use a 
multi-index model which captures different exposures to bond factors. Thirdly, I also 
use an event study methodology using market models for my short-term analysis and 
fourthly, I use panel data regressions for my final analysis on ETF fund flows. All the 
analyses have various robustness tests in place.  
 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis  
 This thesis is structured in six chapters. The first chapter is the introductive 
chapter which provides an explanation of the motivation of my study and describes the 
original contributions of my four empirical analyses in my subsequent chapters. Table 
1.1 at the end of this chapter provides a systematic overview of the four empirical 
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chapters including its main focus, original contributions and research implications. 
Table 8.1 in the appendix has a detailed overview of all the datasets, sources, sample 
size and frequency used in this thesis. 
  
 The second chapter describes the first empirical analysis of fines on stock 
returns. In particular, it looks at the effects of fines on long-term stock returns. Previous 
studies have only looked at measuring the short-term impact of illegalities and less 
attention has been paid to understanding the longer-term impact of fines on stock 
returns. In this chapter, I begin with an introduction and motivation of my study and 
also on previous empirical literature on illegalities. I proceed with the explanation of 
my hypotheses which I develop based on my understanding from the previous literature 
and from theory. As this is the first empirical chapter of this thesis, I describe the 
unique hand-collected dataset of monetary fines I had obtained from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) 10-K filings from the period 1994 to 2012 for United 
States of America (USA) based firms which is the basis of the fines data for the next 
two empirical chapters. Next, I describe the methodology I use in this chapter which is 
based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), three-factor (Fama-French) and 
four-factor (Carhart) models. In this chapter, I use equal weighted portfolios using both 
per fine and per company method and explain the rationale behind the use. For 
robustness, I also create value weighted portfolios. I also describe the European 
Federation of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS) classifications which I use to 
separate each individual E,S,G and LT factor. Furthermore, pursuant to my hand 
collected data, I was able to identify various stages of the legal process of the violations 
which I also empirically examine. In this chapter I also examine seven different 
industry sectors based on Standard Industrial Codes (SIC) to further examine whether 
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there is an industry effect. In addition, I perform analyses on the different levels of fines 
per market size (based on market capitalization) and I also explain the rationale behind 
this analysis. Finally, I present my interpretations of the results and conclusions.   
 
 The third chapter examines empirically the inter-link between two asset classes, 
equity and fixed income. Specifically, I look at the effect of short selling after 
announcements of illegal violations on bond returns from the period 2000 to 2012
7
. 
Similar to the previous chapter, I begin with an introduction and motivation towards the 
reasoning of examining the link of fines between equity and fixed income. I argue that 
even though the US bond market is larger than the equity market, there is still lack of 
research in this area especially on illegality. I further examine other literature on short 
selling and equity performances, existing literature on the inter-link between equity and 
bonds and similar research that is closely related to this chapter, though naturally 
explaining how this study differs from those researches as I examine illegalities. I then 
proceed to explain my hypotheses, the bond returns and the constructed portfolios based 
on different levels of short interest ratios.  In this chapter, I explain the use of the fixed 
income empirical model following Blake, E.J. Elton et al. (1993) and extended by 
Hoepner and Nilsson (2015). In order to examine the inter-link after fines between 
equity and fixed income, I proceed with interpreting the analyses not only using the 
whole portfolio sample but also different criteria’s on the bonds such as timing (pre and 
post crisis periods) and duration (remaining years to maturity). This chapter also has 
numerous robustness and additional tests which I explain in depth.  
 
                                                 
7
 The reason the period is from 2000 to 2012 is due to the availability of the short interest ratios 
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 The fourth chapter involves the empirical analysis of fines on credit defaults 
swaps. Particularly in this chapter I examine whether there is a short-term impact of 
fines on CDS spreads from the period 2009 to 2012
8
.  In the previous chapters I 
examine the long-term impact of fines, however in this chapter I look at the short-term 
impact as I compare both CDS spreads and equity returns. The fines dataset here is 
similar to the ones used in the preceding two chapters and I also proceed to explain the 
CDS spread data. The study in this chapter is based on the event study methodology 
using two different models. I explain the use of the common market adjusted-model and 
also an index-adjusted based model which takes into account a rating based adjusted 
criteria and is used in numerous studies that measure short-term CDS spread impacts. 
The results of the empirical findings are interpreted based on CDS maturity levels, 
stages of different legal processes, by the value of the fines per market capitalization, by 
industries and by the different E,S,G and LT violations. Conclusions are then drawn 
between short-term equity returns and CDS spreads after fines and the implications to 
institutional investors.  
 
 The fifth chapter involves the empirical analysis of ETF fund flows as 
information in the market to understand future market movements. This chapter is 
different than the previous empirical chapters as it does not involve fines or illegalities 
nonetheless it follows the same concept of analyzing the relevance of information for 
institutional investors.  I begin with an introduction and detailed description of the 
process of ETFs between various parties and the motivation behind the study. The 
literature review section in this chapter relates to studies in ETFs and performances and 
more specifically on asset allocation and variability research.  In this chapter, the data I 
                                                 
8
 The reason the period is from 2009  to 2012 is due to the availability of the CDS spread data 
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use is different from the previous chapters and is retrieved from Deutsche Bank and 
which I explain in detail.  The methodology in this paper is also different as I apply 
panel data econometrics and explain the reasoning behind my choices of variables. The 
results of the analyses are then interpreted and connected with the research question that 
has been posed.  
 
 The sixth and final chapter is the conclusion chapter which brings together a 
more holistic roundup of all the conclusions from the previous four empirical chapters. 
This chapter intends to provide an overview and summary of the contributions of this 
thesis and potential further areas for research.  
 
 
 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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Table 1.1 Overview of the Thesis on the Main Empirical Chapters 
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the four main empirical chapters in this thesis, including the title, the major themes, the asset class, main methodologies that are used in 
each chapter, the geographical coverage of the studies as well as the main dataset. The table also lists the original contributions and implications of each of the four empirical 
chapters. 
  Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Title: Corporate Legal Responsibility and 
Stock Returns 
Inter-market Link of Illegality: 
Measuring the Effect of Short 
Selling in the context of Fines 
on Fixed Income 
A Comparative Event Study: The 
Impact of Fines on Credit Default 
Swaps and Stocks 
ETF Fund Flows and Index Returns: 
A Global Multi Asset Class Analysis 
Major Theme: Impact of Environmental, Social, 
Governance and Long-Term 
Monetary Fines on Long-Term  
Equity Returns 
Examining Different Levels of 
Short Selling in the Context of 
Monetary Fines and its 
Response on Bond Returns   
Impact of  Environmental, Social, 
Governance and Long-Term 
Monetary Fines on Short-Term CDS 
Spreads and Equity Returns  
Examining the explanatory power of  
global ETF fund flows in explaining 
global equity, bond and future 
indices returns and the relationship 
on future market movements 
Asset Class: Equity Equity and Bonds Credit Default Swaps and Equity Exchange Traded Funds and Equity, 
Bonds and Future Indices 
Main Methodology 
(Models): 
CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart 
Models 
Multi-Index Bond Models Event Study Models  Panel Data Models 
Geographical Coverage: US US US Global 
Main Dataset: Monetary Fines in US MSCI US 
Large Cap Companies 
Monetary Fines in MSCI US 
Large Cap Companies 
Monetary Fines in MSCI US Large 
Cap Companies 
Global ETF Funds Flows 
Original Contributions: First to examine the impact of  
environmental, social, governance 
and long-term issues on  long-term 
stock returns and in different 
industries 
 
Incorporating all announcements of 
illegality and by different legal 
stages of violations that involve 
monetary penalization and with a 
data period from 1994 to 2012 
First to examine whether short 
selling in the context of fines  
moderates a response on bond 
returns 
 
Linking of asset classes using 
short interest ratios and bond 
returns 
First to examine the impact of  
environmental, social, governance 
and long-term issues on CDS spreads 
 
Examining whether the credit market 
anticipates illegality news  
First study on global ETF fund flows 
from 51 countries into US, Europe, 
Asia Pacific and the Rest of the 
World  
 
Examining the relation between ETF 
fund flows and index returns on a 
global level as well on different asset 
classes  
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Table 1.1 continued 
 
  Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Research Implications for: 
    Institutional Investors: Investors should divest from 
companies that are involved in 
illegalities that result in high 
financial penalties or advocate for 
a stronger change in corporate 
culture and behaviour that tolerates 
illegalities  
Stock market sentiment (using 
short interest ratios) especially 
in the context of fines affects 
corporate bond returns i.e. high 
investor sentiment in equities 
has a direct effect on corporate 
bond prices 
Investors should look at fines as 
information that can affect CDS 
spread changes and as indication of 
the credit risk and the potential 
health of a company  
Investors should use information on 
ETF fund flows for decision making 
especially on equity and future 
indices, as it shows the different 
impact ETF fund flows have on 
global indices. 
Companies: Firms should have strong 
principles of corporate legal 
responsibility as illegal behaviours 
is detrimental for corporation’s 
performances especially in the long 
run 
Firm’s illegal actions during 
crisis period are more 
detrimental than non-crisis 
periods indicating that investors 
are less lenient during crisis 
periods 
Firms should be aware that their 
illegal behaviours impacts their 
company value by drop in share 
prices and also effects their credit 
worthiness which in turn can affect 
their future credit borrowing 
activities   
Firms should keep track of ETF flows 
to better understand investor and 
global market movements  
Academia: Better understanding that the 
impact of illegal behaviours of 
companies not only have a short- 
term but also a  long-term  effect 
on stock returns 
This study finds that short 
selling ratio is a viable indicator 
to measure the link between 
sentiment and bond returns 
This study finds that that the credit 
market anticipates illegality news. 
Researchers  should examine 
individual types of illegality and 
not cluster all types of violations in 
one category 
This study adds to literature on asset 
allocation and prices especially on 
variability and  ETF literature on the 
relationship of global ETF fund flows 
with market movements  
Policymakers/Regulators: Regulators should ensure that 
adequate controls and procedures 
are in place to deter corporate 
illegalities 
Short interest selling is 
detrimental to companies 
especially after a fine  
As this study finds that the CDS 
market anticipates illegalities, 
regulators could use this 
information  to detect illegal 
behaviours of companies 
Regulators should  learn how and if 
flows shift markets  
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2. Corporate Legal Responsibility and Stock Returns 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In 2016, Volkswagen agreed to pay $15 billion in fines in the US to settle their 
emissions-cheating scandal which is the largest paid fine by an auto-maker for 
negligence. Volkswagen’s share price tumbled nearly 45% since the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) announced that the automaker manipulated emissions 
software. In 2012, BP paid a $4.5 billion penalty over the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
which at that time was the single total largest criminal resolution in the history of the 
United States. BP’s share price dropped to a 13 year low after the incident and they 
have yet to recover from that pre-crisis period. BP paid an additional environmental fine 
in 2015 of $18.7 billion to settle legal actions based on that Gulf of Mexico oil spill. 
Eaglesham and Fuller (2015) find that the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) for 
the fiscal year ended September 2014 levied more sanctions (including fines and 
repayment of illicit profits) overall on firms and individuals amounting to $4.2 billion 
which was a 22% increase from the previous year. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) in FY2011 secured $2.4 billion in restitution orders and $16.1 million in fines 
from corporate criminals in that year and the amount of fines increased drastically by 
198% from FY2009 to FY2011
9
. The FBI corporate fraud data also indicate that the 
amount of fines had also increased from $2.8 million to $19.9 million from FY2002 to 
FY2008. It can be deduced that monetary penalties have risen substantially and in 
tandem with an increase in corporate crime. Monetary fines are growing and the 
                                                 
9 This sample time frame of FBI data from FY2002 to FY2011 was chosen as it covers a part of my data sample from 
1994 to 2012. There is no data available prior to FY2002. “Financial Crimes Report 2010-2011” available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-2011 (accessed 10 September 2016) 
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implications of these fines no longer hold just as a “cost” of business. There are strong 
impacts of these fines which are not only felt by the firm but also stakeholders. English 
(2014) state in the Thomson Reuters report on the rising costs of non-compliance that 
“Financial implications are much wider than the actual fine levied… regulatory action 
can have a negative impact on the share price of a firm and damage its relationship 
with investors”.  
     I find numerous amount of literature that have measured the short-term impact 
of firm illegalities on stock returns (Arnold & Engelen, 2007; Bosch & Eckard, 1991; 
Davidson, et al., 1994; Karpoff, et al., 1999; Song & Han, 2015; Wallace & Worrell, 
1988)
10
. One of the earlier studies by Wallace & Worrell (1988) used an event study 
methodology to examine announcements of firm illegalities and find that the market 
does react negatively in the short-term to socially irresponsible acts. There have been a 
number of studies that have measured the impact of different types of crimes on stock 
returns (Davidson, Worrell et al. 1994; Cohen 1996; Arnold and Engelen 2007; Song 
and Han 2015), on different types of industries (Baucus and Near 1991; Zeidan 2013; 
Song and Han 2015) and by environmental and social violations (Karpoff, John R. Lott 
et al. 2005; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna 2010).  
However, I find only two studies that have measured the long-term impact of 
illegalities (Baucus and Near 1991; Baucus and Baucus 1997). I differ from them in 
several ways. Firstly, both studies use a sample of illegal behavior data of convicted 
firms to meet the criteria of only “clear illegal” behavior. Their violation data is based 
only on the assumption that managers knew or should have known the illegality of their 
actions. My study instead incorporates all announcements of illegality and by different 
legal stages of violations that involve monetary penalization.  Secondly, even though 
                                                 
10
 I also measure the short-term impact of illegalities on stock returns in Chapter 4 of this thesis 
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Baucus & Baucus (1997) measure the longer-term performance using accounting and 
market returns, their study is based on a rather simple analysis of covariance procedures 
whereas I intend on measuring the impacts of illegalities using a more advanced, 
Carhart model based portfolio method to measure performance. Thirdly, their data 
sample is from 1963 to 1981 and my data period is from 1994 to 2012 and thus intends 
to examine whether investors in the more recent period react to illegal behaviors of 
firms with monetary fines.  
In this chapter, I examine 5673 US based firms from 1994 to 2012 using hand-
collected data of monetary fines from SEC filings. My review of the literature shows 
that on the short-term, illegal behavior is penalized by the market. Hence my first part 
of the study is to examine whether this also holds in the long-run. Indeed, my empirical 
findings indicate that when holding firms with monetary for one year there are negative 
underperformances of between 29 and 57 basis points per month (p.m) measured as 
Carhart model alphas. These results support the overall finding that fines are also 
detrimental to stock returns in the long run. Secondly, Karpoff, Lee, & Martin (2007) 
state that in determining fines to be imposed on criminal frauds, the US Sentencing 
Commission guidelines mandate that the fines increase with the size and scope of the 
violation. Thus, I also examined whether investors look at the size of the fine in 
respective to the size of the firm. My results confirm that firms with higher fines per 
firm size (based on market capitalization) have a larger underperformance compared to 
firms with lower fines.  
Thirdly, studies such as (Karpoff and John R. Lott 1993; Karpoff, John R. Lott 
et al. 2005; Karpoff, Lee et al. 2005) have all measured the different stages of 
announcements of violations. Similarly, I also investigate the different impacts of the 
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legal stages of violations on stock returns
11
. I find that initial announcements of the 
violations have larger negative returns compared to the other stages, indicating that 
investors are much more concerned when first announcements of the fines are out. In 
this stage investors are uncertain about the possible final penalty and thus feel more 
alarmed after the initial announcement of a possible fine. Fourthly, Zeidan (2013) states 
that shareholders in different industries would react differently when faced with similar 
problems. Therefore, it is important to examine whether these results would also hold in 
the long-term on different industries. Considering that environmental issues such as the 
depletion of natural mineral resources is a concern and scandals such as BP which 
caused massive fines, I find that investors react stronger to violations in the 
manufacturing, mining and transportation and public utilities
12
 industries compared to 
other industries. Finally, I also measure the different types of violations based on 
environment, social, governance and long-term fines. Following my results, I was able 
to find that investors perceive environmental issues on all different stages of violations 
to be a cause of concern, while social, governance and surprisingly also long-term 
aspects matter somewhat less. 
This study extends the growing literature in the area of corporate illegalities. 
While there is substantial research on the impact of illegalities on short-term stock 
returns, this paper is to my knowledge the first to examine the impact of long-term 
stock returns especially on different ESG plus LT issues. The results in this paper will 
be beneficial especially to institutional holders and regulators who are interested in 
understanding the longer-term consequences of illegal behaviours. Furthermore, the 
findings that environmental issue is a key concern to investors, support the views of 
                                                 
11
 Refer to figure 2 in for the full description of the different stages of violations 
12
 Transportation and public utilities includes subcategories i.e. pipelines and electric & gas services  
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numerous institutional holders of the material risk climate change has to society and to 
the economy.
13
 Thus, policymakers should raise awareness and push forward to support 
climate change resolutions and ensure that corporations have better ethical cultures that 
would benefit shareholders in the long-run. 
The remainder of this chapter is ordered as follows. I begin with a literature 
review in section 2 on corporate legal responsibility, empirical studies that measure 
illegalities and firm value and the hypothesis development. Section 3 explains the 
method for the hand-collected data and the reasoning for the empirical methodology. 
Following that I discuss the results in section 4 and additional tests in section 5. Finally, 
I conclude with the findings from the research. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Corporate Legal Responsibility 
The definition of corporate crime can be very diverse. Becker (1968) indicates 
that the word “crime” should cover all violations, not just felonies like murder but also 
white collar crimes and punishment inflicted on offenders vary from imprisonment to 
fines. Baucus & Baucus (1997) define illegal corporate behaviour as “unlawful 
activities of members or agents of a firm, engaged in primarily for the firm's benefit 
which includes intentional and unintentional illegal acts”(p129). Song and Han (2015) 
adopted a comprehensive definition to corporate crime indicating that “corporate 
crimes are illegal activities perpetrated by both corporate executives as individuals and 
corporations as organizations. Individual crimes may include white-collar crimes (e.g., 
fraud, embezzlement) and street crimes (e.g., assault, theft), while organizational 
                                                 
13
 “CalPERS - The Importance of Corporate Engagement on Climate Change”  available at 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/corporate-engagement-climate-change.pdf (accessed 5th June 2017) 
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crimes could incorporate operational crimes (e.g., price fixing, labor law violation) and 
financial crimes (e.g., accounting fraud)” (p2). From a firm’s perspective, firm 
valuation theory explains whether investors are likely to react if a firm commits a crime 
(Wallace and Worrell 1988).  The value of a firm may increase if investors believe that 
the crime committed for example bribery may actually increase firm value (Zeume 
2014 ). Instead, the value of the firm might decrease if investors believe that the crime 
committed may be detrimental to the firm because of potential fines or penalties 
(Wallace and Worrell 1988).  
Once a crime is committed, how are firms punished for their actions? For a firm, 
a court can implement retribution via monetary penalty which Ulen (1996) argues 
should be “calculated according to the amount of harm that the fraud imposes directly 
on identifiable victims (the civil loss) and indirectly on other consumers and business 
organizations (the social loss)”. There are other theories that intend to explain the 
penalties that firms receive for their misconduct. Becker’s (1968) seminal paper 
introduced the optimal penalty theory where the penalty should equal the social harm 
divided by the probability of detention. Cohen (1996) empirically examines the extent 
to which past sentencing practice for corporations convicted of federal crimes (prior to 
adoption of the new sentencing guidelines in 1991) has been consistent with optimal 
penalty theory. “In November 1991, the U.S. Congress enacted the U.S. Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines legislation which had a dramatic impact on corporate America 
and the guidelines consisted essentially of a manual for judges to consider when 
determining the appropriate sentence for corporations convicted of a federal 
crime”pg1046 (Izraeli and Schwartz 1998). Their findings suggest that the sentencing 
practice is consistent with an optimal penalty framework. Cohen (1996) also found no 
deep pocket effects (larger firms receive larger monetary sanctions), which is in 
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contrast to Karpoff, Lee & Martin (2007) who find there are effects of deep pockets as 
their data indicated that both private and regulatory monetary penalties are related to 
defendant’s ability to pay. This shows that there is still ambiguity in the sentencing 
practices. Lott (1996) argues that criminal penalties should be limited to the rare 
situations in which there are third-party externalities. His views are opposing to Ulen 
(1996) who states that criminal penalties are required to ensure that offending firms 
internalize the losses imposed on buyers.  
I find the definition of crime is vast and the sentencing practices ambiguous. 
Nevertheless when corporate crime is committed, it has consequences on shareholders. 
Though it is the firms managers that cause the violations, shareholders are left to bear 
the full economic burden of the fines (Kennedy 1985). Zyglidopoulos (2016) states that 
second-order corruption which is the abuse of power by individuals or groups to change 
existing (or create) rules or norms so that they can benefit unfairly is more harmful in 
long run and is harder to prevent, detect and stop
14
. Thus, it is crucial that the sense of 
corporate legal responsibility is instilled in managers to ensure violations are not re-
occurring phenomena especially in the long run. The debate about corporation’s 
responsibility, especially legally, has led to various discussions on the cultural 
behaviors of the risk perceptions of firms (Tully 2005).  Corporations are taking risks 
without understanding the full extent of the consequences of their actions. Therefore, 
perhaps a stronger sense of the implications especially on the impact of performance on 
firms would deter corporations from having violations and invoking a stronger 
adherence to the law. 
                                                 
14
 The first-order corruption is the abuse of power by either individuals or groups for private gain, given a system of 
existing rules or norms. 
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2.2.2 Illegalities and Firm Value 
It is evident that shareholders bear the consequences of illegal behaviors of 
firms and many scholars assert there are significant negative impacts of these behaviors 
on shareholder returns. Various literatures have used the event study methodology to 
measure impacts of fines on stock prices. Wallace & Worrell (1988) used that method 
to measure the impacts on shareholder returns of announcements of corporate 
illegalities as proxies for social irresponsibility. They claim that this method would be 
able to determine the accurate way to measure effects on very short-terms. With a 
sample of 131 events and 96 firms, using a market model, they find that markets do 
react negatively to announcements of alleged corporate crime. Bosch & Eckard (1991) 
investigated market reactions to only US federal indictments to price fixing. They find a 
total value loss of $2.18billion in equity value for the 127 observed sample firms 
around the announcements of their indictments.  
Davidson, Worrell, & Lee (1994) extended Wallace & Worrell (1988) study by 
using a larger sample size of 535 announcements. In contrast, they find there is an 
overall insignificant market reaction to the announcements but when the samples were 
further broken down to specific crimes, they find that markets react significantly to 
bribery, tax evasion and violations of government contracts. Karpoff et al., (1999) 
investigated defense procurement fraud, indictments and suspensions and find 
significantly negative abnormal returns. Langus and Motta (2006) measured the impact 
of antitrust investigations in Europe on firms stock market value. They find that the 
European Commission’s surprise inspection of the firm’s premises has a strong and 
statistically significant effect on the firm’s share price, with its cumulative average 
abnormal return being approximately -2.2%. Arnold & Engelen (2007) measured the 
 25 
 
impact of announcements of different types of illegal corporate activities on stock 
prices of Belgian and Dutch firms. They find that there were no reactions to news 
related to corruption, and a very small reaction on day [0] and a larger, delayed reaction 
on day [+1]. Investors seem to anticipate news on accounting fraud as an abnormal 
return of -10.40% is found on day [-2]. Choi & Pritchard (2012) find that the stock 
market reacts more negatively to class actions relative to SEC investigations. Zeidan 
(2013) find that the market did not react significantly to the severity of violations. He 
argues even though his study is based only on financial institutions, the findings were 
consistent with reactions of shareholders in other industries. He also controlled for size 
as he indicates that larger firms have extensive resources that allow them to more easily 
absorb the penalties set forth. Kouwenberg and Phunnarungsi (2013) examined market 
reactions when firms with good and poor governance commit violations of the listing 
rules in Thailand. They find a strong market reaction, −8.1% on average, when firms 
with low past violations and low governance scores commit violations. Also using an 
event study methodology, Song & Han (2015) analyzed different types of corporate 
crime
15
 in Korea from 2001 to 2010 and find negative reactions to stock prices around 
the announcements of corporate crimes.  
The string of literature above confirms that investors react to violations 
negatively especially on the short-term. I find only two studies by Baucus & Near 
(1991) and Baucus and Baucus (1997)  that investigate the long-term performance 
effects of corporate illegality. Baucus & Near (1991) used an event history analysis for 
a 19 year period to measure illegal activities of firms using financial performance 
measures such as return on investment. They find that large firms are more prone to 
                                                 
15
 The crimes that they measure are; crime type (white-collar vs. street crime, operational vs. financial), 
industry type (financial vs. industrial), business group affiliation (chaebol-affiliated vs. non-chaebol-
affiliated), and corporate governance (strong vs. weak board structure index) 
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behave illegally and firms with poor performance were not prone to commit 
wrongdoing. Baucus and Baucus (1997) investigated the long-term performance effects 
of corporate illegality over the period of one through five years after a conviction. Their 
results indicate that firms’ experience lower accounting returns over five years and 
slower sales growth in the third through fifth year after a conviction.   
There are also various literatures that have looked into measuring different types 
of specific environmental and social issues on performances of firms. On environmental 
issues, Konar and Cohen (2001) find that legally emitted toxic chemicals have a 
significant effect on the intangible asset value of publicly traded firms. Thomas (2001) 
examined the correlation between the excess stock market returns and the adoption of 
an environmental protocol by firms. His results indicate that both the adoption of an 
environmental policy and prosecution for breach of environment standards have 
significant explanatory power in an analysis of excess returns. Jacobs et al., (2010) 
analyzed the shareholder value effects of environmental performance by measuring the 
stock market reaction associated with announcements of environmental performance. 
They find overall, that the market is selective in reacting to announcements of 
environmental performance with certain types of announcements even valued 
negatively.  Karpoff, John R. Lott, et al., (2005) find firms that violate environmental 
laws suffer statistically significant losses in the market value of firm equity. Capelle-
Blancard and Laguna (2010) examined stock market reactions to industrial disasters 
which caused toxic release and death or serious injuries. They find petrochemical firms 
drop on average 1.3% in their market value over the two days immediately following 
the disaster. On environmental and social issues, Ziegler, Schröder, & Rennings (2007) 
examined the effect of sustainability performance of European corporations on their 
stock performance. The main result is that the average environmental performance of 
 27 
 
the industry has a significantly positive influence on the stock performance. In contrast, 
the average social performance of the industry has a significantly negative influence. I 
proceed in the next section with the explanation of my hypotheses. 
2.2.3 Hypotheses Development 
This chapter makes several contributions to literature. Firstly, most of the 
reviewed studies have focused on event methodologies and measuring short-term 
effects (Wallace and Worrell 1988; Bosch and Eckard 1991; Davidson, Worrell et al. 
1994; Karpoff, D. Scott Lee et al. 1999; Arnold and Engelen 2007; Song and Han 
2015). What about longer term impacts of violations on the performances of stock 
returns? There is very little evidence empirically measuring long-term impacts other 
than Baucus & Near (1991) and Baucus and Baucus (1997). Stock prices are a good 
indicator and appropriate measure compared to accounting measures as there is an 
immediate market reaction to events such as illegalities. Accounting based returns 
would only show a reaction until the next accounting period when the report is 
prepared. Short-term consequences of corporate illegal activity has already been 
researched by academics and the results indicate following efficient market hypothesis 
that the new information of the illegality induces the stock prices to decline 
immediately (Arnold and Engelen 2007). Thus, I intend to investigate whether investors 
penalize firms also in the long run. The question then is why is there a long-term effect 
of illegality on stock returns? Baucus and Baucus (1997) state that longer-term 
performance measures better capture conviction performance relationships since firms 
suffer prolonged damage from illegality. Furthermore, illegality would indirectly hurt a 
firm’s image and brand with its stakeholders. Institutional investors are usually very 
active owners and engage with firms proactively (Gillan and Starks 2000), thus illegal 
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activities might even cost the firm prolonged damage due to the long-term investment 
horizons of these investors. (Marcus and Goodman 1991)  examined market reactions to 
signals such as accidents, scandals and product safety incidents and find that there 
might be reputational damages from these incidents which it might take many years 
before the true impact of managerial actions can be recognized. Though most of the 
short-term studies indicate immediate underperformances, the stock price of a firm 
might actually increase in the short-term after a fine.  For example, JP Morgan’s share 
price increased after a settlement announcement as investors were relieved of the legal 
woes
16
. Thus, this further affirms the need to examine longer-term impacts of corporate 
illegal activities.  
  
Ziegler et al., (2007) also used a longer observation period in their econometric 
analysis as they indicate that the short-term over-reactions of stock markets can become 
weaker or even disappear over time. In addition,. Similar to most of the reviewed 
literature that find short-term negative impacts on stock returns, I expect similar results 
in the long-term. (Gibson  and Krueger 2017) provide evidence that longer term 
oriented institutional investors have a higher sustainability footprint in particulate those 
with longer-term horizons e.g. one year. Thus, following their reasoning that it is 
longer-term investors with one year investment horizons that provide a significant 
difference, I examine long-term consequences of the illegal behaviors of firms after 
violations over the period of one year instead of two or three or any other years. Hence, 
the first hypothesis is   defined as the following:   
                                                 
16
 “JPMorgan’s Soaring Stock Price To Completely Erase $13 billion Fine” available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/jpmorgan-stock-fine_n_4343987.html (accessed at 10 June 
2014)  
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Hypothesis 1:  Stocks of firms that are being held for one year upon announcement of 
violations have negative stock returns  
The second contribution this chapter makes is measuring whether the magnitude 
of fines in the firm has an impact on stock returns. Karpoff, John R. Lott, et al.,(2005) 
were one of the earlier authors to measure the size of the legal penalties imposed on 
environmental violations and find that firms’ losses in share values are related to the 
size of the fine or damage award eventually imposed by regulators or the courts. As part 
of their independent variable, they use the dollar amount of the fine divided by the 
market value of the firm equity to examine the cross-sectional relations between share 
value losses and legal penalties. On the other hand, Karpoff, Lee, & Martin (2005) 
examined the legal penalties due to financial misrepresentation and find that large legal 
penalties can be substantial but market penalties are even larger.  Both studies examine 
the size of the fines and its impact on returns, hence here I intend on measuring whether 
investors also look at the size of the fine in respective to the size of the firm. Using a 
rational expectations assumption, I expect that fines that are high per market size have 
larger underperformances. Hence, the second hypothesis is defined as following:  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with higher fines per market size have a larger negative stock 
return in the long-term compared to firms with lower fines per market size 
The third contribution of this chapter is to understand which legal stage of the 
process would bring a stronger reaction from investors. Though fines are detrimental to 
stock returns, at times the confirmation of fines maybe viewed positively, if the market 
expected worse and/or the market is relieved to have simply been removed from the 
uncertainty. For example, after the settlement was announced for JP Morgan’s $13 
billion fine of selling bad mortgage bonds ahead of the financial crisis, JP Morgan’s 
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share price jumped more than 3 percent as investors were relieved to put the legal woes 
to end
17
. I deduce that the initial stage of violation or announcement would be more of a 
concern (if there were no prior announcements or rumours) compared to the other legal 
stages. This similar is to Karpoff, John R. Lott, et al., (2005) who find that the stock 
price reactions to initial announcements on environmental fines captures most of the 
firm’s total loss in market value. Karpoff & John R. Lott (1993) examined different 
types of press dates (i.e. allegation date, charges filed date and settlement date) 
surrounding corporate fraud and Karpoff, Lee, et al., (2005) also examined various 
stages of the enforcement process surrounding federal securities investigation. Here, I 
examine the impact on different level of the fines per market size and I hypothesize that 
the initial allegation stage would have larger negative returns compared to the other 
legal stages. Thus my third hypothesis is defined as the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Violations at the initial allegation legal stage have larger negative stock 
returns compared to other legal stages  
The fourth contribution this chapter makes is to examine the long-term impacts 
of returns within individual industries. Every industry is unique with its own 
characteristics. Even shareholder perception for each individual industry would differ. 
Zeidan (2013) specifically measured public traded banks using a short-term study 
methodology, noticed that there is a significant negative market reaction on violations 
by banks which were subject to enforcement actions by US regulators. Song and Han  
(2015) find that corporate crime by a financial firm has a stronger negative impact on 
stock market valuation than by an industrial firm in South Korea using a short-term 
                                                 
17
“JPMorgan’s Soaring Stock Price To Completely Erase $13 Billion Fine” available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/jpmorgan-stock-fine_n_4343987.html accessed 8th May 
2017 
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study. Taking into account that both those studies are based only on short-term effects, I 
expect investors to react more on the long-term to industries that have a more profound 
long-term impact to the environment. The reasoning  behind is based on Karpoff and 
John R. Lott (1993) who state that “the firm’s customers, employees, and suppliers can 
be motivated by environmental concern to change their reservation prices in doing 
business with the firm. Environmentally costly activities that attract unfavourable 
attention could then lower demand for the firm’s products or increase the firm’s costs”. 
In addition, considering that the depletion of natural mineral resources is a constant 
debate and concern (Jenkins and Yakovleva 2006), plus environmental massive 
disasters and scandals such as BP and Volkswagen, I expect industries that are related 
to extractions and usage of valuable minerals and natural resources (i.e. mining, 
manufacturing) would have more investor reactions in each stage of the legal process. 
The fourth hypothesis is therefore defined as the following: 
Hypothesis 4: Investors react more to violations in the extractions and usage of 
valuable minerals and natural resources industries compared to other industries based 
on each stage of the legal process 
The fifth contribution of this study is to understand which individual ESG plus 
LT factor is more of a concern to investors. There are various other studies that measure 
individual criteria’s such as environmental and social (Ziegler, Schröder et al. 2007), 
environmental (Konar and Cohen 2001; Thomas 2001; Patten 2002; Karpoff, 
John R. Lott et al. 2005; Shimshack and Ward 2005; Jacobs, Singhal et al. 2010; Leon, 
Devereux et al. 2010) and governance (Baucus and Baucus 1997; Schnatterly 2003; 
Karpoff, Lee et al. 2007; Kouwenberg and Phunnarungsi 2013).Coleman (2011) used 
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proxies
18
 as signals of ESG, however none to my knowledge have used the European 
Federation of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS) standards on all four ESG plus LT 
criteria’s to measure violations. I consider the LT issues key to be added to ESG 
because companies usually pursue corporate sustainability with both an agenda to 
reduce ESG risk but also to increase their long-term viability i.e. increase their profits. 
Hence, examining the LT separately from ESG issues would be crucial in 
understanding whether investors consider LT issues that affect companies as a concern. 
For example, the LT could relate to innovation (i.e. patents) that would affect the long-
term revenue generation of the company. However, bearing in mind that in my previous 
hypothesis, I would perceive violations in the extractions and usage of valuable 
minerals and natural resources industries (i.e. environmental related) to be more of a 
concern compared to other industries, my fifth hypotheses are defined as the following: 
Hypothesis 5a: Investors perceive environmental violations at every stage of the legal 
process to be more of a concern 
Hypothesis 5b: Investors in each industry react only to certain individual E, S, G and 
LT violations 
In order to measure whether my hypotheses above are valid, I examine the 
impacts of these violations using empirical data in the following sections.  
                                                 
18
 This study used fines of environmental breaches, unsafe workplaces, fraudulent accounting standards, 
and product recalls. Those measures are assumed to proxy for signals to stakeholders of ESG risks. 
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2.3 Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Data Sample  
This study consists of a sample of publicly traded US firms that have violated 
regulations that involve only monetary penalization. The lists of US firms were taken 
from the MSCI World Large Cap Constituents over a 19-year period from 1994 to 
2012. Baucus and Near (1991) find that large firms that operate in dynamic, munificent 
environments were the most likely firms to behave illegally. The overall sample 
consists of 597 unique firms with 2370  number of violations throughout the 19 years
19
. 
Most of the reviewed literature use media sources for the date of events such as 
Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones news retrieval service and other news databases such as 
Lexis/Nexis and Factiva. However, using such databases can create several problems. 
Firstly, they may not capture all the relevant or large events. Secondly, different 
databases might provide different event dates and finally  they might only collect 
certain types of announcements that might skew the actual research question (Karpoff, 
Koester et al. 2014). Coleman (2011) had used various governmental databases but also 
indicate that there is no certainty of comprehensive data. 
Hence, the source of information for the violations was identified and hand-
collected via filings of 10-K reports in the SEC database. It is mandatory that all public 
firms publish this which are available at the SEC. Schnatterly (2003) indicates that there 
is a significant amount of repetition between annual reports and 10Ks and further states 
that the 10Ks are usually viewed by regulators and analysts. Hence, this legitimizes my 
purpose using the 10Ks as my source of data. From the 10Ks, I am able to retrieve the 
                                                 
19
 Table 8.2 and 8.4 in the appendix reports the distribution of sample size and the number of violations 
over the years respectively 
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reported date of the announcements of the fines of the firms. The violations were noted 
under Item 103 of legal proceedings or unless directed under commitment and 
contingencies in the fillings.  In order to create the database, only firms that had any 
announcements of corporate violations or violations (i.e. bribery, breach of fiduciary 
duties, anti-trust, tax evasions, fraud, labour issues) with monetary penalties were used.  
However, Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of administrative or judicial 
proceedings arising under any federal, state or local provisions dealing with protection 
of the environment, if the monetary sanctions might exceed $100,000.  
2.3.2 EFFAS’ Criteria 
I used in this study the European Federation of Financial Analysts 
Societies (EFFAS) Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 3.0 as they are the only 
classification that includes long-term as well. These KPIs were created as a guideline 
for the integration of ESG into financial analysis and corporate valuation and was 
specifically designed for stock listed firms.. However, in addition to ESG, these KPIs 
have an additional factor “Long-Term Viability” or “Viability”, herein “Long-Term” 
which are described in section 1.3 “Purpose of the ESG Reports” (p7). It specifically 
states that “corporate sustainability focuses on both minimising risks arising from 
environmental, social and corporate governance aspects and proactively seeking to 
gain advantages from “translating” ESG issues into a company’s product and service 
portfolio. As such, companies pursuing corporate sustainability reconcile long-term 
viability with management of ESG issues”. Thus it is this additional long-term viability 
(V) factor which is provided in each individual KPI section. As discussed in the 
hypotheses section, this could relate to innovation (i.e. patents) or even to anti-
competitive behavior, anti-trust and monopoly practices. These KPIs are defined by 114 
 35 
 
subsectors following the Dow Jones Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). In this 
study I matched my list of firms to the ICB codes and then for each individual violation, 
matched it to the KPIs
20
.  
2.3.3 Data Preparation 
The returns were taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream (Datastream) under 
the Return Index (RI) category where it is assumed that dividends are reinvested
21.
 The 
index is under the local currency of USD. Firstly, ISIN’s for the firms were searched in 
Datastream. The final sample consisted of 597 unique firms. Secondly, all firms were 
checked if either it was delisted or merged. To ensure there were no attrition biases, the 
returns were used until the point of time before the firms were to turn ‘dead’.  Finally, 
the returns were then converted into continuously compounded returns using the 
following: 
        
     
      
             (2.1) 
The above indicates that the natural logarithm (ln) is taken by dividing the 
firms’ price in that period by the price of the previous period.  In order to calculate the 
excess returns, I calculated the risk free rate (    using the three months US Treasury 
bill rate was retrieved from Datastream. It was then converted into monthly data using 
the following:  
                       
  
      
 
       
  
                                          (2.2) 
                                                 
20
 Refer to figure 6 in the appendix for a detailed explanation on the KPIs. 
21
 A return index (RI) is available for individual equities and unit trusts. This shows a theoretical growth 
in value of a share holding over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase 
additional units of an equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date.  
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2.3.4 Portfolio Creation 
Considering that this paper intends on examining the long-term impact of fines, 
a portfolio method is used in this paper. Firstly, Baucus & Baucus (1997) measure the 
longer-term performance using accounting and market returns, their study is based on a 
rather simple analysis of covariance procedures whereas I intend on measuring the 
impacts of illegalities using a more advanced, Carhart model based portfolio method to 
measure performance. Secondly, by using a portfolio method, this would help to 
evaluate the risk-adjusted performance of companies that have illegal corporate 
behavior. Thirdly, creating portfolios would be able to shed light on whether having 
companies with illegal behavior in investor’s portfolios in the long-term is indeed 
detrimental. This is consistent with this papers intent on advocating good corporate 
legal responsibility.  From the database, four different portfolios were created. These 
were depending on the stage of violation of each firm; i) initial allegation ii) confirmed 
violation but pending various other matters iii) confirmed violation and iv) includes an 
overall portfolio consisting of the three different stages. Figure 2 depicts different legal 
stages of a violation. The categorization of the fines according to the different stages of 
violations is objective and is retrieved from the 10K fillings. Furthermore, as I examine 
the different legal stages separately, when a violation is moved from one stage to 
another (i.e. from the initial allegations to the confirmed but pending other matters) it 
still remains in the portfolio. This is to ensure that I am able to examine the different 
reactions to the various legal stages after a fine. The numbers of firms in each portfolio 
also changes every month according to the number of fines that have been awarded to 
the firm. The portfolios (p) were then equally weighted using the following formula: 
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where      is the equally weighted portfolio,     is the stock price of the company 
at the end of month t and        is the company stock price for the month prior and N is 
the total number of companies in the portfolio.  The equal weighted (EW) portfolios 
were also created using two different ways. The first method is EW fine level, where all 
violations events or all fines are equally weighted. For example, if in the portfolio one 
company has five fines in a specific period of time, I would sum up all the returns and 
divide by the number of events/fines in that time period. The second method EW 
company level, I equal weighted the portfolios by individual company. For example, if 
in the portfolio one company has five fines in a specific period of time, I would only 
use the one return data in that specific period of time to ensure that there are no 
overlaps in returns.   
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Figure 2 Different Legal Stages of Violations 
The figure below depicts the process of violation in this study from the first stage of the initial date of 
allegation. The second stage involves firms which are confirmed to have violations or violations but are 
pending numerous actions such as settlement, appeal, re-trial, court approval, fairness hearing or contest. 
The final stage is the actual confirmed violation without any further actions. 
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For the separation by fines per market size, yearly Market Capitalization (MC) 
data were retrieved from Datastream.  For the MC portfolios, I used the end of year MC 
data. The amount of fines in dollar value was all summed up per year for accuracy and 
cohesiveness to the end of year MC figures. The next step was then to rank the fines 
according to percentile ranges. From the percentile ranges, I created two different 
portfolios which consisted of only fines between 0 to 20
th
 percentile and 80
th
 to 100
th
 
percentile. The low (high) percentile portfolio included all fines per market size below 
the 20
th
 (above the 80
th
) percentile in that respective year. This portfolio is made up of 
all the firms from 1994 to 2012 which fell below the 20th percentile (above the 80
th
 
percentile).  
2.3.5 Empirical Model and Benchmark Creation 
For measuring the long-term impact, holding periods of twelve month portfolios 
were created. Time- series regressions were run using the single and multifactor models 
following the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the three factor Fama-French 
model and the four factor Carhart model. 
The CAPM is a widely used and known model that was developed by William 
Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965). The intuition of this model is that the excess 
return can be explained by the expected risk premium, which is the beta multiplied by 
the market return minus risk free rate. Hence, the Jensen (1968) alpha or intercept 
would be zero. Any outperformance of the portfolio will be shown with a positive alpha 
and subsequently underperformance with a negative alpha. 
The CAPM model is said to be flawed as it does not take into account other risk 
factors. Hence, the three factor model was proposed by Fama and French (1993) and 
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Fama and French (1996), where small minus big (SMB) is the difference between the 
returns on diversified portfolios of small and big stocks and  high minus low (HML) is 
the difference between the returns of high and low stocks. Fama & French (2004) states 
that the three factor model “captures much of the variation in average return for 
portfolios formed on size, book-to-market equity and other price ratios that cause 
problems for the CAPM”. 
However, there are stocks that tend to outperform the market on a continuous 
basis for some point and others that tend to do poorly continuously as well. Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) find this as a momentum effect that lasts between three to twelve 
months. Carhart (1997) suggested to extend the three factor model with momentum 
(MOM) as a fourth factor. This factor is the difference between the returns of 
diversified portfolios of short-term winners and losers. Carhart (1997) did indicate that 
momentum is a very important factor that can explain stock returns. He argues that the 
reason momentum strategy works is not because that there is a conscious decision to 
hold these kind of stocks (winners) but rather by chance (Sapp and Tiwari 2004). 
In this analysis, instead of using traditional market benchmarks, I constructed a 
specific market benchmark to match the set of firms in the created portfolios. This set of 
benchmark consists of all the US firms in my entire initial sample from 1994 to 2012. 
The MSCI USA  Large Cap Index was not used as benchmark as this index was only 
launched in June 2007 and data prior to the launch date is only based on back-tested 
data (i.e. e. calculations of how the index might have performed over that time period 
had the index existed
22
). Tailored benchmarks are a very common practice used in 
studies, for example data from Style Research is used to create specific, size, value and 
                                                 
22
 MSCI USA Large Cap Index available at https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/40770696-16c0-
4b70-89f6-9a8496722fa7 (accessed at 1 August 2017) 
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momentum factors for different regions (Renneboog, Ter Horst et al. 2008; Hoepner, 
Rammal et al. 2011). As the data sample in this study is only based on one specific 
country, US, the size, value and momentum factors were retrieved from the Kenneth-
French data library.  
Considering that the sample of US firms in the portfolios consists of only large 
market cap firms, using a conventional benchmark might differ as the asset sizes might 
vary. Hence, the market benchmark was equally weighted using only all unique firms 
from 1994 to 2012 which were in the sample. I start my empirical analysis using the 
simple CAPM as per in formula (2.4): 
     =                     ,                                                                                      (2.4) 
Where      and      represent the excess return of the portfolio (p) and the 
created equity market benchmark minus the risk free rate    , respectively.      is the 
portfolio’s systematic exposure to the created equity market benchmark. The Jensen 
alpha is represented by    and      is the error term which captures the random 
components of a portfolio’s excess return for each observation(t) (Sharpe 1964; Lintner 
1965). I also run my analysis using Fama-French in formula (2.5) and Carhart in 
formula (2.6) models, where the SMB, HML and MOM have been described 
previously: 
      =                                   ,                         (2.5) 
                                               ,                            (2.6) 
 
I also created a second type of market benchmark with the similar methodology 
but for each of the seven individual industries. In order to do so, instead of using all 
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firms, only firms within those industries are used to create the specific industry 
benchmark following the SIC codes as per in table 8..3 in the appendix:  
This specific industry equity benchmark (ind) was used for the regressions of 
the industry separation portfolio:  
      =                         ,                                                              (2.7) 
     =                                       ,                             (2.8) 
                                                                           (2.9) 
2.4 Empirical Results and Analysis  
The following section is to discuss the results from the i) overall (all industries) 
portfolio, ii) portfolios separated by the seven industries, as per the two digit SIC code, 
iii) the results of the portfolios for fines per market size and vi) the results from each 
ESGV portfolio and per industry. Each portfolio has four different subset of portfolios; 
i) Initial Allegations (IA) ii) Confirmed Violations but Pending other Matters (CVPM), 
iii) Confirmed Violations (CV) and iv) Overall including all three stages of violations 
(Overall). Figure 2 previously provides a descriptive view of the different stages.  In 
order to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the Newey and West (1986) 
estimations have been used. Following the empirical model, the alphas are obtained 
using the CAPM, and Fama-French and Carhart models. 
2.4.1 Impact of Overall (All industries) Results 
The results of the alphas in Table 2.1 indicate that three out of the four 
portfolios (IA, CV and Overall) underperform. Examining the initial allegations 
portfolios, I find underperformances of 55 and 57 basis points p.m respectively for the 
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EW per fine and company level with a statistical significance level of 1% at the Carhart 
level. The confirmed violations portfolio also exhibits underperformance of 38 and 41 
basis points p.m respectively for the EW per fine and company level with a stastical 
significance level of 1% at the Carhart levels.  For the overall portfolios, I find also 
underperformances of 29 and 34 basis points p.m with a 5% statistical significance level 
at the Carhart level. Though this overall portfolio has a lower level of undeperformance 
compared to the IA and CV portfolio, this still indicates that investors are concerned 
about violations even on an overall basis. All three portfolios also indicate results that 
are relatively similar for even the CAPM and Fama-French models. i. The adjusted r-
squared values increase for all results and are rather high between 0.73 and 0.90 
indicating a good fit of the model. The results confirm my hypothesis that on an overall 
basis, investors are concerned in the long run and do react negatively to violations and 
specifically monetary fines.  
2.4.2 Impact of Fines per Firm Size Results  
In this section, I compare the results between the lowest portfolio, 20
th
 
percentile and lower (table 2.2) and the highest portfolio, 80
th 
percentile and higher 
(table 2.3) for the fines per firm size. I find that in fact firms with higher fines per firm 
size do have larger underperformances compared to firms with lower fines per firm 
size. This is evident in the example of the IA portfolio, whereby the underperformance 
for the lower and highest percentile in the EW fine level is 51 and 84 basis points p.m 
respectively. Even comparing the overall portfolios, the underperformance for the lower 
and highest percentile in the EW fine level is 40 and 51 basis points p.m respectively. 
This confirms my second hypothesis that firms with higher fines per firm size would 
have a larger negative stock returns in the long-term. 
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2.4.3 Impact of Individual Legal Stages 
As observed in table 2.1 in the Carhart model, IA underperforms in both EW 
fine and company level at 55 and 57 basis points per month respectively, the confirmed 
stage underperforms at only 38 and basis points per month respectively 41 and overall 
underperforms at 29 and 34 basis points per month. These results are similar to the fines 
per firm size results in table 2.2 and 2.3, where IA has a larger underperformance 
compared to other legal stages.  This shows that investors react more negatively to fines 
that are large at the IA stage. This result supports my hypothesis that the initial 
announcement of the violations has a larger negative impact on returns compared to 
other legal stages indicating that investors react more to the first announcements of the 
fines. These results are also comparable to Karpoff and John R. Lott (1993) as  it 
confirms the  notion that the first announcements of the fines have a larger “shock” 
impact compared to settlement announcements even on an all industry level and based 
on the size of the fines per market size. 
 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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Table 2.1 Overall portfolio (All Industries) results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart  
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-
weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) 
corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. N represents the number of observations in each 
panel A and B. 
  All Industries                       
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)   Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)   
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N  Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N  
Initial allegations -0.0043 ** (-2.4766) 0.7534 0.7524  241 -0.0052 *** (-3.4402) 0.7981 0.7972  241 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0016   (-0.9894) 0.7335 0.7324  240 -0.0023   (-1.4945) 0.7804 0.7795  240 
Confirmed violations -0.0034 *** (-2.6362) 0.8454 0.8448  245 -0.0036 *** (-2.8616) 0.8485 0.8478  245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0024 ** (-1.9929) 0.8609 0.8604  246 -0.0031 *** (-2.7239) 0.8773 0.8768  246 
Fama-French Results                         
Initial allegations -0.0041 ** (-2.4433) 0.7838 0.7811  241 -0.0050 *** (-3.5707) 0.8328 0.8307  241 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0015   (-0.9282) 0.7459 0.7427  240 -0.0022   (-1.4605) 0.7928 0.7902  240 
Confirmed violations -0.0032 ** (-2.5802) 0.8568 0.8550  245 -0.0035 *** (-2.8353) 0.8633 0.8616  245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0022 ** (-1.9474) 0.8815 0.8800  246 -0.0029 *** (-2.7712) 0.8991 0.8979  246 
Carhart Results                         
Initial allegations -0.0055 *** (-3.4697) 0.7956 0.7922  241 -0.0057 *** (-4.0484) 0.8359 0.8331  241 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0012   (-0.6353) 0.7465 0.7422  240 -0.0020   (-1.1448) 0.7931 0.7895  240 
Confirmed violations -0.0038 *** (-2.7671) 0.8588 0.8564  245 -0.0041 *** (-3.0838) 0.8658 0.8635  245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0029 ** (-2.4585) 0.8848 0.8829  246 -0.0034 *** (-3.0468) 0.9008 0.8991  256 
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Table 2.2 Portfolio results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks for the fines per market cap (0  to 20th  percentile) 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one indicates the four 
different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-weighted at company level (Panel B). 
Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical 
significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in each panel A and 
B. 
  0 to 20th Percentile Level                  
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)   Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level) 
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N  Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0045 * (-1.7087) 0.5427 0.5408  234 -0.0047 * (-1.9059) 0.5355 0.5335 234 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0016   (-0.5561) 0.4265 0.4241  240 -0.0026   (-1.0161) 0.5506 0.5487 240 
Confirmed violations -0.0011   (-0.4036) 0.5727 0.5709  238 -0.0010   (-0.3532) 0.5908 0.5891 238 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0028   (-1.3275) 0.6261 0.6246  240 -0.0029   (-1.5064) 0.6720 0.6707 240 
Fama-French Results        
Initial allegations -0.0042 * (-1.6714) 0.5783 0.5729  234 -0.0044 * (-1.8754) 0.5712 0.5658 234 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0016   (-0.5495) 0.4321 0.4249  240 -0.0027   (-1.0305) 0.5554 0.5497 240 
Confirmed violations -0.0011   (-0.4100) 0.5845 0.5791  238 -0.0010   (-0.3595) 0.5992 0.5940 238 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0027   (-1.2891) 0.6314 0.6267  240 -0.0028   (-1.4574) 0.6773 0.6732 240 
Carhart Results        
Initial allegations -0.0051 ** (-2.0074) 0.5825 0.5754  234 -0.0052 ** (-2.1784) 0.5745 0.5672 234 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0019   (-0.6532) 0.4324 0.4228  240 -0.0027   (-1.0258) 0.5554 0.5478 240 
Confirmed violations -0.0031   (-1.1157) 0.6017 0.5948  238 -0.0026   (-0.9337) 0.6110 0.6043 238 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0040 * (-1.8152) 0.6424 0.6363  240 -0.0036 * (-1.7984) 0.6817 0.6763 240 
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Table 2.3 Portfolio results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks for the fines per market cap (80th to 100th  
percentile) 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-
weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for 
serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N 
represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
  80th to 100th Percentile Level                   
   Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)    Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level) 
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
  N     Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0074 ** (-2.2470) 0.4979 0.4958  239 -0.0092 *** (-3.2961) 0.5568 0.5549 239 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0047   (-0.9384) 0.5137 0.5116  233 -0.0049   (-1.001) 0.5241 0.5220 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0062 ** (-2.4686) 0.5412 0.5393  240 -0.0065 ** (-2.462) 0.5443 0.5424 240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0051 ** (-2.3893) 0.7116 0.7104  240 -0.0066 *** (-3.443) 0.7339 0.7327 240 
Fama-French Results            
 
           
Initial allegations -0.0071 ** (-2.2145) 0.5425 0.5366  239 -0.0089 *** (-3.2423) 0.6003 0.5952 239 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0042   (-0.8842) 0.5588 0.5530  233 -0.0045   (-0.9454) 0.5714 0.5658 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0060 ** (-2.4462) 0.5468 0.5410  240 -0.0063 ** (-2.4691) 0.5523 0.5467 240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0049 ** (-2.4184) 0.7371 0.7337  240 -0.0063 *** (-3.5431) 0.7695 0.7666 240 
Carhart Results            
 
           
Initial allegations -0.0084 *** (-2.7015) 0.5474 0.5396  239 -0.0090 *** (-3.3377) 0.6004 0.5936 239 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0047   (-0.8859) 0.5592 0.5515  233 -0.0048   (-0.909) 0.5717 0.5642 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0059 ** (-2.0008) 0.5469 0.5391  240 -0.0066 ** (-2.1552) 0.5527 0.5451 240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0051 ** (-2.5617) 0.7374 0.7329  240 -0.0061 *** (-2.9563) 0.7696 0.7657 240 
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2.4.4 Impact of Individual Industry Results  
The results of the individual industry portfolios (tables 2.4 to 2.8) are very 
interesting. I find that not all the portfolios display risk-adjusted returns that are 
statistically significant. This is evident for the Retail Trade and Wholesale Trade 
industries which I find statistically no significant results
23
. I constructed unique industry 
market benchmarks in these portfolios to ensure that appropriate industry level 
benchmarks are regressed. Comparing the remaining five industries, I find for the IA 
portfolios the Manufacturing industry underperforms in both EW fine and company 
level (Carhart model) at 41 and 38 basis points per month respectively.  
For the CVPM portfolio only two industries, namely transportation and public 
utilities and the Services underperform. In both EW fine and company level, the 
Transportation industry indicates underperformances of 73 and 72 basis points p.m 
respectively in the Carhart model. In contrary, the services industry underperforms by 
120 and 131 basis points p.m for the EW fine and company level portfolios respectively 
in the Fama-French models. I find that the significances disappear in the Carhart model.  
For the CV portfolios, only two industries underperform which are 
Transportation and Public Utilities and Mining. At the EW fine and company level, the 
transportation industry underperformed by 73 and 72 basis points p.m respectively and 
mining industry underperformed by 63 basis points p.m only at the EW fine level in the 
Carhart models. 
In the overall portfolios I find four industries underperform. The finance, 
insurance & real estate industry herein Finance, has underperformances of 48 and 52 
                                                 
23
 Results for the Retail and Whole Trade portfolios are available upon request  
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basis points p.m at the EW fine and company level respectively but only in the Fama-
French model. The transportation and public utilities industry underperforms by 36 
basis points p.m at the EW company level in the Carhart model. The Services industry 
underperforms by 63 and 70 basis points p.m at the EW fine and company level 
respectively also only in the Fama-French model. The mining industry underperforms 
in the Carhart model by 42 and 41 basis points in the EW fine and company level 
respectively.   
My initial hypothesis is that investors would react more to violations in the 
extractions and usage of valuable minerals and natural resources industries compared to 
other industries. In examining only the Carhart results, I find that manufacturing, 
mining, transportation and public utilities have at least two stages of the legal process 
with statistical significance compared to the other industries, thus supporting my 
hypothesis
24
. Though I find that the majority of the portfolios underperform, the 
manufacturing industry for CVPM portfolio outperforms with 39 basis points p.m at the 
EW fine level in Carhart model. One explanation could be that investors in 
manufacturing industries perceive the violation at the IA to be of more of a concern, 
hence the negative return. However, once the violation is subject to legal procedures, 
investors are much more confident of a better outcome of the fine.  
 
 
                                                 
24
  Transportation and public utilities includes subcategories i.e. pipelines and electric and gas services 
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Table 2.4 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate portfolio results of CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one indicates the four different 
portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio 
reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% 
and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistic. N represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
 
   Finance, Insurance and Real Estate  
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)    Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N   Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0058   (-1.3868) 0.4182 0.4157 238   -0.0069   (-1.4445) 0.4058 0.4033 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0039   (-1.0181) 0.5028 0.5006 233   -0.0038   (-0.9935) 0.5021 0.4999 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0054   (-1.4569) 0.4712 0.4690 241   -0.0047   (-1.5278) 0.4854 0.4832 241 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0043   (-1.6131) 0.5954 0.5937 241   -0.0047   (-1.7888) 0.6015 0.5998 241 
Fama-French Results                         
Initial allegations -0.0064   (-1.545) 0.4260 0.4186 238   -0.0075   (-1.5498) 0.4121 0.4045 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0043   (-1.1471) 0.5117 0.5053 233   -0.0043   (-1.1288) 0.5118 0.5054 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0058   (-1.5785) 0.4878 0.4813 241   -0.0062   (-1.6451) 0.5041 0.4979 241 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0048 * (-1.8851) 0.6118 0.6069 241 
 
-0.0052 ** (-2.0265) 0.6197 0.6149 241 
Carhart Results                        
Initial allegations -0.0045   (-1.1485) 0.4345 0.4248 238   -0.0057   (-1.239) 0.4202 0.4102 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0036   (-0.9027) 0.5139 0.5054 233   -0.0035   (-0.8857) 0.5140 0.5055 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0054   (-1.2991) 0.4883 0.4796 241   -0.0060   (-1.4124) 0.5042 0.4958 241 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0038   (-1.4573) 0.6159 0.6094 241   -0.0043   (-1.647) 0.6229 0.6165 241 
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Table 2.5 Manufacturing portfolio results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-
weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for 
serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N 
represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
   Manufacturing  
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)    Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
One Year Holding Period - CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N   Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0037 ** (-2.0362) 0.7312 0.7301 240   -0.0039 ** (-2.3644) 0.7574 0.7564 240 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0045 ** (2.2349) 0.5126 0.5105 237   0.0031 * (1.7417) 0.5907 0.5890 237 
Confirmed violations -0.0003   (-0.2411) 0.7113 0.7102 245   -0.0002   (-0.1672) 0.7371 0.7360 245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0002   (-0.2123) 0.7795 0.7786 245   -0.0007   (-0.6679) 0.8128 0.8120 245 
One Year Holding Period - Fama-French Results                         
Initial allegations -0.0034 ** (-2.2325) 0.7964 0.7938 240   -0.0037 *** (-2.6549) 0.8283 0.8262 240 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0045 ** (2.2955) 0.5191 0.5129 237   0.0031 * (1.7992) 0.5989 0.5937 237 
Confirmed violations -0.0002   (-0.1115) 0.7383 0.7351 245   -0.0001   (-0.042) 0.7633 0.7603 245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations 0.0000   (-0.0399) 0.8242 0.8220 245   -0.0005   (-0.5404) 0.8569 0.8551 245 
One Year Holding Period - Carhart Results                         
Initial allegations -0.0041 *** (-2.6595) 0.7984 0.7949 240   -0.0038 *** (-2.6968) 0.8284 0.8254 240 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0039 ** (1.9885) 0.5214 0.5132 237   0.0022   (1.2959) 0.6031 0.5962 237 
Confirmed violations -0.0006   (-0.3727) 0.7394 0.7351 245   -0.0002   (-0.168) 0.7635 0.7596 245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0005   (-0.446) 0.8255 0.8226 245   -0.0008   (-0.7779) 0.8573 0.8550 245 
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Table 2.6 Transportation and Public Utilities portfolio results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-
weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for 
serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N 
represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
   Transportation and Public Utilities  
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)    Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N   Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations 0.0004   (0.1163) 0.4229 0.4204 238   -0.0006   (-0.2268) 0.4886 0.4864 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0074 ** (-2.1382) 0.5365 0.5345 233   -0.0074 ** (-2.1366) 0.5358 0.5338 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0028   (-1.1863) 0.4679 0.4657 243   -0.0031   (-1.3054) 0.5066 0.5046 243 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0007   (-0.3092) 0.6087 0.6071 243   -0.0021   (-1.1935) 0.6785 0.6771 243 
Fama-French Results                         
Initial allegations 0.0008   (0.2887) 0.4637 0.4569 238   -0.0001   (-0.05) 0.5282 0.5222 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0073 ** (-2.0889) 0.5505 0.5446 233   -0.0073 ** (-2.0832) 0.5515 0.5457 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0025   (-1.0641) 0.4764 0.4698 243   -0.0029   (-1.1942) 0.5136 0.5075 243 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0003   (-0.1579) 0.6364 0.6318 243   -0.0018   (-1.0112) 0.7066 0.7029 243 
Carhart Results                         
Initial allegations -0.0024   (-0.8654) 0.5352 0.5272 238   -0.0029   (-1.1849) 0.5848 0.5777 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0073 ** (-2.0302) 0.5505 0.5426 233   -0.0072 ** (-2.0055) 0.5516 0.5438 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0042 * (-1.7875) 0.5007 0.4923 243   -0.0044 * (-1.8554) 0.5338 0.5260 243 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0026   (-1.2677) 0.6892 0.6840 243   -0.0036 ** (-2.0255) 0.7410 0.7367 243 
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Table 2.7 Services portfolio results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-
weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for 
serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N 
represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
   Services  
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)    Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N   Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0068   (-1.5454) 0.4854 0.4832 232   -0.0063   (-1.4589) 0.4930 0.4908 232 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0117 ** (-2.3523) 0.3718 0.3690 226   -0.0127 ** (-2.4031) 0.3808 0.3781 226 
Confirmed violations -0.0023   (-0.4675) 0.4102 0.4074 212   -0.0031   (-0.62) 0.3942 0.3913 212 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0060   (-1.616) 0.5255 0.5235 232   -0.0067 * (-1.6748) 0.5225 0.5204 232 
Fama-French Results                         
Initial allegations -0.0068   (-1.5555) 0.4898 0.4831 232   -0.0063   (-1.4669) 0.4982 0.4916 232 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0120 ** (-2.4078) 0.3996 0.3915 226   -0.0131 ** (-2.4768) 0.4100 0.4021 226 
Confirmed violations -0.0030   (-0.6829) 0.4546 0.4467 212   -0.0039   (-0.8504) 0.4457 0.4377 212 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0063 * (-1.845) 0.5588 0.5532 232   -0.0070 * (-1.9) 0.5583 0.5526 232 
Carhart Results                         
Initial allegations -0.0074   (-1.5395) 0.4903 0.4813 232   -0.0068   (-1.444) 0.4985 0.4897 232 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0059   (-1.198) 0.4360 0.4258 226   -0.0073   (-1.3033) 0.4409 0.4308 226 
Confirmed violations -0.0042   (-0.8536) 0.4568 0.4463 212   -0.0060   (-1.187) 0.4530 0.4424 212 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0052   (-1.3386) 0.5609 0.5533 232   -0.0064   (-1.4946) 0.5589 0.5513 232 
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Table 2.8 Mining portfolio results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-
weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for 
serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N 
represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
   Mining  
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)    Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N   Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0027   (-1.0504) 0.6521 0.6506 238   -0.0022   (-0.8869) 0.6534 0.6519 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0044   (-1.0097) 0.3338 0.3307 216   -0.0008   (-0.2510) 0.7128 0.7114 216 
Confirmed violations -0.0078 ** (-2.3216) 0.5848 0.5830 235   -0.0056 * (-1.7656) 0.5461 0.5441 235 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0050 ** (-1.9804) 0.7000 0.6987 238   -0.0048 ** (-1.9702) 0.7207 0.7195 238 
Fama-French Results         
Initial allegations -0.0028   (-1.0913) 0.6624 0.6581 238   -0.0022   (-0.9058) 0.6643 0.6600 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0040   (-0.9647) 0.3440 0.3347 216   -0.0005   (-0.1810) 0.7200 0.7160 216 
Confirmed violations -0.0079 ** (-2.4432) 0.6081 0.6030 235   -0.0060 ** (-2.0219) 0.5872 0.5818 235 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0051 ** (-2.1564) 0.7383 0.7350 238   -0.0049 ** (-2.1347) 0.7567 0.7536 238 
Carhart Results         
Initial allegations -0.0029   (-1.1057) 0.6625 0.6567 238   -0.0024   (-0.9214) 0.6644 0.6586 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0035   (-0.7591) 0.3452 0.3328 216   0.0005   (0.1400) 0.7234 0.7181 216 
Confirmed violations -0.0063 * (-1.9291) 0.6184 0.6118 235   -0.0048   (-1.5432) 0.5932 0.5861 235 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0042 * (-1.6812) 0.7430 0.7386 238   -0.0041 * (-1.7091) 0.7601 0.7560 238 
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2.4.5 Impact of ESG plus LT Results  
In this section, I discuss the results from the four different ESG plus LT portfolios 
(tables 2.9 to 2.12). For the environment portfolios results, I find strong statistical 
significance at a 1% level on all four different types of allegation portfolios in the Carhart 
model. The alphas indicate underperformances of between 38 and 127 basis points per month 
on a consistent basis for both EW fine and company level and the adjusted r-squared values 
are relatively high between 0.43 and 0.78.   
The social portfolio on the other hand does not indicate any statistical significance on 
the EW fine level but only on the company level. Only two portfolios, the IA and CV 
portfolios underperform by 72 and 51 basis points per month respectively in the Carhart 
model.  Only at the EW company level for the governance portfolios, the IA and Overall 
portfolios underperform by 53 and 37 basis points per month in the Carhart model. The LT 
portfolios for the EW fine level showed underperformance of 27 basis points p.m only at the 
Overall portfolio. However on the EW company level, both the IA and Overall portfolios 
underperformed by 44 and 33 basis points per month. 
When comparing the four ESG plus LT portfolios, my hypothesis is confirmed that 
investors in overall are concerned more on the illegal behaviours of firms relating to 
environmental issues as I find statistical significance at all four levels of violations and with a 
larger underperformance of 127 basis points per month. This concurs with other literature that 
indicates environmental performances of firms can impact their firm value (Konar and Cohen 
2001; Jacobs, Singhal et al. 2010). My results further extends Capelle-Blancard and Laguna 
(2010) who examined market reactions to only industrial disasters of 64 chemical plants and 
refineries worldwide. They find that not only is there a 1.3% drop in market value of the 
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firms in their sample but also this loss is significantly related to the seriousness of the 
accident as measured by the number of casualties and by chemical pollution: each casualty 
corresponds to a loss of $164 million and a toxic release to a loss of $1 billion.  I am to my 
knowledge the first to show that environmental fines have larger underperformances 
compared to social, governance and long-term fines.  A further possible explanation of 
investor’s strong reaction to environmental fines could be the increase of fines in FY11 and 
FY12 and tighter inspections and evaluations
25
. The fiscal year 2015 Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) enforcement and compliance annual results showed that 
Administrative and Civil Judicial Penalties assessed in FY11 was $162 million and increased 
to $215 million in FY12. Federal Inspections and Evaluations also increased in FY12. 
 
 
 
 [This section has been intentionally left blank] 
                                                 
25
 Available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-12/documents/fy-2015-enforcement-annual-
results-charts_0.pdf#page=1 (accessed 10 February 2016) 
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Table 2.9  Environment portfolio results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-
weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for 
serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N 
represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
  Environment                       
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)    Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N   Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0024   (-1.3017) 0.6641 0.6627 241   -0.0026   (-1.4351) 0.6654 0.6640 241 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0128 *** (-2.8927) 0.4407 0.4383 236   -0.0119 *** (-2.975) 0.5269 0.5249 236 
Confirmed violations -0.0032   (-1.646) 0.6402 0.6387 245   -0.0038 ** (-2.1394) 0.6895 0.6882 245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0034 * (-1.9516) 0.7151 0.7139 245   -0.0036 ** (-2.3151) 0.7506 0.7496 245 
Fama-French Results                         
Initial allegations -0.0021   (-1.1932) 0.7064 0.7027 241   -0.0022   (-1.3180) 0.7137 0.7101 241 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0126 *** (-2.8182) 0.4440 0.4369 236   -0.0118 *** (-2.9231) 0.5300 0.5240 236 
Confirmed violations -0.0030   (-1.5632) 0.6531 0.6488 245   -0.0036 ** (-2.0403) 0.7001 0.6964 245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0031 * (-1.8894) 0.7403 0.7371 245   -0.0033 ** (-2.2568) 0.7764 0.7736 245 
Carhart Results                         
Initial allegations -0.0038 ** (-2.2462) 0.7241 0.7194 241   -0.0038 ** (-2.2671) 0.7285 0.7239 241 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0127 *** (-2.669) 0.4441 0.4344 236   -0.0123 *** (-2.9479) 0.5306 0.5226 236 
Confirmed violations -0.0043 ** (-2.1442) 0.6631 0.6575 245   -0.0045 ** (-2.3014) 0.7049 0.7000 245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0047 *** (-2.8633) 0.7565 0.7525 245   -0.0046 *** (-3.0239) 0.7868 0.7832 245 
  
. 
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Table 2.10 Social portfolio results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-
weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for 
serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N 
represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
  Social                      
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)   Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0030   (-0.8618) 0.2837 0.2806  234 -0.0054   (-1.5628) 0.3515 0.3487  234 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0028   (0.7898) 0.2715 0.2682  225 0.0027   (0.8252) 0.3450 0.3421  225 
Confirmed violations -0.0034   (-1.2763) 0.4048 0.4023  240 -0.0039   (-1.4124) 0.4518 0.4495  240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations 0.0001   (0.0495) 0.4984 0.4963  240 -0.0009   (-0.501) 0.5762 0.5745  240 
Fama-French Results                        
Initial allegations -0.0029   (-0.8256) 0.2950 0.2858  234 -0.0052   (-1.5232) 0.3694 0.3611  234 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0031   (0.892) 0.2915 0.2819  225 0.0030   (0.928) 0.3611 0.3524  225 
Confirmed violations -0.0030   (-1.1764) 0.4451 0.4380  240 -0.0035   (-1.375) 0.4981 0.4918  240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations 0.0005   (0.2264) 0.5451 0.5394  240 -0.0006   (-0.3351) 0.6299 0.6252  240 
Carhart Results           
 
           
Initial allegations -0.0052   (-1.4624) 0.315718 0.3038 234 -0.0072 ** (-2.051) 0.3848 0.3741  234 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0041   (1.1553) 0.295219 0.2824  225 0.0041   (1.2519) 0.3657 0.3541  225 
Confirmed violations -0.0042   (-1.5176) 0.450437 0.4411  240 -0.0051 * (-1.8633) 0.5085 0.5001  240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations 0.0003   (0.1224) 0.545388 0.5377  240 -0.0009   (-0.4906) 0.6305 0.6242  240 
. 
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Table 2.11 Governance portfolio results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one indicates the 
four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-weighted at company level 
(Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates 
statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in 
each panel A and B. 
  Governance                      
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)   Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
One Year Holding Period - CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0049   (-1.6212) 0.5228 0.5208  237 -0.0057 ** (-1.9793) 0.5341 0.5321  237 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0029   (-0.7453) 0.3922 0.3895  233 0.0070   (1.2861) 0.3955 0.3936  233 
Confirmed violations -0.0040 * (-1.7309) 0.6512 0.6498  240 -0.0038   (-1.6344) 0.6560 0.6545  240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0039 ** (-2.0343) 0.7350 0.7338  240 -0.0039 ** (-2.1862) 0.7601 0.7591  240 
One Year Holding Period - Fama-French Results                      
Initial allegations -0.0045   (-1.5416) 0.5345 0.5284  237 -0.0053 * (-1.8917) 0.5482 0.5423  237 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0030   (-0.7332) 0.3934 0.3855  233 0.0068   (1.2414) 0.3977 0.3948  233 
Confirmed violations -0.0040 * (-1.7311) 0.6601 0.6558  240 -0.0038   (-1.6353) 0.6649 0.6606  240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0039 ** (-2.0486) 0.7401 0.7368  240 -0.0038 ** (-2.1911) 0.7656 0.7627  240 
One Year Holding Period - Carhart Results                        
Initial allegations -0.0046   (-1.5268) 0.5345 0.5264  237 -0.0053 * (-1.8429) 0.5482 0.5403  237 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0012   (-0.3132) 0.4006 0.3901  233 0.0092   (1.5832) 0.4011 0.3966  233 
Confirmed violations -0.0034   (-1.3356) 0.6615 0.6558  240 -0.0038   (-1.5357) 0.6649 0.6592  240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0034   (-1.5728) 0.7409 0.7365  240 -0.0037 * (-1.8756) 0.7657 0.7617  240 
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Table 2.12 Long-Term portfolio results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-
weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for 
serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N 
represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
  Long-Term                      
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)   Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0028   (-1.1238) 0.5936 0.5918  236 -0.0054 ** (-2.4039) 0.6542 0.6527  236 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0015   (-0.7002) 0.6664 0.6650  238 -0.0008   (-0.3435) 0.6536 0.6521  238 
Confirmed violations -0.0016   (-0.8447) 0.6972 0.6960  237 -0.0008   (-0.4438) 0.6810 0.6797  237 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0022   (-1.3961) 0.8094 0.8086  238 -0.0032 ** (-2.2038) 0.8375 0.8368  238 
Fama-French Results                        
Initial allegations -0.0025   (-1.0402) 0.6218 0.6169  236 -0.0052 ** (-2.3956) 0.6894 0.6854  236 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0014   (-0.6572) 0.6824 0.6784  238 -0.0008   (-0.3082) 0.6664 0.6622  238 
Confirmed violations -0.0014   (-0.7963) 0.7046 0.7008  237 -0.0006   (-0.3467) 0.6984 0.6945  237 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0020   (-1.302) 0.8203 0.8180  238 -0.0030 ** (-2.1125) 0.8571 0.8552  238 
Carhart Results                        
Initial allegations -0.0029   (-1.2777) 0.6223 0.6158  236 -0.0044 ** (-1.9751) 0.6921 0.6868  236 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0017   (-0.7154) 0.6830 0.6775  238 -0.0010   (-0.3495) 0.6666 0.6609  238 
Confirmed violations -0.0022   (-1.0872) 0.7077 0.7027  237 -0.0020   (-0.9737) 0.7086 0.7035  237 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0027 * (-1.6694) 0.8226 0.8196  238 -0.0033 ** (-2.1233) 0.8576 0.8551  238 
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2.4.6 Impact of ESG plus LT per Industry Results  
The results on the single and multifactor regressions on the industry level are based 
only on the Overall - all three stages of the violations (tables 2.13 to 2.15). Supporting my 
hypothesis, I find investors in each industry react only to certain individual E, S, G and LT 
violations. 
 For the environmental portfolios, observing the Carhart model, I find that only two 
industries show underperformance. Both manufacturing and transportation and public utilities 
underperformed by 47 and 61 basis points p.m at the EW fine level respectively. This 
supports my earlier findings that investors in the extractions and usage of valuable minerals 
and natural resources industries react to environmental fines.  
For the social portfolio, based on the Carhart model, the manufacturing industry 
outperforms and services underperform on the EW fine level portfolios by 42 and 121 basis 
points p.m respectively. I find these results similar with the findings in table 2.4 where the 
manufacturing CVPM portfolio outperforms. Interestingly, on the EW company level I find 
that manufacturing industry does not have any significance but instead Services and 
transportation underperforms by 117 and 12 basis points p.m respectively. These results show 
that investors in the manufacturing industry do not perceive social fines to be of a concern. 
For the governance portfolio, after controlling for momentum, the EW fine level 
shows that only mining and services underperform by 63 and 87 basis points p.m 
respectively. However, in EW company level in addition to mining and services, I find now 
finance has statistical significance and underperforms by 61 basis points p.m. Thus, when 
looking deeply at the type of fine it does show that investors in the finance industry do react 
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negatively to illegal behaviours of finance firms. Finally, for the LT portfolio, surprisingly I 
also find no statistical significant results on an industry level
26
.  
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
 
                                                 
26
 Results for the LT portfolios are available upon request 
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Table 2.13  Environment portfolio results (individual industries) of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one indicates the four different portfolios based on the 
stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared 
values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent 
the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
  Environment                    
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)   Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R2 Adj R
2 N  Alpha     R2 Adj R2 N 
Finance -0.0039   (-1.0343) 0.2372 0.2330  183 -0.0037   (-0.9907) 0.2368 0.2326  183 
Manufacturing -0.0032   (-1.5975) 0.7080 0.7068  245 -0.0033 * (-1.9653) 0.7562 0.7552  245 
Mining -0.0016   (-0.5323) 0.6694 0.6680  239 -0.0019   (-0.7307) 0.7173 0.7161  239 
Services -0.0070   (-1.546) 0.7350 0.7301  56 -0.0069   (-1.4399) 0.5998 0.5924  56 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.0041   (-1.557) 0.4725 0.4703  244 -0.0048   (-1.6302) 0.3133 0.3105  244 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.0026   (0.7708) 0.4599 0.4576  242 0.0026   (0.7708) 0.4599 0.4576  242 
Fama-French Results                        
Finance -0.0041   (-1.0961) 0.2593 0.2468  183 -0.0039   (-1.0495) 0.2598 0.2474  183 
Manufacturing -0.0029   (-1.6045) 0.7573 0.7543  245 -0.0031 * (-1.9382) 0.8127 0.8104  245 
Mining -0.0016   (-0.5684) 0.6829 0.6788  239 -0.0019   (-0.7328) 0.7307 0.7272  239 
Services -0.0064   (-1.529) 0.7699 0.7566  56 -0.0068   (-1.5014) 0.6289 0.6075  56 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.0036   (-1.4382) 0.4918 0.4855  244 -0.0044   (-1.6054) 0.3581 0.3501  244 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.0027   (0.7901) 0.4667 0.4599  242 0.0027   (0.7901) 0.4667 0.4599  242 
Carhart Results                        
Finance -0.0015   (-0.4152) 0.2797 0.2635  183 -0.0013   (-0.3723) 0.2802 0.2641  183 
Manufacturing -0.0047 *** (-2.8133) 0.7719 0.7682  245 -0.0042 *** (-2.6077) 0.8188 0.8158  245 
Mining -0.0012   (-0.4198) 0.6836 0.6782  239 -0.0017   (-0.643) 0.7309 0.7262  239 
Services -0.0060   (-1.4531) 0.7717 0.7538  56 -0.0069   (-1.4755) 0.6294 0.6003  56 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.0061 ** (-2.3761) 0.5450 0.5373  244 -0.0076 *** (-2.6523) 0.4312 0.4217  244 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.0032   (0.8545) 0.4674 0.4584  242 0.0032   (0.8545) 0.4674 0.4584  242 
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Table 2.14 Social portfolio results (individual industries) of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one indicates the four different portfolios based on the 
stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared 
values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent 
the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
  Social                    
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)   Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha 
  
R2 Adj R
2 N Alpha 
  
R2 Adj R
2 N 
NFinance -0.0038   (-0.8629) 0.4293 0.4266  212 -0.0039   (-0.8895) 0.4288 0.4261 212 
Manufacturing 0.0046 ** (2.175) 0.3833 0.3808  241 0.0030   (1.5942) 0.4831 0.4809 241 
Mining -0.0029   (-0.8195) 0.6737 0.6722  217 -0.0026   (-0.7406) 0.6781 0.6766 217 
Services -0.0082 * (-1.8591) 0.3538 0.3506  210 -0.0083 * (-1.8856) 0.3530 0.3498 210 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.0111 * (-1.7504) 0.2397 0.2361  227 -0.0105 * (-1.657) 0.2367 0.2330 227 
Retail and Wholesale Trade -0.0007   (-0.2632) 0.4252 0.4226  231 -0.0005   (-0.1639) 0.4214 0.4189 231 
Fama-French Results 
     
  
     
 
Finance 0.0032  (0.8124) 0.4997 0.4973  212 0.0032  (0.8124) 0.4997 0.4973 212 
Manufacturing -0.0034   (-0.7468) 0.4347 0.4266  241 -0.0035   (-0.7722) 0.4349 0.4267 241 
Mining 0.0048 ** (2.2457) 0.4304 0.4231  217 0.0032 * (1.698) 0.5234 0.5174 217 
Services -0.0025   (-0.7513) 0.6837 0.6792  210 -0.0022   (-0.6712) 0.6867 0.6822 210 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.0078 * (-1.8271) 0.3691 0.3596  227 -0.0079 * (-1.8547) 0.3687 0.3592 227 
Retail and Wholesale Trade -0.0115 * (-1.9479) 0.3036 0.2934  231 -0.0110 * (-1.8627) 0.3014 0.2912 231 
Carhart Results 
 
  
   
  
 
  
   
 
Finance -0.0002   (-0.0899)  0.5072 0.5005  212 0.0000   (0.0159)  0.5049 0.4983 212 
Manufacturing  0.0033    (0.8449)  0.5082  0.5008  241  0.0033    (0.8449)  0.5082 0.5009 241 
Mining -0.0025   (-0.5315) 0.4365 0.4256  217 -0.0026   (-0.5579) 0.4366 0.4257 217 
Services 0.0042 * (1.9111) 0.4322 0.4226  210 0.0026   (1.3419) 0.5254 0.5174 210 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.0019   (-0.5101) 0.6846 0.6787  227 -0.0015   (-0.4101) 0.6880 0.6821 227 
Retail and Wholesale Trade -0.0057   (-1.2826) 0.3820 0.3696  231 -0.0058   (-1.308) 0.3817 0.3692 231 
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Table 2.15 Governance portfolio results (individual industries) of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks  
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one indicates the four different portfolios based on the 
stages of the violations, column two indicates the equal-weighted at the fine level (Panel A) followed by the equal-weighted at company level (Panel B). Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared 
values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent 
the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
  Governance                    
  Panel A: Equal Weighted (Fine Level)   Panel B: Equal Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R2 Adj R
2 N  Alpha     R2 Adj R2 N 
Finance -0.0058 * (-1.6966) 0.5105 0.5085  238 -0.0077 ** (-2.2424) 0.5316 0.5296  238 
Manufacturing -0.0040 * (-1.687) 0.5124 0.5103  234 -0.0038   (-1.6107) 0.5057 0.5036  234 
Mining -0.0055 ** (-2.3767) 0.7550 0.7539  224 -0.0055 ** (-2.3767) 0.7550 0.7539  224 
Services -0.0109 ** (-2.4472) 0.4536 0.4513  234 -0.0099 ** (-2.3078) 0.4990 0.4968  234 
Transportation and Public Utilities 0.0010   (0.5277) 0.5277 0.5255  222 0.0011   (0.3585) 0.5337 0.5316  222 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.0037   (1.0203) 0.5416 0.5385  253 0.0037   (1.0203) 0.5416 0.5385  253 
Fama-French Results                        
Finance -0.0069 ** (-2.165) 0.5324 0.5264  238 -0.0086 *** (-2.6062) 0.5474 0.5416  238 
Manufacturing -0.0038 * (-1.7542) 0.5604 0.5547  234 -0.0037 * (-1.6794) 0.5525 0.5467  234 
Mining -0.0059 *** (-2.6486) 0.7673 0.7641  224 -0.0059 *** (-2.6486) 0.7673 0.7641  224 
Services -0.0109 ** (-2.4255) 0.4567 0.4496  234 -0.0099 ** (-2.294) 0.5029 0.4964  234 
Transportation and Public Utilities 0.0013   (0.4593) 0.5512 0.5451  222 0.0014   (0.4663) 0.5565 0.5504  222 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.0040   (1.1032) 0.5434 0.5339  253 0.0040   (1.1032) 0.5434 0.5339  253 
Carhart Results                        
Finance -0.0042   (-1.2198) 0.5503 0.5426  238 -0.0061 * (-1.6584) 0.5622 0.5547  238 
Manufacturing -0.0033   (-1.5843) 0.5617 0.5540  234 -0.0032   (-1.5566) 0.5534 0.5456  234 
Mining -0.0063 *** (-2.7226) 0.7678 0.7635  224 -0.0063 *** (-2.7226) 0.7678 0.7635  224 
Services -0.0087 * (-1.7341) 0.4621 0.4527  234 -0.0079   (-1.6207) 0.5079 0.4993  234 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.0002   (-0.0681) 0.5648 0.5567  222 -0.0001 * (-0.0436) 0.5693 0.5614  222 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.0041   (1.0552) 0.5435 0.5307  253 0.0041   (1.0552) 0.5435 0.5307  253 
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2.5 Additional Analyses  
2.5.1 Value Weighted Results 
In this section I compare the results of the equal weighted portfolios with the 
portfolios which are value weighted. Hoepner and Zeume (2013) and Adamsson and 
Hoepner  (2015 ) have critiqued the use of only equal weighted (EW) portfolios as most 
studies regress equal weighted portfolios on value weighted (VW) benchmarks 
(Fabozzi, Ma et al. 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). However, in my previous 
analysis, my EW portfolios are regressed on EW benchmarks which therefore does not 
create any discrepancies or biases, thus in this section I conduct additional VW analysis 
which is regressed on VW benchmarks similar to Hoepner and Schopohl (2016), to 
measure whether VW portfolios would have similar results to my EW portfolios. The 
VW portfolios were created using the below: 
            
     
       
  
        
             
     
    
      
  
        
             
                          (2.10) 
 
where       is firms’ price in that period over the price of the previous period 
         and the weight of the company using the MC of the firm i at period t over the 
total sum of the MC of firms in the portfolio at period t .My VW portfolios were also 
regressed on created value weighted market benchmarks even on different industry 
levels. It can be observed that my overall portfolio in table 2.16 (Panel A) has similar 
underperformance results in a four factor regression setting. The alphas, the r-squared 
value and the level of statistical significance are reduced. Nevertheless, the fit of the 
model is still relatively high with adjusted r-squared values of between 0.54 and 0.86.  
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The separate VW industry portfolios results are shown in table 2.16 (Panel B) to 
table 2.18 (Panel A). For IA, in addition to manufacturing in the EW model I now find 
finance underperforms by 77 basis points p.m in the Carhart model and mining 
underperforms by 37 basis points p.m in the Fama-French model. For EW CVPM, I 
initially had underperformances in both transportation and public utilities and services, 
and outperformance in manufacturing. Now the VW portfolios show no statistical 
significance at all. The EW and VW CV portfolio both show underperformance in 
Transportation and Mining. In the VW overall portfolios, I also find the same 
industries, Finance, Mining and Transportation exhibiting underperformances. I still 
observe no risk-adjusted returns that are statistically significant for the Retail and 
Wholesale Trade industry portfolios. 
When analysing the ESG plus LT portfolios, I find that the environmental VW 
Carhart model results in table 2.18 (Panel B) is similar to the EW portfolios even on 
statistical significance levels. The VW CVPM underperformance is larger at 142 basis 
points p.m compared to 127 basis points p.m in the EW model. Interestingly, I find now 
outperformance of 250 basis points p.m in the social CVPM VW model in table 2.18 
(Panel A). The governance VW portfolio in table 2.19 (Panel B) still underperforms in 
the overall portfolio. However, the LT portfolio for the VW model does not indicate 
any statistical significance
27
. The results above affirm that the environmental portfolio 
on both EW and VW model is strongly robust. In relation to the VW fines per market 
cap in table 2.20, I find similar results to the EW model where the portfolio with higher 
fines indicates larger underperformance compared to lower fines.  
 
                                                 
27
 Results for the LT portfolios are available upon request 
 68 
 
Examining the VW ESG plus LT per industry results (table 2.21 to 2.22) for 
environment portfolios, I find similar results that manufacturing and transportations and 
public utilities underperform. However, in the social portfolio I find no statistical 
significance in the Carhart model. For the governance portfolio, I find manufacturing, 
mining and services underperform. I still observe no risk-adjusted returns that are 
statistically significant for the LT portfolios
28
. Hereby, the VW portfolios also indicate 
that investors in each industry react only to certain individual E, S, G and LT violations. 
 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
                                                 
28
 Results for the LT portfolios are available upon request. 
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Table 2.16 Value Weighted (Company level) results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the value-weighted results at company level. Each portfolio reports the r-
squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 
1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
   Overall - All Industries    Finance   
   Panel A: Value Weighted (Company Level)    Panel B: Value Weighted (Company Level)    
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N   Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N  
Initial allegations -0.0022   (-1.3974) 0.6573 0.6559  241   -0.0079 ** (-2.5930) 0.6508 0.6494 238  
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0005   (0.2238) 0.5454 0.5435  240   -0.0027   (-0.6925) 0.4962 0.4940 233  
Confirmed violations -0.0016   (-1.3107) 0.7962 0.7953  245   -0.0038   (-1.1795) 0.5929 0.5912 241  
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0012   (-1.0572) 0.8163 0.8156  246   -0.0036   (-1.4399) 0.7027 0.7014 241  
Fama-French Results   
 
    
         
Initial allegations -0.0021   (-1.4830) 0.7369 0.7335  241   -0.0087 *** (-3.0088) 0.6633 0.6589 238  
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0003   (0.1349) 0.5716 0.5661  240   -0.0033   (-0.8755) 0.5103 0.5038 233  
Confirmed violations -0.0017   (-1.6239) 0.8245 0.8223  245   -0.0046   (-1.522) 0.6268 0.6221 241  
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0012   (-1.3253) 0.8493 0.8474  246   -0.0044 ** (-1.9999) 0.7306 0.7272 241  
Carhart Results   
 
    
         
Initial allegations -0.0026 * (-1.6533) 0.7379 0.7335  241   -0.0077 *** (-2.6333) 0.6655 0.6597 238  
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0007   (-0.3463) 0.5761 0.5689  240   -0.0025   (-0.5911) 0.5126 0.5041 233  
Confirmed violations -0.0028 ** (-2.3304) 0.8322 0.8294  245   -0.0036   (-1.0824) 0.6297 0.6234 241  
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0022 ** (-2.3206) 0.8558 0.8534  246   -0.0035   (-1.4746) 0.7331 0.7286 241  
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Table 2.17 Value Weighted (Company level) results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the value-weighted results at company level. Each portfolio reports the r-
squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 
1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
      Manufacturing      Transportation and Public Utilities  
  Panel A: Value Weighted (Company Level)    Panel B: Value Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N   Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0019   (-0.8940) 0.5939 0.5922 240   0.0011   (0.2884) 0.2054 0.2020 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0035   (1.3048) 0.3387 0.3358 237   -0.0052   (-1.1703) 0.2706 0.2674 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0004   (-0.3143) 0.6689 0.6676 245   -0.0045   (-1.5800) 0.4034 0.4009 243 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0001   (-0.0448) 0.7170 0.7159 245   -0.0023   (-1.0734) 0.4880 0.4859 243 
Fama-French Results         
Initial allegations -0.0022   (-1.2341) 0.6798 0.6757 240   0.0011   (0.3279) 0.2821 0.2727 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0033   (1.2380) 0.3638 0.3556 237   -0.0061   (-1.4071) 0.3452 0.3366 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0004   (-0.3645) 0.7006 0.6968 245   -0.0046   (-1.5716) 0.4109 0.4035 243 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0001   (-0.1218) 0.7724 0.7696 245   -0.0024   (-1.171) 0.5233 0.5173 243 
Carhart Results         
Initial allegations -0.0033 * (-1.8242) 0.6849 0.6795 240   -0.0015   (-0.4787) 0.3129 0.3009 238 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0015   (0.6359) 0.3766 0.3658 237   -0.0057   (-1.3483) 0.3457 0.3342 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0019   (-1.4607) 0.7140 0.7093 245   -0.0062 ** (-2.1901) 0.4263 0.4166 243 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0015   (-1.4897) 0.7851 0.7815 245   -0.0042 ** (-2.0258) 0.5513 0.5438 243 
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Table 2.18 Value Weighted (Company level) results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks  
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the value-weighted results at company level. Each portfolio reports the r-
squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 
1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
      Mining       Environment  
  Panel A: Value Weighted (Company Level)   Panel B: Value Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
  N Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0034   (-1.4479) 0.7225 0.7214 238 -0.0021   (-1.0088) 0.5392 0.5373 241 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0017   (-0.5546) 0.7111 0.7098 216 -0.0126 *** (-2.5954) 0.3693 0.3667 236 
Confirmed violations -0.0055 * (-1.7065) 0.5553 0.5534 235 -0.0026   (-1.4066) 0.5675 0.5658 245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0033   (-1.4229) 0.7224 0.7212 238 -0.0027 * (-1.7232) 0.6434 0.6420 245 
Fama-French Results                
Initial allegations -0.0037 * (-1.8473) 0.7707 0.7678 238 -0.0020   (-1.0711) 0.6000 0.5949 241 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0017   (-0.5706) 0.7179 0.7139 216 -0.0128 *** (-2.6359) 0.3756 0.3677 236 
Confirmed violations -0.0059 * (-1.9455) 0.5976 0.5924 235 -0.0024   (-1.3058) 0.5740 0.5687 245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0036 * (-1.8122) 0.7705 0.7676 238 -0.0026 * (-1.7018) 0.6671 0.6630 245 
Carhart Results                
Initial allegations -0.0032   (-1.4845) 0.7721 0.7681 238 -0.0038 ** (-1.9905) 0.6200 0.6136 241 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0010   (-0.3019) 0.7195 0.7141 216 -0.0142 *** (-2.926) 0.3796 0.3690 236 
Confirmed violations -0.0048   (-1.4802) 0.6027 0.5958 235 -0.0049 *** (-2.7783) 0.6105 0.6041 245 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0031   (-1.4524) 0.7719 0.7680 238 -0.0042 *** (-2.7206) 0.6923 0.6873 245 
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Table 2.19 Value Weighted (Company level) results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the value-weighted results at company level. Each portfolio reports the r-
squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 
1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
  Social    Governance  
  Panel A: Value Weighted (Company Level)    Panel B: Value Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N   Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations 0.0130 * (1.8292) 0.5392 0.5373  234   -0.0043   (-1.2801) 0.4334 0.4310  237 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0255 ** (2.3831) 0.3693 0.3667  225   0.0060   (1.0763) 0.3182 0.3139  233 
Confirmed violations -0.0022   (-0.8345) 0.5675 0.5658  240   -0.0028   (-0.9852) 0.5036 0.5015  240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations 0.0006   (0.2711) 0.6434 0.6420  240   -0.0032   (-1.3586) 0.6460 0.6445  240 
Fama-French Results                         
Initial allegations 0.0135 * (1.8908) 0.6000 0.5949  234   -0.0050   (-1.6025) 0.4894 0.4828  237 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0255 ** (2.4824) 0.3756 0.3677  225   0.0062   (1.1099) 0.3469 0.3441  233 
Confirmed violations -0.0023   (-0.9004) 0.5740 0.5687  240   -0.0036   (-1.3437) 0.5647 0.5592  240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations 0.0006   (0.2848) 0.6671 0.6630  240   -0.0039 * (-1.8564) 0.7113 0.7076  240 
Carhart Results                         
Initial allegations 0.0099   (1.5586) 0.6200 0.6136  234   -0.0049   (-1.6007) 0.4894 0.4806  237 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters 0.0250 ** (2.5515) 0.3796 0.3690  225   0.0093   (1.5794) 0.3486 0.3467  233 
Confirmed violations -0.0041   (-1.5471) 0.6105 0.6041  240   -0.0040   (-1.3751) 0.5652 0.5578  240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0006   (-0.3229) 0.6923 0.6873  240   -0.0040 * (-1.6856) 0.7113 0.7064  240 
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Table 2.20 Value Weighted (Company level) results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one 
indicates the four different portfolios based on the stages of the violations, column two indicates the value-weighted results at company level. Each portfolio reports the r-
squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 
1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The values in the parentheses represent the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in each panel A and B. 
 
Fines per Market Cap 0 to 20th Percentile Level       80th to 100th Percentile Level    
  Panel A: Value Weighted (Company Level)   Panel B: Value Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
  N Alpha     R
2
 Adj R
2
 N 
Initial allegations -0.0029   (-1.0443) 0.4462 0.4439  234 -0.0101 *** (-2.8717) 0.3524 0.3496 239 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0012   (-0.4306) 0.4244 0.4220  240 0.0025   (0.4608) 0.3528 0.3500 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0012   (-0.549) 0.5356 0.5336  238 -0.0048 * (-1.7266) 0.5051 0.5031 240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0001   (-0.0593) 0.5389 0.5370  240 -0.0048 * (-1.8329) 0.5545 0.5526 240 
Fama-French Results                        
Initial allegations -0.0026   (-1.0025) 0.4894 0.4829  234 -0.0110 *** (-3.4486) 0.4419 0.4346 239 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0014   (-0.4745) 0.4279 0.4206  240 0.0018   (0.3705) 0.4230 0.4154 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0010   (-0.4596) 0.5407 0.5348  238 -0.0053 ** (-2.0181) 0.5361 0.5302 240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations 0.0000   (-0.0142) 0.5548 0.5492  240 -0.0056 *** (-2.629) 0.6695 0.6653 240 
Carhart Results                        
Initial allegations -0.0039   (-1.4589) 0.4958 0.4872  234 -0.0102 *** (-3.1502) 0.4434 0.4336 239 
Confirmed violations but still pending other matters -0.0025   (-0.9384) 0.4320 0.4223  240 0.0011   (0.2082) 0.4239 0.4138 233 
Confirmed violations -0.0046 ** (-2.0657) 0.5848 0.5777  238 -0.0065 ** (-2.3609) 0.5409 0.5331 240 
Overall - Including all three stages of violations -0.0020   (-1.0694) 0.5747 0.5675  240 -0.0059 ** (-2.5573) 0.6698 0.6642 240 
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Table 2.21 Value Weighted (Company level) results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one indicates the portfolios from seven different 
industries, column two indicates the value-weighted results at company level. Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for serial 
correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The value in the parentheses represents the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in each 
panel A and B. 
  Environment   Social  
  Panel A: Value Weighted (Company Level)   Panel B: Value Weighted (Company Level)  
One Year Holding Period - CAPM Results Alpha     R2 Adj R
2 N  Alpha     R2 Adj R
2 N 
Finance -0.0044   (-1.0458) 0.4432 0.4401  183 -0.0014   (-0.3408) 0.3027 0.2994 212 
Manufacturing -0.0032 * (-1.7146) 0.6413 0.6399  245 0.0026   (1.0324) 0.3892 0.3866 241 
Mining -0.0019   (-0.7466) 0.6908 0.6895  239 -0.0017   (-0.5105) 0.6157 0.6138 217 
Services -0.0032   (-0.7487) 0.2758 0.2729  56 -0.0049   (-0.7269) 0.0745 0.0701 210 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.0036   (-1.213) 0.2758 0.2729  244 0.0026   (0.8993) 0.1158 0.1119 227 
Retail and Wholesale Trade -0.0013   (-0.3904) 0.4001 0.3976  242 -0.0083 * (-1.6891) 0.6039 0.5980 231 
One Year Holding Period - Fama-French Results                        
Finance -0.0050   (-1.1539) 0.4543 0.4452  183 -0.0012   (-0.3052) 0.3187 0.3089 212 
Manufacturing -0.0034 ** (-2.0443) 0.6903 0.6864  245 0.0022   (0.9612) 0.4731 0.4664 241 
Mining -0.0022   (-0.9162) 0.7155 0.7119  239 -0.0013   (-0.4342) 0.6287 0.6231 217 
Services -0.0028   (-0.6749) 0.6901 0.6722  56 -0.0072   (-1.1166) 0.1637 0.1515 210 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.0034   (-1.1897) 0.2993 0.2905  244 0.0026   (1.0454) 0.2717 0.2619 227 
Retail and Wholesale Trade -0.0013   (-0.3817) 0.4009 0.39335  242 -0.0082 * (-1.6861) 0.1556 0.1430 231 
One Year Holding Period - Carhart Results                        
Finance -0.0033   (-0.7394) 0.4617 0.4496  183 0.0003   (0.0594) 0.3254 0.3124 212 
Manufacturing -0.0056 *** (-3.3379) 0.7118 0.7070  245 0.0003   (0.141) 0.4898 0.4811 241 
Mining -0.0022   (-0.8969) 0.7155 0.7107  239 -0.0006   (-0.1896) 0.6299 0.6224 217 
Services -0.0033   (-0.769) 0.6946 0.6707  56 -0.0076   (-1.2144) 0.1639 0.1475 210 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.0058 ** (-2.0524) 0.3387 0.3276  244 0.0011   (0.4805) 0.2887 0.2759 227 
Retail and Wholesale Trade -0.0002   (-0.0639) 0.4051 0.3951  242 -0.0059   (-1.2321) 0.1701 0.1534 231 
. 
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Table 2.22 Value Weighted (Company level) results of CAPM,Fama-French and Carhart regressions with created benchmarks 
The following table displays the Jensen's alpha's results from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart regressions with the specific overall created benchmark. Column one indicates the portfolios from seven different 
industries, column two indicates the value-weighted results at company level. Each portfolio reports the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values. T-statistics are computed with Newey-West (1987) corrections for 
serial correlation.  ***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The value in the parentheses represents the values of the t-statistics. N represents the number of observations in 
each panel A and B. 
  Governance  
  Panel A: Value Weighted (Company Level)  
CAPM Results Alpha     R2 Adj R
2 
N 
Finance -0.0051 * (-0.3408) 0.7207 0.7195 238 
Manufacturing -0.0038   (1.0324) 0.2986 0.2956 234 
Mining -0.0058 *** (-0.5105) 0.7432 0.7420 224 
Services -0.0127 *** (-0.7269) 0.3532 0.3505 234 
Transportation and Public Utilities 0.0033   (0.8993) 0.2961 0.2929 222 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.0069   (0.8111) 0.1029 0.09672 253 
Fama-French Results            
Finance -0.0062 ** (-0.3408) 0.7389 0.7355 238 
Manufacturing -0.0048 * (1.0324) 0.4530 0.4458 234 
Mining -0.0062 *** (-0.5105) 0.7546 0.7513 224 
Services -0.0134 *** (-0.7269) 0.3725 0.3643 234 
Transportation and Public Utilities 0.0032   (0.8993) 0.3359 0.3268 222 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.0052   (0.8300) 0.2028 0.18619 253 
Carhart Results            
Finance -0.0042   (-0.3408) 0.7479 0.7436 238 
Manufacturing -0.0048 * (1.0324) 0.4530 0.4434 234 
Mining -0.0067 *** (-0.5105) 0.7555 0.7510 224 
Services -0.0127 ** (-0.7269) 0.3730 0.3621 234 
Transportation and Public Utilities 0.0006   (0.8993) 0.3675 0.3558 222 
Retail and Wholesale Trade 0.0033   (0.4981) 0.2185 0.19665 253 
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2.5.2 Effect of Value of Fines on Short Interest  
To analyze whether investors have a negative sentiment when a company has a 
high fine, I investigate whether firms have high short interest due to fines. I find that 
indeed there is a significantly positive relation to the amount of fines with short interest. 
This confirms my notion that fines can induce higher short selling.  
Short interest can be perceived as a sentiment indicator of investors. If short 
interest is high, it can be an indication that they expect the value of shares to decline 
and vice versa. Karpoff & Lou (2010) found that abnormal short interest increases 
steadily in the last 19 months before financial misrepresentation is publically revealed. 
Their study revealed that short selling had anticipated an eventual discovery and 
severity of financial conduct. Hence, following their study, I anticipate that fines would 
have an effect on the sentiment of investors, thus inducing them to short sell.  
For each month t, the short interest ratio (SIR) is regressed on variables that 
would explain whether the values of fines have an effect on short selling. Short interest 
is measured as the total number of shares an investor has sold short divided by the 
average daily trading volume for a specific time period. The explanatory variables 
include Institutional Ownership (Int_Ownership), Share Turnover (Turnover), Cash 
over Assets (Cash_Assets) and Total Assets (Assets) which are all measured monthly. 
Accruals (Acc) and the value of fines (Fine) is measured using annual data, so it is the 
same in all months t in a given year. To calculate accruals for firm i in month t, I used 
the basic formula as per in Hribar & Collins (2002): 
Accbs= (ΔCA- ΔCL- ΔCash +  ΔSTDebt – Dep)                (2.11) 
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where ΔCA is the change in current assets during period t; ΔCL is the change in 
current liabilities in period t; ΔCash is the change in cash and cash equivalents during 
period t; ΔSTDebt is the change in current maturities of long-term debt and other short-
term debt included in current liabilities during period t and Dep is the depreciation and 
amortization expense during period t. 
Following, Karpoff & Lou (2010) I used institutional ownership, total accruals 
data and turnover for the explanatory variable for Model 1(Eq 2.12). Investors are 
usually concerned with the cash balances when a company is hit with a fine. Hence, I 
added Cash and Cash per Assets as additional explanatory variables as per Model 2(Eq 
2.13). Assets was orthogonalized (Asset_ort) due to its high correlation with Cash per 
Assets. Finally, I added the value of fines variable which was calculated based on the 
data collected for Model 3(Eq 2.14). The short interest ratio data was retrieved from 
Bloomberg. The regressions are based on monthly ten years data from April 2002 to 
December 2012.  
SIRi,t = αi + β1Int_Ownershipi,t + β2Acci,t + β3Turnoveri,t + e                             (2.12)                                  
     
SIRi,t = αi + β1Int_Ownershipi,t + β2Acci,t + β3Turnoveri,t  + β4Cash_Assetsi,t  + 
β5Asset_orti,t   + e              (2.13)
     
 SIRi,t = αi + β1Int_Ownershipi,t + β2Acci,t + β3Turnoveri,t  + β4Cash_Assetsi,t  + 
β5Asset_orti,t      + β6Finei,t   +  e                                           (2.14)
  
Table 2.23 reports the empirical results from the time-series and t-statistics 
monthly coefficient for the three models. Table 8.5 in the appendix provides the full 
description of the variables and sources. The adjusted r-squared value increases from 
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0.37 to 0.40 in each model indicating a sufficient fit. According to the estimates, it 
appears that share turnover is significantly negatively related to short interest. This is 
quite intuitive as a drop in share turnover could indicate low confidence in the stocks 
and a move to short sell. The results in the first model indicate a significantly positive 
relation of institutional ownership with short selling. This shows when there are more 
institutional investors, there is higher short selling. In the second and third model, I find 
no statistical significance of this variable. Additionally in the second and third model, I 
find statistical significance in the cash per asset variable. On a first glance, the 
significantly positive relation of the cash per asset to short interest may not be intuitive. 
However, considering that these firms are large in size and their cash balances do not 
deteriorate per asset, this would not have a negative relation to short interest. The 
results in the third model with the fines variable show a positive statistical significance 
which indicates the when there is more fines, there is higher short selling. 
 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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Table 2.23 The Effect of Value of Fines on Short Selling 
This table presents OLS regressions over the period of 2002 to 2012. For each month t, the short interest 
ratio (SIR) is regressed on variables that would explain whether the values of fines have an effect on short 
selling. Short interest is measured as the total number of shares an investor has sold short divided by the 
average daily trading volume for a specific time period. The explanatory variables include institutional 
ownership, share turnover, cash over assets and assets which are all measured monthly. Accruals and the 
value of fines is measured using annual data, so it is the same in all months t in a given year. The table 
below reports the results from the time-series averages of the coefficient estimates and t-statistics are 
computed with Newey–West (1987) corrections for serial correlation for the three models.***,** ,*  
indicates statistical significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively. The value in the parentheses 
represents the value of the T-Statistics. 
 
Model 1   2   3 
 Independent Variables SIR 
 
SIR 
 
SIR 
 Constant 33.6687*** 
 
21.4880** 
 
8.3984** 
   (3.5541) 
 
(2.0108) 
 
(0.677) 
 Institutional Ownership 0.0000** 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
   (2.5883) 
 
(0.1856) 
 
(-0.5086) 
 Ln(Accruals) 0.1574 
 
0.0236 
 
0.1366 
   (1.0199) 
 
(0.1179) 
 
(0.6652) 
 Ln(Share Turnover) -1.8714*** 
 
-1.4350*** 
 
-1.2052*** 
   (-4.317)  (-3.0821) 
 
(-2.5427) 
 Cash/Assets     0.1040** 
 
0.1448** 
       (2.2794)  (2.9288) 
 Ln(Assets)     0.0006   0.0005 
       (0.9466)   (0.7092) 
 Ln(Fines)         0.2241*** 
           (2.0093) 
 R - squared 0.3862   0.4130   0.4318 
 adjusted R- squared 0.3715   0.3891   0.4038 
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2.6 Summary 
The aim of this chapter is to use the information of fines to measure the impact 
on long-term performance of stock returns. Various literatures have measured the short-
term impact of negative events such as fines on the performance of stock returns. 
However, I find that there is a gap in understanding the long-term impact of fines. The 
sample of firms used in this chapter is comprised of large cap firms and institutional 
investors usually hold stocks of large cap firms for the long run. In this chapter I used 
hand-collected data of monetary fines from 10-K fillings which is in contrast to most 
data sources used in comparable studies. Furthermore, my sample size of nineteen years 
reflects a larger observable period. Instead of using conventional benchmarks, I created 
a specific market benchmarks for the overall and each individual industry. 
I began with analyzing the CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart models which 
control for size, value and growth factors for the overall industry. My results affirm my 
first hypothesis that firms that are being held for one year upon announcement of 
violations do show underperformances of between 29 and 57 basis points p.m. My 
findings are sturdy as the adjusted r squared values are rather high. Next, I measured the 
different levels of fines per market size. My results on an overall basis confirm my 
second hypothesis that firms with higher fines do indeed have a higher level of 
underperformance compared to firms with lower fines. My third hypothesis that initial 
announcements of the violations have a larger negative returns compared to other legal 
stages is also supported. My results are in line with my fourth hypothesis, which 
suggests that investors react more to violations in manufacturing, mining and 
transportation and public utilities, which are firms that have a strong connection with 
natural resources. Using the EFFAS ESG plus LT classifications, I was able to confirm 
 81 
 
my fifth hypothesis that investors perceive environmental issues on all different stages 
of violations to be a cause of concern and with larger underperformance. In addition, I 
find that investor’s considerations of ESG plus LT issues in different industries vary 
and hence confirms my final hypothesis that each individual E,S,G, and LT issues are 
relevant in only certain industries. This confirms my fourth hypothesis that investors are 
concerned more on industry specific types of ESG plus LT issue. In totality my 
portfolios indicate underperformances after fines are imposed, however this does not 
hold for the manufacturing industry where I find outperformance in social and 
confirmed but pending other matters fines. This warrants interesting further research to 
investigate and understand the behaviors of investors in the manufacturing industry. 
This chapter shows that investors perceive the value of the firm will decrease 
not only in the short but also in the long run after a fine. In summary, this chapter 
further sheds light on the impact of corporate violations on the performance of firms. 
Literature has already confirmed that in the short-term, illegality does indeed have 
negative consequences on firms. Here I provide evidence that this also holds for the 
long run. These results will be especially important to institutional investors who hold 
portfolios of firms on a long-term basis. Based on these results, investors should divest 
from companies that are involved in illegalities that result in high financial penalties or 
advocate for a stronger change in corporate culture and behaviour that tolerates 
illegalities. On the other hand, firms should have strong principles of corporate legal 
responsibility as behaviors of violations would be detrimental for corporation’s 
performances especially in the long run. Instilling this sense of corporate legal 
responsibility could stem out from firms having sufficient steps and measures in place 
such as the creation of adequate controls, the protection of whistleblowers, the 
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simplification and visibility of its structures and procedures, and the creation of an 
ethics-based culture (Zyglidopoulos and Fleming 2016). 
Although I have tried to obtain the most accurate and reliable data to measure 
violations, there are some limitations to be noted. My results are only prevalent for 
large US firms and further research might be directed towards measuring smaller US 
firms. In addition, due to database limitations and my long sample period of nineteen 
years, I was unable to collect data regarding rumors prior to the fines and hence it 
would be an avenue for further research. 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
 83 
 
3. Inter-market Link of Illegality: Measuring the Effect of 
Short Selling in the context of Fines on Fixed Income 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I examined the impact of fines on stock returns and 
presented various research on the impact of illegal activities of companies which has 
been more on the performances of stock returns (Karpoff, John R. Lott et al. 2005; 
Karpoff, Lee et al. 2007; Karpoff, Scott Lee et al. 2008; Zeidan 2013). However, as of 
2016, the size of the US bond market (total outstanding debt) is $40 trillion and is larger 
than the US equity market (market capitalization) which stands at $23.8 trillion.
29
. 
Nevertheless, there has been very little research on the impacts on fixed income returns 
after illegal behaviors of companies.  
Investor sentiment has been researched strongly to find out whether their 
behaviours influence security prices. Brown & Cliff (2004) found that there is a strong 
relation that exists between institutional sentiment and large stocks.  Results by Baker 
& Wurgler (2006) also indicated that investor sentiment does indeed explain stock 
returns. They find that during the beginning period of low (high) sentiment, the 
subsequent returns of stocks are high (low). However, their results are true only for 
younger stocks, small stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend paying stocks, high 
volatility stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. On the bond front, 
Nayak (2010) found that investor sentiment is a significant factor in determining 
corporate bond yield spreads. Their findings indicate that it is high yield bonds that are 
                                                 
29
 “ US Bond Market and Issuance”  available at http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (accessed 
5 December 2016) and “ China’s stock market have soared  by 1,479% since 2003” available at 
http://www.businessinsider.com/world-stock-market-capitalizations-2016-11?IR=T (accessed 17 June 
2017) 
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more susceptible to mispricing due to sentiment than low yield bonds. One can 
conclude that investor sentiment shows clear signs of impact on financial markets. 
 
Yet, there is very little empirical research that measures the effects of different 
levels of equity sentiment and whether or not that has a direct impact on bond returns. 
Even though equities and bonds have some similar fundamental characteristics, they are 
still different in nature.  The seminal paper by Fama & French (1993) indicates that 
both bonds and stocks have common risk factors and Merton (1974) state they have 
joint claims on a firms assets. However, bonds are illiquid, have cash flows that are pre-
determined by maturities and interest rates, and are primarily traded by institutions 
(Nayak 2010). Nevertheless, Murphy (2011) indicate that there is a strong positive 
relationship between bonds and stocks. In essence the price reaction of both these asset 
classes should confirm each other and move in the same direction. Hence, there should 
be a link between sentiment driven by equity holders and the impacts it has on bond 
holders. 
 
In this study, I investigate whether short selling in the context of fines has an 
impact on bond returns. This is also supported by my results (section 2.5.2) in the 
previous chapter, where I find a significantly positive relation to the amount of fines 
with short interest. I use short selling as an indicator of sentiment as it is done by 
investors who believe that the prices of stocks would eventually decline, though 
controversial in nature (as some indicate that short sellers profit by spreading 
rumours
30
). Karpoff & Lou (2010) find that short sellers are able to anticipate the 
                                                 
30
 For example, in April 2008, SEC charged a Wall Street trader with securities fraud and market 
manipulation for intentionally spreading false rumours about The Blackstone Group's acquisition of 
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eventual discovery and severity of financial misconduct. This indicates that short selling 
can be a good predictor of misconduct.  
 I find four papers which are closely related to this study (Dyck, Morse et al. 
2010; Karpoff and Lou 2010; Henry, Kisgen et al. 2015; Huang, Rossi et al. 2015). 
However, my study differs significantly from theirs. Firstly, both Dyck, Morse, & 
Zingales (2010) and Karpoff and Lou (2010) use short selling in their research to 
identify misconduct. On the other hand, Henry, Kisgen et al. 2015  uses short sellers 
and examines whether they can identify firms that have significant changes in default 
likelihoods and credit rating downgrades. My study is different as I use short selling to 
examine the impact on bond returns. Finally, the next closest paper to my research is by 
Huang, Rossi et al. (2015). They instead use the Baker-Wurgler sentiment index
31
 to 
examine the link between sentiment and corporate bond spreads. My paper differs from 
theirs in the sentiment variable as I use short selling as an investor sentiment especially 
since both Dyck, Morse, & Zingales (2010) and Karpoff and Lou (2010) find that short 
selling is a good predictor of corporate misconduct. Secondly, they only examine the 
link between stock market sentiment on corporate bond yields. Instead, I examine 
further whether short selling in the context of fines impacts corporate bond returns. 
Thirdly, as their paper is interested in the sentiment effect on corporate bond yields, 
they run their analysis using control variables such as bond specific characteristics, 
firm-specific variables and macro-economic variables. My study is different, as I use a 
                                                                                                                                               
Alliance Data Systems (ADS) while selling ADS short (available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-64.htm accessed 29 July 2016) 
31
 This index is constructed using two versions of equity market-based sentiment series. “The first 
version of the sentiment measure is constructed by taking the first principal component of six measures of 
investor sentiment. The six measures include the closed-end fund discount, the number and the first-day 
returns of initial public offerings (IPOs), turnover of stocks traded on New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), the equity share in total new issues and the dividend premium. The principal component 
analysis aims at filtering out idiosyncratic noise in the six measures and capturing their common 
component. The second BW measure is the one where each of the six measures has first been 
orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic conditions”pg6 Huang, Rossi et al. (2015) 
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more advanced multi index model which was an extension of the initial 4 factor model 
used by Blake, E.J. Elton, & Gruber (1993). 
To examine whether short selling in the context of fines can in fact have an 
effect on bond returns, I use Short Interest Ratios (SIR) from only US companies in the 
MSCI Large Cap universe and announcements of fines and settlements that have been 
published in 10-K fillings of firms in Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) reports 
and are therefore considered legitimate. In my sample of 691 firms and 4661 only US 
dollar and non-callable bonds from 2000 to 2012, I find an average of 20 basis points 
p.m drop of bond returns after a fine. This pattern is evident in high SIR portfolios of 
between 60
th
 to 80
th
 percentiles on equal and value weighted portfolios which confirm 
my assumption that it is higher SIR portfolios that underperform. In line with 
expectations I find none of the lower SIR portfolios have any statistical significance in 
the equal weighted portfolios. Nevertheless, I find in the value weighted portfolios that 
there are underperformances in the lower SIR portfolio of between 20
th
 to 40
th
 
percentiles. However, this underperformance is on average 7 basis points p.m lesser 
than the high SIR portfolio between 60
th
 to 80
th
 percentiles. This confirms the view that 
high short selling can affect bond returns more and there is a positive relationship 
between equity sentiment and bond returns after illegal activities. This chapter is the 
first to document that bad sentiment caused by illegal behaviours of companies also has 
a negative effect on bond returns.  
I also investigate whether short selling during crisis periods has a stronger effect 
than during non-crisis periods. Separating the data into periods of recessions, I find that 
short selling in the context of fines does indeed have larger underperformance in bond 
returns compared to non-crisis periods. I find that three out of the six different SIR 
portfolios indicate underperformances in the crisis period compared to only one 
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portfolio in the non crisis period. This indicates that investors perceive crisis periods to 
be more detrimental compared to non-crisis periods. Furthermore, it is only in the crisis 
periods that the higher SIR percentiles (both the 40
th
 to 60
th
 and the 60
th
 to 80
th
) have 
underperformances. .  This result is quite intuitive as investors would penalize 
companies more during crisis periods as fines and settlements would be a higher cost 
incurred for the company and would affect potentially already distressed cash flows.  
Bonds are considered long-term investments and the maturity levels of bonds 
affect returns. Hence, I measure different investment horizons and their effect on 
returns of bonds after announcements of violations. My results show that the negative 
underperformance is more profound on bonds with longer remaining years to maturity 
compared to those with shorter remaining years to maturity. This coincides closely with 
the long-term outlook of responsible investment investors and very instinctively states 
that negative events would carry a worst effect on bonds that have longer remaining 
years to last redemption.  
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to show that high short 
selling in the context of fines induces negative returns on bonds. This paper is also the 
first to show that bond investors perceive fines during crisis periods to be more 
detrimental. Finally, this study adds to the literature on the inter link effects between 
asset classes especially on equity and bonds. Furthermore, this study complements the 
paper by Huang, Rossi et al. (2015) who examine equity sentiment using the Baker-
Wurgler sentiment index on corporate bond spreads. I conclude that fines can be a very 
valuable piece of information when assessing the value of bonds. Investors should make 
use of this in addition to other traditional information such as bond ratings, earnings 
announcements and even macro-economic news.  
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The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 presents the data and the bond methodology used. Section 4 
describes the descriptive statistics of the monthly return data. Section 5 discusses the 
empirical results and Section 6 provides the robustness followed with additional 
analyses. Finally Section 7 concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Short Selling and Equity Performances 
Short selling has always been associated as a controversial activity. Short selling 
literature has revolved around valuation perception of the stock amongst investors. 
There have been cases of bad rumors spread to benefit investors when the price of the 
stock decline
32
. This would then allow the investor to sell the stock and buy it back with   
a profit.   
Short interest research has revolved mainly on the performances of stock 
returns. One of the earlier studies by Seneca (1967) find evidence that stocks do 
experience underperformances after high short interest. The paper also states that short 
sales act as a predictor rather than a causal variable on a stock price. Desai, Ramesh, 
Thiagarajan, & Balachandran (2002) measures the level of short interest ratio and stock 
returns in the Nasdaq market from 1988 to 1994. They find that heavily shorted firms 
experience significant negative abnormal returns of between -0.76 to -1.13 percent per 
month. This also confirmed by (Boehmer, Jones et al. 2008; Boehmer, Huszar et al. 
2010) who find that high short interest does experience subsequent negative abnormal 
                                                 
32
 For example, in April 2008, SEC charged a Wall Street trader with securities fraud and market 
manipulation for intentionally spreading false rumours about The Blackstone Group's acquisition of 
Alliance Data Systems (ADS) while selling ADS short (available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-64.htm accessed 29 July 2016) 
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stock returns. Asquith, Pathak, & Ritter (2005) find that on an equal weighted basis, 
stocks with high short interest ratios and low institutional ownership underperform 176 
basis points p.m more than on a value weighted basis. Diether, Lee & Warner (2009) 
examined daily short selling activity and find increased short selling activity predicts 
negative abnormal returns in a portfolio setting. Even though there have been numerous 
researches on the effects of short selling on equity performances, I find no literature on 
the effects of short selling on bond prices.  
3.2.2 Different Information Effects on Asset Classes (Equity and Bond) 
There are various papers related to measuring the inter-link between equity and 
bond. The first aspect is information about changes in bond ratings as a reaction by 
investors and on stock returns. The earlier work by Goh & Ederington (1993) measured 
the reaction of common stock returns to bond rating changes and find results of 
negative stock responses to downgrades. Nevertheless, they argue that this should not 
be expected for all downgrades as it is only downgrades that result from revaluation of 
a firm’s or industry’s financial prospects that provide those negative reactions. Dichev  
and Piotroski (2001) use Moody’s bond rating changes to find that there are no reliable 
abnormal stock returns following upgrades of rating. They indicate, however, that a 
downgrade results in between 10 to 14 percent negative abnormal returns and these 
findings are most pronounced in the first months following the downgrade and on small 
and low credit-quality firms. Their paper highlights that the “downside” of information 
such as downgrades provides more of an extreme reaction. This notion perhaps stems 
from a behavioral stand point that negativism can carry more of an impact than 
optimistic news and hence provide more extreme reactions to stock returns. 
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The second aspect is earnings announcements in the stock market and whether 
there is an impact on bond markets. Datta & Dhillon (1993) were one of the earliest to 
measure both bond and stock market reaction to unexpected earnings announcements. 
Their findings suggest that earnings surprises convey information to the bond markets 
and changes in the firm value are split among bondholders and stockholders. Their 
study also confirms earlier studies that bondholders react positively (negatively) to 
unexpected earnings increases (decreases). However, one can argue that their sample 
was small and for only six years from 1984 to 1990. DeFond & Zhang (2008) extended 
the research on earnings surprises and bonds. They instead measured whether and how 
earnings surprises convey information to the bond market. Their results indicate in 
contrast to Datta & Dhillon (1993) that the bond market has a significant positive 
reaction to both positive and negative earnings surprise and is weaker than the stock 
market’s reaction. They also studied if the information content of earning surprises is 
smaller for bonds with low default risk. They found that investment grade bonds have a 
weaker reaction to both positive and negative earnings surprises. In addition, their 
results indicated bond’s market reaction to negative earnings surprises news is stronger 
for profitable firms than for loss firms. Their study has a wider sample from 1994 to 
2006 and consists of a final sample of 690 issuers and 11,525 firm-quarter observations. 
Not just measuring whether news has a good or bad impact on bond prices, Defond & 
Zhang  (2014) tested the timelines of bond as well as stock market reaction to good and 
bad earnings news. They find that bond price quotes react on a timelier basis to bad 
news than to good news and that that bond price quotes impound bad news on a timelier 
basis than the stock market. According to their rational based on conservatism, even 
though bondholders would receive bad news at the similar time with shareholders, 
bondholders prefer timelier recognition. 
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The third aspect is measuring the impact of bond prices based on economic 
news. Fleming & Remolana (1997) examined the U.S treasury securities market and 
found that sharpest price changes were attributed to just released macroeconomic 
announcement.  Balduzzi, Elton, & Green (2001) studied intraday data from U.S 
Treasury bonds to investigate the effects of scheduled macroeconomic announcements 
on prices, trading volumes and bid-ask spreads. Their main findings is that based on 17 
news releases, which were measured by the surprise in announcement, had a significant 
impact on the price of at least one of the following instruments: i) 3 month bill ii) two 
year note iii) 10 year note and iv) 30 year bond. Furthermore, those effects varied 
significantly according to maturity
33
. Green (2004) examined the influence of 
macroeconomic news releases on bond prices and found that there is a significant 
increase in the informational role of trading following economic announcements, which 
suggests the release of public information increases the level of information asymmetry 
in the government bond market.  
3.2.3 Related Research 
I find four prior studies that are closely related to this study. The first is the 
paper by Henry, Kisgen, & Wu (2015) and they investigate whether short sellers 
identify firms that have significant changes in default likelihoods and credit rating 
downgrades. Their results indicate that short sellers predict changes in default 
probabilities that lead to bond rating downgrades by focusing on firms with inaccurate 
                                                 
33
 “While nine announcements affect the price of the T-bill, 13 announcements affect the price of 
the two-year note, 16 announcements affect the price of the 10-year note, and 10 announcements affect 
the price of the 30-year bond” pg 524. Balduzzi, Elton, & Green Balduzzi, P., E. J. Elton, et al. (2001). 
"Economic News and Bond Prices: Evidence from the U.S. Treasury Market." Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 36(04): 523-543. 
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or biased ratings. Their paper adds to the body of knowledge on short sellers as a useful 
tool for assessing credit risk on a timely basis.  
The next two papers measure the link between short selling and an actual 
misconduct. First, Karpoff & Lou (2010) examine whether short sellers are able to 
detect firms that misrepresent their financial statements using data from 632 SEC 
enforcement actions from 1988 through 2005. They find that abnormal short interest 
increases steadily in the 19 months before misrepresentation is publically revealed. The 
second, Dyck, Morse, & Zingales (2010) measure short interest to corporate fraud cases 
of U.S firms against security class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2004. Using both equal 
and value weighted methodology, they find fraud detection when short selling activity 
is three standard deviations over the three month prior average prior to a revelation.  
Their findings indicate that between 3.5% and 14.5% of their 216 events is detected by 
short sellers.  Both paper’s findings indicate that short selling can indeed be a measure 
for eventually discovery of misconduct.  
The fourth paper measures the link between sentiment and corporate bond 
spreads. Huang, Rossi, & Wang (2015) provide evidence that stock market sentiment 
can be an important driver of corporate bond valuations. Using the Baker-Wurgler 
(BW) sentiment index, they find that sentiment is negatively related to corporate bond 
spreads, especially after the 2007-2008 financial crises.  
From the papers above, it can be concluded that the level of short selling affects 
not only the performances of stocks but can also be a good measure to detect illegal 
behaviors. Most importantly, the impact of short selling is not limited to it equity 
returns class but also impacts bonds. Nevertheless, this study differs from the above 
papers in several ways. Firstly, I am using different levels of short interest as a measure 
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of sentiment and examining its impact on bond performances. Secondly, using 12 years 
of hand collected data and with 1652 monetary fines, I further investigate whether there 
is an interlink between companies that short sell when fines are given to a company and 
if that can be a new useful piece of information  when assessing bond performance.  
3.2.4 Bonds and Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) 
There has been growing research interest on SRI and bonds. One of the earlier 
papers to measure SRI bond funds performance was by Derwall & Koedijk (2009).  
They found that average SRI bond funds performed similar to conventional funds while 
the average SRI balanced outperformed its conventional peers by more than 1.3% per 
year. Their paper could be called a pioneer in the SRI field as it opened up the way for 
more SRI research in mutual funds. Following them there are two recent studies using 
their similar methodology which is an extension of the Blake, E.J. Elton, & Gruber 
(1993) model to measure the performances of bond mutual funds. Henke, et al., (2014) 
measured the performance of 103 US and Eurozone socially responsible bond funds and 
compared them with a matched sample of conventional funds. They found that during 
the period 2001-2014 socially responsible bond funds outperform by half a percent 
annually.  Hoepner & Nilsson (2015), extended Derwall & Koedijk (2009) multi index 
model by adding 4 additional factors. They find that SRI bond funds that are from fund 
management companies that are not involved in ESG engagement perform significantly 
worse indicating the materiality of fund management companies' ESG expertise and 
ESG engagement in bond investments. 
Drut (2010) analyzed sovereign bonds in 20 developed countries in a SRI 
framework and their results indicated that socially responsible portfolios of sovereign 
bonds can be built without a significant loss of mean-variance efficiency. So far the 
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research mentioned above have shed a positive light on SRI and bonds. Menz (2010) 
investigated the  relationship between the valuation of European corporate bonds and 
the standards of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and found that the premium for 
socially responsible firms were the similar with non-socially responsible companies. 
Their results show that the effects of CSR have yet to be incorporated into pricing of 
bonds.  Oikonomou, Brooks, & Pavelin (2014), using KLD stats with an extensive set 
of data of more than 3000 bonds issued by 742 firms operating in 17 industries, were 
the first to investigate the differential impact that various dimensions of Corporate 
Social Performance (CSP) has on pricing of corporate debt as well as the assessment of 
the credit quality of specific bond issues. Their work is one of the first to use an 
extensive cross-industrial longitudinal data set of U.S bonds from 1991 to 2008. Their 
results indicate that overall, good performance is rewarded and corporate social 
transgressions are penalized through lower and higher corporate bond yield spreads, 
respectively. Their paper induces the notion that doing good pays off for a company and 
thus increasing efforts in CSP would be beneficial for the company as well as for the 
bondholders. Stellner, Klein, & Zwergel (2015) instead measured whether CSR reduces 
a company’s credit risk using 872 bonds from twelve European countries. Their results 
interestingly indicate that there is weak evidence to support the notion that superior 
CSP results in systematically reduced credit risk. However, in a deeper analysis they 
find strong results that it rather is a country’s ESG performance that moderates the 
CSP–credit risk relationship. 
3.2.5 Conceptual background and Hypotheses Development 
Freeman (1984) defines a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives". Stakeholders of the 
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firm include stockholders, creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, public interest 
groups, and governmental bodies. There is a vast amount of literature that measure 
companies’ performances based on stakeholder theories. However, only in the last 
decade has there been an increase in measuring the actions of companies based on ESG 
issues. One of the main concerns is that the competitive environment that has been put 
in place by society has rather forced or urged corporations or specifically managers to 
react only in their self-interest (Campbell 2007).  In order to pursue short-term profits 
which would inevitably look good for the corporation, managers are instead closing an 
eye to acting responsibly within the purview of good corporate behaviour. Narayanan 
(1985) indicates that when the manager has private information regarding his or her 
decisions, situations exist wherein the manager has incentives to make decisions which 
yield short-term profits but are not in the stockholders best interest. This risk is called 
agency risk which was introduced in the seminal paper by Jensen & Meckling (1976). 
There are many such cases of managers acting irresponsibly or illegally in order to 
benefit themselves in the name of pursuing profits. For example the Enron corporate 
accounting scandal in the early 2000s which inevitably led to its bankruptcy. 
Oikonomou, et al.,(2014) state that “a firm that is found to behave irresponsibly 
in a given dimension of its Corporate Social Performance risks a higher probability of 
a class of negative events occurring such as product boycotts, employees going on 
strike or withholding best efforts, imposition of fines, penalties, government sanctions, 
punitive damages, and associated litigation costs”. Illegal behaviours of companies are 
detrimental to a company as it causes not only reduced loyalty but also serious 
governance implications. The credibility of the company can be questioned which could 
then tarnish its reputation and create further repercussions. 
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It can be deduced that illegal behaviours of managers due to their own self-
interest have a negative impact on stakeholders. Hence, in this chapter I try to measure 
whether there is a link between those two types of stakeholders: shareholders and 
bondholders. Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) account for agency risk in their paper when 
measuring the link of corporate governance on bond rating and yields. They find that 
bond ratings (yields) on new debt issues are positively (negatively) associated with the 
percentage of shares held by the institutions and the fraction of the board made up of 
non-officers. They advocate that governance mechanisms can reduce default risk by 
mitigating agency costs and monitoring managerial performance and by reducing 
information asymmetry between the firm and the lenders. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & 
LaFond (2006) investigated how various governance mechanisms that are intended to 
control agency conflicts between management and all stakeholders impact credit 
ratings. They indicated that the interests of bondholders and shareholders can diverge 
when there are differing stakes in firm performance and differing views on 
management’s investment policies. They find that firms with stronger shareholder 
rights have lower credit ratings implying a higher cost of debt financing. Weber (2006) 
affirmed and believed that Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & LaFond (2006) study does 
indeed provide persuasive evidence that debt holders value different aspects of a firm's 
system of corporate governance. The studies above investigate the effects of 
governance mechanisms on yields and credit ratings; instead I intend to measure the 
inter-link of equity shareholders reactions with the returns on bonds due to the illegal 
behaviours of companies.   
 
From the above literature, it can be observed there is clearly a relationship 
between equity holders and bond holders. There is a gap though in measuring the inter-
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market reaction of shareholders with bondholders due to illegal behaviours of 
companies especially those fined. All markets are related, the key question here is 
investigating the directions of these reactions. There is a strong positive link between 
stocks and bonds and both markets have a tendency to trend together (Murphy 2011). 
Hence, the main hypothesis of my study is: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with high short interest ratios have lower bond returns upon 
announcement of illegal violations of companies compared to firms with lowers short 
interest ratios 
 
The sample periods of this study is from 2000 to 2012 and in that span of 12 
years there were two major crisis periods, the dot com bubble burst and the subprime 
mortgage crisis. Many studies test the effect of crisis periods on performances. 
Nofsinger & Varma (2014) found that socially responsible mutual funds outperform 
conventional mutual funds during periods of market crisis.. On a bond level, Henke, et 
al., (2014) measured whether socially responsible bond funds have better performances 
during crisis periods compared to conventional bunds funds. Similarly to Nofsinger & 
Varma (2014), their study confirmed that there is a crisis related return effect out of 
sample among socially screened indices for their US sample. In both studies, they find 
that the reduction in downside risk during crisis periods nevertheless comes at a cost 
during non-crisis periods, as then SRI funds under-perform. Callen & Fang (2015) find 
evidence that short interest is positively related to one year ahead stock price crash. 
They also find that this relationship is more salient with firms that have weak 
governance mechanism, excessive risk-taking behaviour, and high information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Hence, as my companies in the 
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portfolio are based on illegal behaviours and more risky, during a financial crisis, the 
impacts of the “bad behaviours” should be penalized more. My second hypothesis is as 
below: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with announcements of illegal violations have  lower e bond 
returns during crisis period than non-crisis periods 
 
SRI research has always been focused on long-term impacts as SRI investors are 
more concerned on long-term returns. The US Forum for Sustainable and Responsible 
Investment (USSIF) even states that “(SRI) is an investment discipline that considers 
ESG criteria to generate long-term competitive financial returns and positive societal 
impact
34”. Furthermore, bondholders in definition are long-term holders and are more 
inclined to consider long-term issues such as event risks. Oikonomou, Brooks et al. 
(2014) examine the effect of CSP on corporate bond spreads based on different levels of 
maturities and find the link between CSP and yield spreads is more significantly 
negative for longer maturity bonds. Announcement of illegal violations can be 
considered as long-term event risks as implications of violations usually have longer 
time frames for regulatory enforcements. Hence, from the above I believe that the 
impacts of these illegalities should be more profound on bond returns that have longer 
remaining years to maturity. Hence my third hypothesis is as below: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with announcements of illegal violations have more pronounced 
lower bond returns with longer remaining years to maturity than shorter remaining 
years to maturity 
                                                 
34
 “SRI Basics” http://www.ussif.org/sribasics accessed 11 June 2017 
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I proceed in the next sections to explain the data collection methods which were 
used to test the above hypotheses and the empirical findings.  
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data of Illegal Violations 
The source of monetary fines data obtained in this study is similar to the 
previous chapter. This study consists of a sample of publicly traded US firms that have 
violations and involve only monetary penalization. The lists of US firms were taken 
from the MSCI World Large Cap Constituents over a 12-year period from 2000 to 
2012. The twelve year period is chosen because of the availability of data. The SIR 
ratios from Bloomberg were only from 2000 onwards.  As shown in table 8.6 in the 
appendix, the final sample consisted of 691 unique firms with 4661 bonds. 
3.3.2 Data Preparation 
Monthly bond return data was retrieved from Thompson Reuters Datastream 
from the period 2000 to 2012. According to DeFond & Zhang (2008), Datastream tends 
to have a more comprehensive coverage of bond prices in contrast to alternative 
databases such as the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) or the Lehman Brothers 
bond databases. In addition, the bond prices in Datastream are actual quotes by market 
markets. Another alternative would be to use the Trade Reporting and Compliance 
Engine (TRACE) which is corporate bond data provided by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority. TRACE was introduced to increase the price transparency in the 
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U.S corporate debt market
35
. TRACE could have been a good substitute to collect 
monthly bond prices as it includes almost all over-the-counter bonds trades, 
unfortunately their data coverage only starts in July 2002. Defond & Zhang (2014) also 
compared the TRACE and Datastream databases on the number of bonds and issuers. 
They also conclude that Datastream has a longer history of bond data compared to 
TRACE, resulting in a larger sample of issues and issuers. They go on to add that 
TRACE has issuers that are larger, more profitable and more highly leveraged than 
issuers on Datastream. The bonds have lower offering yields, larger offering amounts 
and shorter maturity. Therefore, in this study I proceed to use Datastream data for the 
bond prices. 
To create my portfolios, I included only bond equivalents in US dollar (USD) 
denominated currencies and in the US market. Following Oikonomou, et al., (2014) I 
excluded banks and financial institutions as the large number of bonds in that sector 
would dominate the sample. Furthermore, in 2008 there was a US ban on short selling 
of financial firms during the financial crisis and shorting activity for large-cap firms 
dropped by an average of 77% (Boehmer, Jones et al. 2013; Jain, Jain et al. 2013). As I 
am using short selling as an investor sentiment, this would only reduce the variability of 
explanation.  
 
Bonds that have a callable feature provide an option for the borrowing 
corporation to buy back the bond at a stated price prior to maturity. Should the rates 
fall, this option would provide the borrower with financial flexibility to replace the 
bond (Boyce and Kalotay 1979). Considering that my analysis is based on measuring 
the impacts of bond prices after an event and to ensure that the effect is not based on 
                                                 
35
 https://www.finra.org/industry/trace/corporate-bond-data 
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other arguments such as predictions or expectations of interest rate changes, I included 
only bonds that have no callable features. I exclude all floating rate notes, index-linked 
bonds, convertible bonds, exchangeable bonds, hybrids, preferred bonds, perpetual 
bonds, private placements, sinking fund provisions, bonds with embedded options or 
warrants, and bonds with any other nonstandard characteristic (Campbell and Taksler 
2003; Oikonomou, Brooks et al. 2014). Also, having a bond that has a non-callable 
feature signals the long-term nature and characteristics of the bond. To ensure that my 
portfolios are not subjected to potential survivorship bias, I include firms that are dead 
in my sample (Grinblatt and Titman 1989; Adamsson and Hoepner 2015 ).Nevertheless, 
I do not use any bond prices that are constant throughout a significant period of time. 
S.J. Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, & Ross (1992) indicate that if a sample inclusion 
depends in part on rate of return, then survivorship bias will lead to possible biases in 
the moments of returns and the beta. The three month US Treasury bill for the 
calculation of risk free return was also downloaded from Thompson Reuters 
Datastream. 
 
In this chapter I used the Barclays Capital United States Aggregate Indices as 
the benchmark factors. Barclays is the leading provider of bond indices. Barclays 
Capital Indices was a rebranding in 2008 which combines the Lehman Brothers and 
Barclays Capital Indices into a single platform. The quality of the bonds here must be 
rated investment grade (Baa3/BBB-/BBB- or above) using the middle rating of 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch respectively. All these bonds are denominated in USD. This 
index excludes bonds with equity-type features (e.g. warrants, convertibility), private 
placements, floating-rate issues, strips, inflation linked bonds, Securities with both 
Regulation S and SEC Rule 144A without Registration Rights tranches USD25/50 par 
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bonds (Barclays, 2008). Table 8.7 in the appendix provides details of the benchmark, 
sources and codes used. 
3.3.3 Data Construction 
Short interest ratio monthly (SIR) data was retrieved from Bloomberg from 
2000 to 2012. SIR is defined as the total number of shares an investor has sold short 
divided by the average daily trading volume for a specific time period. Firstly, I 
matched the SIR data with each companies ISIN code in each respective month. 
Secondly, I then created a percentile ranking in terms of the level of SIR in that 
respective quarter (March, June, September and December). Following those percentile 
rankings, I was then able to separate each company into different levels of SIR. The 
first, second, third, fourth and fifth portfolio’s consisted of the level of SIR from 0% to 
20%, 20 % to 40 %, 40% to 60%, 60% to 80% and 80% to 100% respectively. I also 
created a sixth portfolio of companies that did not have any SIR data.  
 
Once I was able to identify companies in their respective levels of SIR, I then 
matched those companies with their monthly bond return data. These portfolios are 
updated every quarter and held for three months after an event. For example, in 
December 2005, company XYZ was ranked in the first portfolio (level of SIR from 0% 
to 20%). Firstly, I check if that company had any illegal events in December 2005, if 
yes, I then used the data of the returns from all its bonds with a three months holding 
period (January to March 2006)  I repeat this every quarter to have full year returns in 
my portfolio.  Secondly, I then added these returns in the first portfolio. I carry on this 
exercise with other companies.  
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3.3.4 Bond Methodology 
Following Hoepner & Nilsson (2015) I used their multi index model which was 
an extension of the initial 4 factor model used by Blake, E.J. Elton, & Gruber (1993) as 
per the formula (3.1) below. Their seminal work was the first to measure the 
performance of mutual fund bonds. Multi index models are a better measure than single 
index models because they are unable to explain the returns of all bond classes (Derwall 
and Koedijk 2009).  
 pt −  ft =  i +  i(      mt –  ft) +  1i       t +  2i      t +  3i      t +  it             (3.1) 
 
where Rpt is the monthly portfolio return of the bonds equal weighted in month 
t, Rft is the monthly US T-Bill rate. This model consists of the excess return of a created 
bond market benchmark to take into the account the overall exposure to the entire 
portfolio (MARKET). I created this unique market benchmark using only the returns 
from all the companies in the portfolio. This market benchmark is on securities level 
and uses the bond return data. It also includes the excess return of a high yield bond 
index to take into account exposure to the high yield market and the potential default 
risk inherent in this exposure (DEFAULT). However, in this chapter, I follow Hoepner 
& Nilsson (2015), who altered the DEFAULT factor to instead of consisting of the 
excess return of a high yield index, to consist of the difference between a high yield 
index and an AAA only bond index. They believe that this would clean the factor to 
purely take into account high yield exposure. The model also includes a factor to 
capture exposure to the market for securitized debt and option characteristics of bonds, 
consisting of the excess return of a mortgage index (OPTION). Finally, it includes the 
excess return of an equity index to cover any exposure to the equity market (EQUITY).  
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Hoepner & Nilsson (2015) improved on the 4 factor model by introducing a 8 
factor model which takes into account 3 main exchange rates; USD:EUR, USD:GBP, 
and USD:YEN. They indicate that exchange rates are an important factor in explaining 
bond returns because there may be an inherent exchange rate risk in bond funds. Even 
though this chapter is not on funds but on firm level bonds, I find that the influence is 
crucial as investors who buy bond bonds from another currency would receive 
payments of their coupons and principal payment in US dollar. They also added 
(DURATION) which is the difference between a long and short-term government bond 
index to capture the exposure to the difference in duration and expectation changes in 
interest rates over time. 
 pt −  ft =  i +  i(      mt –  ft) +  1i       t +  2i      t +  3i      t             
+ 4iDURATIONt + β5i€ + β6i£ + Β7i¥+  it                                                                                                                                     (3.2) 
 
My portfolios are equally weighted (EW) which is the most common weighting 
scheme. This means that each investor would hold the same value of its stock within the 
portfolio and would be an equal part. Bender (2012) using equal weighted MSCI 
flagship  indexes such as MSCI EAFE and Emerging market indices, indicated that 
those indexes delivered significantly enhanced returns over its cap weighted 
counterparts. This clearly indicates that there are biases on methodology in portfolio 
creation that can tilt results to benefit certain type of investors. Various literature have 
critiqued the use of just equal weighted portfolios indicating that portfolio managers use 
equal weighted portfolios on value weighted benchmarks (Hoepner and Zeume 2013; 
Adamsson and Hoepner 2015 ). In order to ensure that my study is not bias on certain 
tilted weights, for robustness, I also value weighted (VW) the portfolios within each 
company. I used the Market Value code in Datastream which is defined as, the current 
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market value of the issue, that is, the current market price multiplied by the amount 
currently in issue, to calculate the market weights for each individual company. The 
process to value weight the bonds is as per the following steps: 
i)  The first step is retrieving the current market value issued of each bond for each 
firm at time t 
ii)  The second step is calculating the weights at the specific period of time of the 
firm for each respective portfolio per bond in each individual company. The total 
weights for at period t should equal to 1 for each individual firm (i.e. each 
individual bond weight summed up per firm) 
iii)  The third step is then multiplying the returns of the individual bond with the 
individual calculated bond weights. Then summing up the calculated returns per 
weight for each individual firm (i.e. if firm x has 6 bonds, then all the calculated 
returns per weight of the 6 bonds are summed up for firm x) 
iv)  The fourth step is calculating the overall market weights of each individual firm. 
This is done by summing up all the individual bonds market value for each firm 
and calculating its weight in the entire portfolio at individual time t. (i.e. The total 
weight at period t should equal to 1 for the entire portfolio) 
v)  The final step is then to use the calculated returns per weight for each individual 
firm in the third step and multiply it with the overall weight of the portfolio in the 
fourth step. 
 
There are various studies in the portfolio selection literature that measure the use 
of both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios (Plyakha, Uppal et al. 2012; 
Chung, Liao et al. 2015; Adamsson and Hoepner 2015 ). Value weighting portfolios is 
also a common practice with portfolio managers. The use of different weights that a 
manager assigns to its portfolio can affect its portfolio returns and is just as important as 
investment timing and stock selection decisions (Chung, Liao et al. 2015).  
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, I discuss the descriptive statistics of both the equal-weighted and 
value-weighted portfolios which can be viewed in table 3.1. Comparing the equal-
weighted portfolios against the value-weighted portfolios, I find three portfolios have 
higher mean returns (20
th
 to 40
th
, 40
th
 to 60
th
 and 80
th
 to 100
th
) but all equal-weighted 
portfolios have higher standard deviations. Standard deviation can be measured as the 
volatility of the portfolio. A (low) high volatile portfolio will have a (lower) higher 
standard deviation. This indicates that the equal-weighted portfolios show higher risk-
return behavior. For example, the highest equal-weighted SIR portfolio has a mean 
return of 61 basis points whereas the value-weighted portfolio has a mean return of 59 
basis points and the standard deviations are 0.0187 and 0.0169 respectively.  I further 
observe the equal-weighted 20
th
 to 40
th
 SIR percentile portfolio has higher mean returns 
and standard deviations compared to the other SIR percentile portfolios. 
 
 
 [This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The table below is the descriptive statistics for both equal weighted and value weighted portfolios. It 
describes the mean return, maximum return, minimum return and standard deviation. The data is based 
on monthly total return. 
Portfolio  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Equal Weighted 
    Zero - SIR 0.0058 0.0672 -0.0803 0.0184 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR 0.0054 0.0678 -0.0803 0.0208 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0071 0.1206 -0.0847 0.0212 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR 0.0060 0.0810 -0.0879 0.0187 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR 0.0039 0.0480 -0.0896 0.0181 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0061 0.0593 -0.0639 0.0187 
Panel B:Value Weighted         
Zero - SIR 0.0062 0.0705 -0.0716 0.0174 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR 0.0062 0.0543 -0.0567 0.0163 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0061 0.0742 -0.0693 0.0175 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR 0.0050 0.0540 -0.0751 0.0165 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR 0.0044 0.0500 -0.0760 0.0174 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0059 0.0584 -0.0621 0.0169 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Bond Returns on Overall Portfolios 
Table 3.2 presents the results for the equal weighted single and multi-factor 
regressions respectively. Column 1 represents the various different levels of SIR 
portfolios and column 2 reports the monthly alphas obtained when running the 1, 5 and 
8 factor models against the created benchmark and the additional variables. These 
portfolios use the Barclays US indices to represent the benchmark factors in the model. 
The equity factor in my regression is based on the MSCI USA index. I note that the 
adjusted R squared values are considerably high, ranging from 0.5 to 0.9. However,, 
when comparing the 1 factor, 5 factor and 8 factor model, the adjusted r squared values 
increase though only marginally.  Hoepner & Nilsson (2015) indicate that their 
additional 8 factor model produces an increase in R squared values. Thus, it is noted 
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that using their extended model with my data only produces slightly better adjusted r-
squared values. Nevertheless, using the extended model is important to ensure I have 
captured all the necessary additional factors. All market betas are statistically 
significant at a 1% level and are very high. My benchmarking procedure was to closely 
match the firms in the sample, hence when observing the betas I find that most of the 
portfolios are close to 1 (except the 60
th
 to 80
th 
percentile SIR portfolio) indicating that 
the portfolios have a tendency to follow the created market benchmark. In both the 5 
and 8 factor model, the two lowest SIR portfolios
36
 have a beta of more than 1 
indicating a higher volatility compared to the market. This is consistent with my initial 
observation of its standard deviation which was very high in comparison to the other 
portfolios.  Similarly when examining the other 8 factor variables (refer to table 8.13 in 
the appendix), I find that the portfolio has very low exposure to either long or short 
term bonds as I find no significant coefficients. The portfolios also seem to have also no 
significant exposure to the default, option or even to the equity market. However, the 
40
th
 to 60
th
 percentile SIR portfolio has a negative coefficient sign to USD-YEN and the 
80
th
 to 100
th
 percentile SIR portfolio has a negative coefficient to USD-EUR.   
My objective is to examine whether firms with high short interest ratios have 
negative bond returns upon announcement of illegal violations of companies. When 
analyzing the results, in each of the three different factor models, I find consistent 
statistically significant underperformance in the 2
nd
 highest SIR
37
 portfolio. For 
example, in the 8 factor model, I find a decrease in alpha of 20 basis points p.m. I note 
the low beta of 0.6 and this was also evident in its low standard deviation in comparison 
to the other portfolios. Despite the fact that only the 2
nd
 highest and not also the highest 
portfolio indicates underperformance, this still shows that fines can be a sign of “bad” 
                                                 
36
 0 to 20
th
 and 20
th
 to 40
th
 percentile 
37
 60
th
 to 80
th
 percentile 
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sentiment from equity investors especially when there is high level of short selling. 
Additionally, the lower SIR portfolios do not show any statistical significance which is 
in line with expectations. In Table 3.3, I split the sample into two sub periods; 10/2000 
to 12/2006 and 1/2007 to 4/2013. I find that only the first half of the sample period has 
underperformance in the 60
th
 to 80
th
 percentile of 28 basis points p.m. The 
underperformance though vanishes in the 5 and 8 factor model. This indicates that the 
results are primarily driven by the first half of the sample. Examining the other factor 
variables, I find in the first half of the sample, only the 40
th
 to 60
th
 percentile portfolio 
has a positive exposure to the option factor and for the second half of the sample only 
the zero SIR portfolio has a negative coefficient to the option factor.  In overall, it can 
be deduced that the SIR portfolios do not have any significant exposure to the 
additional factor variables and most of the alpha results are driven by the market beta. 
 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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Table 3.2 Equal Weighted Results based on Barclays US Index Benchmark (Full 
Sample Period) 
The table below displays the regression results of the monthly alphas and market variable which are adjusted 
based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors. The portfolios are equally weighted. The table displays the 
adjusted R-square for each portfolio. Significance levels are presented as *,** and *** for 10%,5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. The value in the parentheses represents the values of the T-statistics 
Portfolio Alpha     Market     Adj R2 
1 Factor               
Zero - SIR -0.0010   (-1.1765) 0.9615 *** (13.1315) 0.69 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0014   (-1.3859) 0.9683 *** (8.8141) 0.55 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0003   (-0.2841) 1.0821 *** (8.2815) 0.65 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0006   (-0.7472) 0.9527 *** (12.0034) 0.65 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0021 * (-1.9176) 0.8488 *** (11.8152) 0.55 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0002   (0.1873) 0.8180 *** (11.1781) 0.47 
5 Factor               
Zero - SIR -0.0005   (0.6520) 0.8222 *** (6.7654) 0.70 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0018   (-1.4414) 1.0746 *** (4.3335) 0.56 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0006   (-0.7566) 1.0436 *** (4.0556) 0.66 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0008   (-0.9156) 0.9304 *** (9.0911) 0.65 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0022 ** (-2.0369) 0.6713 *** (5.084) 0.55 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0002   (-0.1643) 0.8342 *** (6.5363) 0.48 
8 Factor               
Zero - SIR -0.0005   (-0.6823) 0.8173 *** (6.3057) 0.71 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0014   (-1.2293) 1.0695 *** (4.1258) 0.57 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0008   (-1.0219) 1.0850 *** (3.5857) 0.66 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0010   (-1.2958) 0.9459 *** (7.927) 0.66 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0020 * (-1.9389) 0.6427 *** (4.5429) 0.55 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0003   (-0.2527) 0.9258 *** (7.6092) 0.49 
.
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Table 3.3 Equal Weighted Results based on Barclays US Index Benchmark (Split 
Sample Period) 
The table below displays the regressions results of the monthly alphas which are based on the Barclays US Benchmark 
factors .The portfolios are equally weighted. Column 1 and 2 are the first half of the sample period from 2000 to 2006. 
Column 3 and 4 are the second half of the sample period from 2007 to 2013.  The table displays adjusted R-square for each 
portfolio. The regressions are computed with (Newey and West 1987) corrections for serial correlation. Significance levels 
are presented as *,** and *** for 10%,5% and 1% significance level respectively. The value in the parentheses represents the 
values of the T-statistics. All regressions include a series of variables described in the text (but their regression coefficients 
are not reported in the table). 
 
  First Half (2000 to 2006) Second Half (2007 to 2012) 
  Equal Weighted Equal Weighted 
Portfolio Alpha     Adj R2   Alpha     Adj R2   
1 Factor (1)     (2)   (3)     (4)   
Zero - SIR -0.0004   (-0.3673) 0.54   -0.0014   (-0.9928) 0.78   
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0021   (-1.2079) 0.55   -0.0013   (-0.6911) 0.57   
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0015   (-1.1088) 0.71   0.0009   (0.6423) 0.61   
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0003   (-0.2976) 0.76   -0.0008   (-0.7285) 0.61   
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0028 * (-1.7732) 0.53   -0.0014   (-0.9456) 0.57   
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0007   (-0.3392) 0.36   0.0012   (1.0240) 0.65   
5 Factor                     
Zero - SIR -0.0008   (-0.795) 0.55   -0.0002   (-0.1625) 0.83   
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0017   (-0.8899) 0.54   -0.0019   (-0.9072) 0.59   
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0011   (-1.1822) 0.72   0.0005   (0.4313) 0.62   
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0002   (-0.2441) 0.82   -0.0006   (-0.4174) 0.59   
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0024   (-1.5501) 0.57   -0.0021   (-1.0948) 0.57   
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0028   (-1.3693) 0.40   0.0010   (0.9693) 0.70   
8 Factor                     
Zero - SIR -0.0010   (-0.9051) 0.54   -0.0003   (-0.2482) 0.85   
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0008   (-0.5488) 0.58   -0.0014   (-0.7096) 0.58   
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0012   (-1.2215) 0.71   0.0001   (0.082) 0.61   
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0003   (-0.3149) 0.81   -0.0013   (-1.0929) 0.60   
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0024   (-1.6273) 0.57   -0.0019   (-1.0175) 0.57   
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0032   (-1.4378) 0.41   0.0008   (0.7462) 0.70   
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3.5.2 Bond Returns in Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods 
 In this section I categorize crisis periods during economic recessions as this is 
a time of market turmoil and instability during a period of more than a few months. 
During an economic recession there is usually a drop in pricing in stock markets and 
negative economic growth as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The most 
recent financial crisis which began in 2007 had a profound impact on the debt market 
due to the mortgage back securities market. This resulted in numerous downgrades of 
bond credit ratings and inevitably the failure of various financial institutions. I follow  
Henke, et al., (2014) who used the National Bureau of Economic Research Lists for the 
US 38 recessionary periods which began from December 2001 until June 2003 and 
from December 2007 until June 2009. The non-recession periods are the other 
remaining months in the sample from 10/2000 to 04/2013.  
  Table 3.4 presents the monthly alpha results of both the crisis and non-crisis 
periods. Three out of six of the crisis period portfolios for both the 5 and 8 factor 
models are statistically significant with underperformances. In the 8 factor model, I find 
the three portfolios
38
 underperform by 99, 39, and 65 basis points p.m respectively. On 
the non-crisis periods, I still find statistical significant underperformances. The 
underperformance is in the 20
th
 to 40
th
 percentile portfolio and in all three different 
factor models. For instance the 8 factor model shows a decrease of 27 basis points per 
month. When comparing both the different periods, my hypothesis is confirmed. I find 
there are lower returns in the crisis periods and when comparing it to the non-crisis 
periods at the respective SIR percentile levels, I find no statistical significance at all. 
                                                 
38
 0 to 20
th
, 40
th
 to 60
th
 and 60
th
 to 80
th
 percentile 
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This could indicate that investors at the specific SIR percentile level feel that the 
illegalities are more detrimental during crisis periods. When examining the crisis and 
non-crisis period 8 factor variables (table8.14 and 8.15 in the appendix), I find two out 
of the six portfolios only in the crisis periods have a positive exposure to the duration 
factor. I find only one portfolio in the crisis period (20
th
 to 40
th
) and one in the non-
crisis period (60
th
 to 80
th
) has negative and positive significant coefficients to the 
default factor respectively. The default factor indicates exposure to the high yield 
bonds. I also find relatively low exposure to the equity market. Only the 0
 
to 20
th
 SIR 
percentile in crisis and non crisis periods have a negative and positive significance 
coefficient respectively.  Only two portfolios in the non-crisis period (zero in the crisis 
period) had any exposure to the option factor which indicates in both periods there is 
low exposure to the mortgage market. In terms of the currency exposure, I find that 
only the crisis period (60
th
 to 80
th
) is exposed to the USD-EUR and USD-GBP factor 
and the 20
th
 to 40
th
 percentile to the USD- YEN factor. Additionally, as I find 3 out of 6 
of the SIR portfolios in the 8 factor model shows negative statistical significance, this 
indicates that investors are clearly reacting to illegal events more during crisis periods 
regardless of the different levels of shorting. Both crisis and non-crisis portfolios show 
high adjusted r-squared values of 0.5 to 0.8.  
 These results support my hypothesis that firms with announcements of illegal 
violations have larger negative bond returns during crisis period than non-crisis periods. 
One can conclude that the strong negative sentiment investors have on companies are 
very much significant during recessions periods especially on companies that behave 
illegally and are monetarily penalized for their actions. This confirms the notion that 
investors would penalize companies for their bad behavior even more during these 
crisis periods. My study adds to this body of literature of crisis and non-crisis periods, 
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by indicating that companies that are fined based on illegal activities have a more 
pronounced effect during crisis times than non-crisis times. 
 
 [This section has been intentionally left blank] 
 115 
 
Table 3.4 Equal Weighted Alpha Results for Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods 
The table below displays the regression results (alphas) for both equal monthly returns for the different levels of SIR 
percentile of firms The regressions are run using the Barclays US Benchmark factors and are equal weighted. The crisis 
periods cover economic recessions for the US of 38 months from 12/2001 until 06/2003 and from 12/2007 until 06/2009. 
The non recession periods are the other remaining months in the sample from 01/2000 to 12/2013.The table displays the T-
statistics in parentheses and the adjusted R-square values for each portfolio. The regressions are computed with (Newey 
and West 1987) corrections for serial correlation. Significance levels are presented as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels respectively. All regressions include a series of variables described in the text (but their regression 
coefficients are not reported in the table). 
  Recession Periods Non - Recession Periods  
  Equal Weighted Equal Weighted 
Portfolio Alpha     Adj R2 Alpha     Adj R2 
1 Factor (1) 
  
(2) (3) 
  
(4) 
Zero - SIR -0.0022 
 
(-1.009) 0.73 -0.0004 
 
(-0.5702) 0.64 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0057 
 
(-1.612) 0.45 -0.0001 
 
(-0.1476) 0.72 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0020 
 
(1.3166) 0.71 -0.0019 ** (-2.3507) 0.68 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0030 
 
(-1.6515) 0.64 0.0004 
 
(0.5067) 0.69 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0072 *** (-2.8417) 0.61 0.0000 
 
(-0.0342) 0.50 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0030 
 
(1.0891) 0.49 -0.0010 
 
(-0.7937) 0.46 
5 Factor 
        
Zero - SIR 0.0005 
 
(0.1783) 0.78 -0.0006 
 
(-0.7548) 0.63 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0098 ** (-2.2273) 0.53 -0.0003 
 
(-0.4372) 0.75 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0003 
 
(0.1897) 0.79 -0.0025 *** (-2.6403) 0.69 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0043 ** (-2.1179) 0.63 0.0002 
 
(0.2896) 0.69 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0087 *** (-3.068) 0.58 -0.0006 
 
(-0.6078) 0.52 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0007 
 
(0.2332) 0.55 -0.0011 
 
(-0.7849) 0.48 
8 Factor 
        
Zero - SIR 0.0003 
 
(0.1106) 0.76 -0.0005 
 
(-0.5903) 0.63 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0099 * (-1.9609) 0.50 -0.0001 
 
(-0.2) 0.75 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0002 
 
(-0.0912) 0.80 -0.0027 ** (-2.518) 0.69 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0039 * (-1.7263) 0.61 0.0000 
 
(0.0246) 0.69 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0065 ** (-2.2428) 0.59 -0.0005 
 
(-0.4774) 0.51 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0007 
 
(0.1762) 0.51 -0.0014 
 
(-0.9478) 0.48 
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3.5.3 Bond Returns according to Remaining Years to Maturity  
 The very common perception on bond pricing literature is that “…for a given 
change in yields, the fluctuations in market price will be greater the longer the term to 
maturity”(Hopewell and Kaufman 1973). Most corporate bond literatures have 
measured the relationship of debt maturity as the riskiness of the bond varies according 
to the level of remaining years to maturity. Oikonomou, et al.(2014) measured the 
relation between CSP and yield spreads according to different bond maturity.  
Following, J. Y. Campbell & Taksler (2003), I  similarly group my portfolios of bonds 
according to their remaining years to maturity; which is short-term if they have 2 to 7 
years remaining years to maturity, medium term if they have 7 to 15 years remaining 
years to maturity and long-term if they have more than 15 years remaining to maturity. 
Additionally, I also include low term maturities of less than 2 years. I use the starting 
event date of the announcement of the fines to calculate the remaining years to 
maturity. According to the results in Table 3.5, I find that both portfolios of low and 
short-term years remaining to maturity have statistically significant outperformance. In 
the 8 factor model, the low YTM has a 16 basis points outperformance in the 40
th
 to 
60
th
 percentile and the short YTM has a 15 basis points outperformance in the 80
th
 to 
100
th
 percentile. This indicates that short-term investors believe that fines would not 
have any significant negative impact if the remaining years to maturity of the bond after 
the fines are both on the lower end.  
 Confirming my hypothesis, results in Table 3.6 show statistical significant 
underperformances of the medium and long-term years remaining to maturity. This 
concurs with responsible investment literature that the mindset of SRI investors are 
within a long-term investment horizon. The results are more profound with the long-
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term remaining years to maturity of more than 15 years. I find that negative 
outperformance is no more just for the high SIR portfolios but also for lower SIR 
portfolios but the significance vanishes in the 8 factor model when controlling for 
currency exposure. I also continue to observe high adjusted r-squared values ranging 
from 0.5 to 0.9. This indicates that the effect of illegal behaviors on corporate bonds is 
more pronounced in long-term investment horizons.  Examining the additional factor 
variables (table 8.15 to 8.17 in the appendix), I find that three out of six portfolios in 
each of the low, short and medium YTM displayed significant coefficients for the 
duration factor, where six were positive and  three were negative, indicating that these 
YTM portfolios have a significant exposure to short term bonds. On contrast, only two 
out (with positive statistical significance) of the six long YTM portfolios have 
exposures to the duration factor. This indicates that the longer YTM portfolios have 
more of an exposure to long term bonds.  For the default factor which indicates 
exposure to high yield bonds, I find that only either one or two of the portfolios in each 
of the low, short, medium and high YTM has statistical significances. This indicates not 
much exposure to high yield bonds. In the option variable, I find also not much 
exposure to the mortgage market as only one portfolio in the low and high YTM and 
two portfolios in the short YTM showed any statistical significance. This is also similar 
with the equity and currency factor which also indicates relatively low exposure to the 
equity market and to the currency exchanges.   Similar to the results in the previous 
sections (3.5.1 and 3.5.2) it can be observed that the alpha results are mainly driven by 
the market beta and have very low exposure to the other factor variables. 
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Table 3.5 Equal Weighted Alpha Results for Remaining Years to Maturity (YTM) 
The table below displays the regression results (alphas) of the monthly returns for the different levels of SIR percentile of 
firms which had illegal violations/fines. The regressions are run using the Barclays US Benchmark factors and are equal 
weighted. I classify bonds by maturity with low term (Panel 1 and 2) if they have less than 2 years remaining maturity 
and short-term (Panel 3 and 4) if they have 2 to 7 remaining years to maturity. The table displays the T-statistics in 
parentheses and the adjusted R-square values for each portfolio. The regressions are computed with (Newey and West 
1987) corrections for serial correlation. Significance levels are presented as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels respectively. All regressions include a series of variables described in the text (but their regression 
coefficients are not reported in the table). 
 
  Equal Weighted - US Benchmark 
  Low YTM Short YTM 
Porfolio Alpha     Adj R2 Alpha     Adj R2 
1 Factor (1)     (2) (3)     (4) 
Zero - SIR 0.0002   (0.2712) 0.77 0.0001   (0.1569) 0.69 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR 0.0001   (0.1978) 0.62 -0.0001   (-0.2182) 0.66 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0018 * (1.8055) 0.38 0.0001   (0.1479) 0.67 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR 0.0020 *** (2.7291) 0.40 0.0001   (0.1531) 0.66 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR 0.0002   (0.2286) 0.54 0.0003   (0.368) 0.49 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0001   (-0.1562) 0.76 0.0021 ** (2.2146) 0.48 
5 Factor                 
Zero - SIR 0.0001   (0.1303) 0.78 -0.0003   (-0.3531) 0.69 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0002   (-0.3023) 0.67 -0.0006   (-0.8386) 0.67 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0015   (1.5986) 0.41 -0.0004   (-0.5276) 0.68 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR 0.0017 ** (2.1176) 0.47 -0.0002   (-0.2841) 0.70 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR 0.0002   (0.2603) 0.56 -0.0005   (-0.7201) 0.54 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0001   (0.1134) 0.78 0.0015 * (1.6897) 0.51 
8 Factor                 
Zero - SIR 0.0000   (0.0422) 0.78 -0.0002   (-0.2418) 0.68 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0002   (-0.2208) 0.68 -0.0005   (-0.6686) 0.67 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0015   (1.6165) 0.42 -0.0002   (-0.3425) 0.68 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR 0.0016 ** (2.2346) 0.49 -0.0004   (-0.5818) 0.71 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR 0.0001   (0.1027) 0.57 -0.0005   (-0.6745) 0.55 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0000   (-0.0062) 0.79 0.0015 * (1.7324) 0.54 
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Table 3.6 Equal Weighted Alpha Results for Remaining Years to Maturity (YTM) 
The table below displays the regression results (alphas) of the monthly returns for the different levels of SIR percentile of 
firms which had illegal violations/fines. The regressions are run using the Barclays US Benchmark factors and are equal 
weighted. I classify bonds by maturity with medium term (Panel 1 and 2) if they have 7 to 15 remaining years to maturity 
and long-term (Panel 3 and 4) if they have more than 15 remaining years to maturity. The table displays the T-statistics in 
parentheses and the adjusted R-square values for each portfolio. The regressions are computed with (Newey and West 
1987) corrections for serial correlation. Significance levels are presented as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels respectively. All regressions include a series of variables described in the text (but their regression 
coefficients are not reported in the table). 
 
  Equal Weighted - US Benchmark 
  Medium YTM Long YTM 
Porfolio Alpha     Adj R2 Alpha     Adj R2 
1 Factor (1)     (2) (3)     (4) 
Zero - SIR -0.0013   (-1.6034) 0.77 -0.0020 ** (-2.3151) 0.85 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0022   (-1.5378) 0.46 -0.0028 * (-1.8450) 0.54 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0000   (-0.0295) 0.64 0.0000   (0.0016) 0.52 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0021 * (-1.9028) 0.60 -0.0023 ** (-2.3995) 0.60 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0012   (-1.0948) 0.58 -0.0045 ** (-2.5018) 0.59 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0013   (1.4995) 0.58 -0.0015   (-0.7902) 0.46 
5 Factor                 
Zero - SIR -0.0002   (-0.3481) 0.82 -0.0016 ** (-2.0938) 0.85 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0023   (-1.3298) 0.46 -0.0018   (-1.2453) 0.57 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0004   (0.3677) 0.65 0.0012   (0.5220) 0.56 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0016   (-1.5240) 0.64 -0.0022 * (-1.9676) 0.60 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0008   (-0.7730) 0.60 -0.0034 ** (-2.3900) 0.62 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0009   (1.1187) 0.60 -0.0010   (-0.4443) 0.48 
8 Factor                 
Zero - SIR -0.0003   (-0.6420) 0.82 -0.0013   (-1.6523) 0.86 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0021   (-1.3483) 0.46 -0.0016   (-1.1139) 0.57 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0000   (-0.0375) 0.66 0.0009   (0.4435) 0.56 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0016   (-1.5016) 0.63 -0.0026 ** (-2.2483) 0.60 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0007   (-0.7308) 0.59 -0.0031 ** (-2.2349) 0.62 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0008   (1.0119) 0.62 -0.0011   (-0.5065) 0.47 
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3.6 Robustness Test 
3.6.1 Different Benchmark Index 
 For robustness, I used the Barclays Capital Global Aggregate indices in table 8.8 
in the appendix as my benchmark factor. These indices are still under the family of 
Barclays index returns and are part of their global/multi-currency benchmark. The 
purpose of using a Global index is to check whether my results would still hold even 
with different benchmark factors
39
. I follow the same methodology and model as 
described in section 4. In addition, I also split the sample into two sub periods; 10/2000 
to 12/2006 and 1/2007 to 4/2013. From the results in table 3.7 I find statistical 
significance for the full sample for the 60
th
 to 80
th
 SIR percentile but only in the 1 factor 
model. In the first half of the sample period, I find that not only the 60
th
 to 80
th
 
percentile but also the 80
th
 to 100
th
 percentile portfolios have negative coefficients and 
are statistically significant. The 60
th
 to 80
th
 and 80
th
 to 100
th
 SIR percentile portfolio has 
an underperformance of 26 and 42 basis points per month respectively. This indicates 
that the results are more profound by the first half of the sample period which is similar 
to the results using the US benchmarks. There is no statistical significance in the second 
half of the sample. 
 
                                                 
39
 I also conduct re-examinations using a different equity factor (S&P500) and the results are similar and 
consistent. I have not included the tables in the chapter for simplicity purposes. 
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Table 3.7 Equal Weighted Alpha Results based on Barclays Global Index Benchmark 
The table below displays the regressions results of the monthly alphas which are based on the Barclays Global Benchmark factors 
.The portfolios are equally weighted.  Column 1 and 2 indicate the full sample period from 2000 to 2013. Column 3 and 4 is the first 
half of the sample period from 2000 to 2006. Column 5 and 6 is the second half of the sample period from 2007 to 2012.  The table 
displays adjusted R-square for each portfolio. The regressions are computed with (Newey and West 1987) corrections for serial 
correlation. Significance levels are presented as *,** and *** for 10%,5% and 1% significance level respectively. All regressions 
include a series of variables described in the text (but their regression coefficients are not reported in the table). 
  Full Period (2000 to 2012) First Half (2000 to 2006) Second Half (2007 to 2012) 
  Equal Weighted Equal Weighted Equal Weighted 
Portfolio Alpha     Adj R2 Alpha     Adj R2 Alpha     Adj R2 
1 Factor (1)     (2) (3)     (4) (5)     (6) 
Zero - SIR -0.0010   (-1.1765) 0.69 -0.0004   (-0.3673) 0.54 -0.0014   (-0.9928) 0.78 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0014   (-1.3859) 0.55 -0.0021   (-1.2079) 0.55 -0.0009   (-0.5433) 0.57 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0006   (-0.7472) 0.65 -0.0009   (-0.5433) 0.57 0.0009   (0.6423) 0.61 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0006   (-0.7472) 0.65 -0.0003   (-0.2976) 0.76 -0.0008   (-0.7285) 0.61 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0021 * (-1.9176) 0.55 -0.0028 * (-1.7732) 0.53 -0.0014   (-0.9456) 0.57 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0002   (0.1873) 0.47 -0.0007   (-0.3392) 0.36 0.0012   (1.024) 0.65 
5 Factor                         
Zero - SIR -0.0008   (-1.1162) 0.69 -0.0008   (-0.7119) 0.54 -0.0013   (-1.1713) 0.81 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0015   (-1.2128) 0.56 -0.0015   (-0.7819) 0.54 -0.0010   (-0.548) 0.56 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0005   (-0.7216) 0.65 -0.0010   (-0.548) 0.56 0.0004   (0.3763) 0.61 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0005   (-0.7216) 0.65 0.0000   (-0.0452) 0.79 -0.0005   (-0.4404) 0.59 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0017   (-1.6125) 0.57 -0.0029   (-1.6179) 0.55 -0.0008   (-0.5661) 0.59 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0001   (0.0426) 0.50 -0.0035 * (-1.7520) 0.45 0.0012   (1.1431) 0.72 
8 Factor                         
Zero - SIR -0.0011   (-1.4494) 0.70 -0.0013   (-1.1117) 0.56 -0.0007   (-0.661) 0.83 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0012   (-1.111) 0.56 -0.0006   (-0.4281) 0.59 -0.0008   (-0.4752) 0.55 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0011   (-1.3694) 0.65 -0.0008   (-0.4752) 0.55 -0.0004   (-0.4144) 0.61 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0011   (-1.3694) 0.65 -0.0003   (-0.3707) 0.82 -0.0009   (-0.7604) 0.59 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0010   (-1.0878) 0.58 -0.0026 * (-1.7401) 0.55 -0.0003   (-0.1942) 0.59 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0004   (-0.3443) 0.51 -0.0042 * (-1.9519) 0.45 0.0012   (1.1522) 0.71 
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3.6.2 Value Weighted 
In addition to using different benchmarks, the portfolios are also value 
weighted. Taking into consideration that the number of bonds per company in the 
sample varies from a few to hundreds, equal weighting the portfolios and giving each 
company similar weights might not be precise. Hence, I value weight the portfolios 
using market values within each bond in the company. The results in table 3.8 show 
both value weighted portfolios using the US and Global benchmark indices. Using the 
US benchmark indices portfolios, I find now negative coefficients that are statistically 
significant in the 20
th
 to 40
th
 percentile portfolios. Similarly to the equal weighted 
portfolios, the 60
th
 to 80
th
 percentile portfolios also underperform with statistical 
significance. These results are interesting as I now find that value weighting the 
portfolios induces negative underperformances for the lower SIR portfolios. This is also 
evident in the 8 factor model using Global benchmark indices. The underperformances 
though are much larger for the higher SRI portfolio compared to the lower SRI 
portfolio. However, in the global benchmark indices, the statistical significance for the 
60 to 80
th
 portfolio vanishes. I also value weight the results during the crisis and non-
crisis periods using both US and Global Benchmarks. Reviewing tables 3.9 and 3.10, I 
find that there are still larger underperformances during crisis periods compared to non-
crisis periods. This therefore still supports my second hypothesis. While some results 
are slightly weaker with this approach, my overall conclusion that short selling based on 
fines has a negative impact on bond returns, remains unchanged. 
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Table 3.8 Value Weighted Alpha Results based on Barclays US and Global Benchmark 
The table below displays the regressions results of the monthly alphas which are based on the Barclays US and Global 
Benchmark factors .The portfolios are value weighted based on market value of each individual bond.  The sample 
period is from 2000 to 2013. The table displays the adjusted R-square for each portfolio. The regressions are computed 
with (Newey and West 1987) corrections for serial correlation. Significance levels are presented as *, ** and *** for 
10%,5% and 1% significance level respectively. All regressions include a series of variables described in the text (but 
their regression coefficients are not reported in the table). 
 
  Barclays US Benchmark   Barclays Global Benchmark 
          Value Weighted          Value Weighted 
Portfolio Alpha     Adj R2 Alpha     Adj R2 
1 Factor (1)     (2) (3)     (4) 
Zero - SIR -0.0007   (-0.8037) 0.56 -0.0007   (-0.803) 0.56 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0006   (-0.9077) 0.62 -0.0006   (-0.8763) 0.62 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0012   (-1.4934) 0.66 -0.0012   (-1.4934) 0.66 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0013   (-1.0642) 0.56 -0.0013   (-1.0642) 0.56 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0019 * (-1.763) 0.48 -0.0019 * (-1.763) 0.48 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0008   (-0.781) 0.54 -0.0007   (-0.6449) 0.56 
5 Factor                 
Zero - SIR 0.0002   (0.2406) 0.62 -0.0003   (-0.4011) 0.60 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0005   (-0.7145) 0.64 -0.0003   (-0.3631) 0.65 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0013 * (-1.6921) 0.66 -0.0011   (-1.4368) 0.65 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0007   (-0.7104) 0.60 -0.0009   (-0.8866) 0.59 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0020 ** (-2.0382) 0.50 -0.0017   (-1.6183) 0.51 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0010   (-0.9455) 0.55 -0.0008   (-0.7201) 0.58 
8 Factor                 
Zero - SIR 0.0001   (0.1535) 0.63 -0.0005   (-0.7018) 0.61 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0003   (-0.4112) 0.64 0.0000   (0.0143) 0.65 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0014 * (-1.8336) 0.65 -0.0014 * (-1.8754) 0.65 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0009   (-0.9834) 0.61 -0.0011   (-1.1451) 0.60 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0019 * (-1.9285) 0.50 -0.0011   (-1.1847) 0.53 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0011   (-1.0236) 0.56 -0.0008   (-0.728) 0.57 
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Table 3.9 Value Weighted Alpha Results for Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods (US 
Benchmark) 
The table below displays the regression results (alphas) of the monthly returns for the different levels of SIR percentile of 
firms which had illegal violations/fines during crisis and non-crisis periods. The regressions are run using the Barclays 
US Benchmark factors and are value weighted. The crisis periods cover economic recessions for the US of 38 months 
from 12/2001 until 06/2003 and from 12/2007 until 06/2009. The non recession periods are the other remaining months 
in the sample from 01/2000 to 12/2013.The table displays the T-statistics in parentheses and the adjusted R-square values 
for each portfolio. The regressions are computed with (Newey and West 1987) corrections for serial correlation. 
Significance levels are presented as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. All regressions 
include a series of variables described in the text (but their regression coefficients are not reported in the table). 
  Value Weighted - US Benchmark 
  Recession Periods Non - Recession Periods 
Portfolio Alpha     Adj R2 Alpha     Adj R2 
1 Factor  (1) 
  
(2) (3) 
  
(4) 
Zero - SIR -0.0015   (-0.5347) 0.50 -0.0004   (-0.5031) 0.63 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0011   (-0.4719) 0.61 -0.0004   (-0.6793) 0.63 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0001   (0.0933) 0.74 -0.0020 ** (-2.4499) 0.64 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0070 ** (-2.3606) 0.56 0.0007   (0.7685) 0.65 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0070 ** (-2.5408) 0.52 0.0000   (0.0328) 0.48 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0010   (-0.7937) 0.46 -0.0017   (-1.5546) 0.49 
5 Factor                 
Zero - SIR 0.0034   (0.9479) 0.65 -0.0005   (-0.6166) 0.62 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0020   (-0.8439) 0.67 -0.0003   (-0.4245) 0.68 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0006   (-0.3816) 0.78 -0.0026 *** (-2.7686) 0.65 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0048 * (-1.8858) 0.66 0.0006   (0.6199) 0.65 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0075 ** (-2.494) 0.48 -0.0006   (-0.6258) 0.51 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0017   (-1.1531) 0.49 -0.0019   (-1.5414) 0.50 
8 Factor                 
Zero - SIR 0.0033   (0.8844) 0.62 -0.0004   (-0.54) 0.62 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0021   (-0.8306) 0.65 -0.0001   (-0.2078) 0.67 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0006   (-0.3405) 0.76 -0.0028 *** (-2.8808) 0.64 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0041 * (-1.8835) 0.66 0.0004   (0.472) 0.65 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0062 * (-1.8936) 0.50 -0.0006   (-0.6341) 0.50 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0016   (-1.1047) 0.48 -0.0021   (-1.6368) 0.50 
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Table 3.10 Value Weighted Alpha Results for Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods (Global 
Benchmark) 
The table below displays the regression results (alphas) of the monthly returns for the different levels of SIR percentile of 
firms which had illegal violations/fines during crisis and non-crisis periods. The regressions are run using the Barclays 
Global Benchmark factors and are value weighted. The crisis periods cover economic recessions for the US of 38 months 
from 12/2001 until 06/2003 and from 12/2007 until 06/2009. The non recession periods are the other remaining months in the 
sample from 01/2000 to 12/2013.The table displays the T-statistics in parentheses and the adjusted R-square values for each 
portfolio. The regressions are computed with (Newey and West 1987) corrections for serial correlation. Significance levels 
are presented as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. All regressions include a series of 
variables described in the text (but their regression coefficients are not reported in the table).  
 
  Value Weighted - Global Benchmark 
  Recession Periods Non - Recession Periods 
Portfolio Alpha     Adj R2 Alpha     Adj R2 
1 Factor  (1)       (2)       
Zero - SIR -0.0015   (-0.5347) 0.50 -0.0003   (-0.5002) 0.63 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0011   (-0.4719) 0.61 -0.0004   (-0.6279) 0.62 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0001   (0.0933) 0.74 -0.0020 ** (-2.4499) 0.64 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0070 ** (-2.3606) 0.56 0.0007   (0.7685) 0.65 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0070 ** (-2.5408) 0.52 0.0000   (0.0328) 0.48 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0010   (0.7331) 0.61 -0.0015   (-1.421) 0.51 
5 Factor                 
Zero - SIR 0.0034   (0.4932) 0.60 -0.0006   (-0.7792) 0.62 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0020   (-0.9848) 0.65 0.0002   (0.3656) 0.68 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0006   (-0.255) 0.77 -0.0027 *** (-2.8100) 0.66 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0048   (-1.6387) 0.64 0.0004   (0.4769) 0.65 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0075 * (-1.8561) 0.52 -0.0006   (-0.5744) 0.50 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0017   (0.6436) 0.64 -0.0020   (-1.6109) 0.53 
8 Factor                 
Zero - SIR 0.0033   (-0.0785) 0.60 -0.0006   (-0.8583) 0.63 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0021   (-0.5361) 0.67 0.0001   (0.1854) 0.68 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0006   (-0.3387) 0.75 -0.0028 *** (-2.9028) 0.65 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0041 * (-1.7997) 0.63 0.0003   (0.3775) 0.65 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0062   (-0.6565) 0.66 -0.0004   (-0.4598) 0.49 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0016   (0.604) 0.62 -0.0019   (-1.5523) 0.52 
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3.6.3 Liquidity Measure 
 Bonds are known to be very illiquid in nature and various researches have tried 
to measure whether liquidity affects bond pricing and yields (Chen, Lesmond et al. 
2007; Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter et al. 2012). There has been no real consensus on a 
common liquidity measure in bond literature. A recent paper by Schestag, Schuster et 
al. (2016) was the first to compare all commonly employed liquidity measures based on 
intraday and daily data for the U.S corporate bonds. They find that high frequency data 
based on intraday data are very strongly correlated and daily data generally also 
measure transaction costs well. Based on that, I use intraday data from TRACE to 
calculate my daily bond volume. TRACE provides intraday volume data of bonds only 
from July 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015. Nayak (2010) used different liquidity metrics 
to evaluate whether there is differences in bond liquidity based on investor sentiment. 
Following his paper, I use the Amihud illiquidity measure based on Amihud (2002) 
which is a widely used measure.  Everything else equal, smaller values would indicate 
greater liquidity. 
        
 
      
 
     
     
      
      
                                                                             (3.3) 
 where rit is the ith bond’s return on day t, VOLit is the total daily trading volume 
in dollars, and DAYSit is the total number of trading days for bond i in the year, 
respectively. Using the mean Amihud illiquidity measure, I separate the companies 
above 75
th
 percentile which indicate greater illiquidity and below the 25
th
 percentile for 
greater liquidity. The results in table 3.11 indicate that my results are robust to even 
high and low liquidity bonds. I find that there are statistically significant 
underperformances for the high and low liquidity portfolios at the 60
th
 to 80
th
 and 80
th
 
to 100
th
 percentile portfolios, respectively. 
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Table 3.11 Equal Weighted Alpha Results for High and Low Liquidity 
The table below displays the regression results (alphas) of the monthly returns for the different levels of SIR percentile of 
firms which had illegal violations/fines. The regressions are run using the Barclays US Benchmark factors and are equal 
weighted. I classify bonds that are above the 75th percentile which indicate greater illiquidity and below the 25th percentile 
for greater liquidity. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. The table displays the T-statistics in parentheses and the 
adjusted R-square values for each portfolio. The regressions are computed with (Newey and West 1987) corrections for 
serial correlation. Significance levels are presented as *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
All regressions include a series of variables described in the text (but their regression coefficients are not reported in the 
table). 
 
  Equal Weighted - US Benchmark   
  High Liquidity Low Liquidity 
Portfolio Alpha     Adj R2 Alpha     Adj R2   
1 Factor  (1)     (2) (3)     (4)   
Zero - SIR -0.0001   (-0.8878) 0.99 -0.0002   (-0.9741) 0.99   
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0010   (-0.7938) 0.55 -0.0013   (-1.076) 0.60   
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0002   (0.2047) 0.63 0.0010   (0.4661) 0.59   
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0020   (-0.9239) 0.55 -0.0004   (-0.4753) 0.81   
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0019 * (-1.8568) 0.71 -0.0006   (-0.4899) 0.66   
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0022   (-1.2167) 0.53 -0.0024 *** (-1.7989) 0.56   
5 Factor               
 
  
Zero - SIR -0.0001   (-0.9239) 0.99 -0.0003   (-1.0111) 0.99   
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0001   (-0.0724) 0.60 -0.0001   (-0.1591) 0.64   
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0008   (0.8438) 0.65 0.0013   (0.6558) 0.58   
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0020   (-0.8693) 0.55 -0.0007   (-0.7986) 0.81   
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0022 * (-1.7512) 0.71 -0.0003   (-0.2608) 0.67   
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0029   (-1.4126) 0.53 -0.0032 ** (-2.1489) 0.57   
8 Factor               
 
  
Zero - SIR -0.0001   (-0.9043) 0.99 -0.0003   (-0.9855) 0.99   
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR 0.0001   (0.0418) 0.60 -0.0001   (-0.0655) 0.64   
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0007   (0.7797) 0.65 0.0011   (0.5956) 0.58   
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0021   (-1.0092) 0.57 -0.0007   (-0.8239) 0.80   
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0021 * (-1.7575) 0.71 -0.0001   (-0.0699) 0.67   
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0029   (-1.4546) 0.52 -0.0033 ** (-2.0974) 0.57   
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3.6.4 Additional Analysis  
3.6.4.1 Control Sample  
 The understanding behind the results presented in the previous section is that 
only companies with fines and settlements demonstrate negative underperformances on 
bond returns. One can argue that the results are biased only on those specific companies 
that have illegal violations and the underperformance is driven by bad sentiment caused 
by the reactions to the fines. Hence, using the similar methodology presented in section 
4, I re-estimate my models using all U.S companies in the MSCI Large Cap universe 
regardless whether they have a fine or settlement. The portfolios are also updated every 
quarter and held for three months.  
 The results presented in Table 3.12 are interesting in nature. Firstly, I observe 
that the portfolio of zero SIR data indicates positive alpha coefficients in all 1, 5 and 8 
factor models. This is quite intuitive considering, no short selling would indicate 
“good” sentiment and hence outperformance. For instance, the 8 factor model shows 
outperformance of 54 basis points p.m. Secondly, I observe that the lowest SIR 
portfolio shows negative alpha coefficients in the 5 and 8 factor models. In the 8 factor 
model, the underperformance is 15 basis points p.m. These results suggest that firms 
with low short selling ratio have a negative impact on bond performances regardless 
whether a firm has a fine or settlement. This analysis further strengthens my results as 
this shows that when a firm has a fine, there is higher short selling which in turn 
induces larger underperformances on bond returns. 
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Table 3.12 Control Sample Equal Weighted Results based on Barclays US Index 
Benchmark (Full Sample Period) 
The table below displays the monthly alphas which are adjusted based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors. The 
tables also indicate the coefficients estimated by model for the duration, default, option, equity, USD-EUR,USD-
GBP and USD-YEN. The portfolios are equally weighted. The table displays the R-square and adjusted R-square for 
each portfolio. Significance levels are presented as *,** and *** for 10%,5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
The value in the parentheses represents the values of the T-statistics. 
Portfolio Alpha     Market     Adj R2 
1 Factor               
Zero - SIR 0.0038 *** (3.3425) 0.6965 *** (9.8259) 0.47 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0016   (-1.6223) 0.9766 *** (14.0217) 0.75 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0001   (0.2124) 0.9321 *** (15.0525) 0.85 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR 0.0002   (0.2854) 0.8320 *** (12.93) 0.74 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR 0.0000   (-0.0259) 0.8274 *** (18.3494) 0.74 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0000   (-0.0319) 0.9457 *** (8.0617) 0.52 
5 Factor               
Zero - SIR 0.0035 *** (0.6520) 0.8638 *** (5.1864) 0.50 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0017 * (-1.7622) 0.8833 *** (10.4777) 0.81 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0000   (-0.0207) 0.7728 *** (8.4097) 0.90 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR 0.0001   (0.2493) 0.8185 *** (8.8041) 0.80 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR 0.0003   (0.4295) 0.9412 *** (8.6362) 0.75 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0010   (1.0267) 0.9577 *** (7.9127) 0.65 
8 Factor               
Zero - SIR 0.0054 ** (2.3963) 0.9317 *** (3.8374) 0.38 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0015 * (-1.7107) 0.8484 *** (8.963) 0.81 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0000   (-0.0693) 0.7530 *** (7.0604) 0.90 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR 0.0001   (0.3034) 0.7773 *** (8.741) 0.80 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR 0.0004   (0.5823) 0.9268 *** (7.913) 0.75 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0009   (1.0154) 0.9789 *** (7.4047) 0.69 
 130 
 
3.6.4.2 Inclusion of bonds with all characteristics and features 
 My early analysis involved only bonds that have non-callable and straight 
features. This research revolves around understanding whether fines can be information 
that the market can use in analysis. Thus the previous results should also hold for all 
bonds regardless of its features. Here I test whether the results would also hold using 
US dollar bonds that have callable features and the nature of their cash flows vary
40
. 
The results presented in Table 3.13 confirm my view that companies with fines and 
high SIR have negative underperformances in bond returns. The results further 
substantiates my hypothesis as it shows the highest portfolio level of 80
th
 to 100
th
 SIR 
percentile with underperformances of 25 basis points p.m in the 5 factor model. I note 
that there is no statistical significance in the 8 factor model; nevertheless the results also 
still show underperformances in returns. This further affirms my view that fines is a 
type of information that is robust to even different types of bond features. 
 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
                                                 
40
 Bond with Warrant (cash flow depends on a bond plus a call option for an equity), Convertible (cash flow depends 
on a conversion option), Index Linked (cash flow is adjusted usually in line with a consumer price index), Floating 
Rate (cash flow are variable) 
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Table 3.13 Callable and Non-Callable Bonds Equal Weighted Results based on 
Barclays US Index Benchmark (Full Sample Period) 
The table below displays the monthly alphas which are adjusted based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors. The 
tables also indicate the coefficients estimated by model for the duration, default, option, equity, USD-EUR,USD-
GBP and USD-YEN. The portfolios are equally weighted. The table displays the R-square and adjusted R-square for 
each portfolio. Significance levels are presented as *,** and *** for 10%,5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
The value in the parentheses represents the values of the T-statistics. 
Portfolio Alpha     Market     Adj R2 
1 Factor               
Zero - SIR 0.0003   (0.289) 0.9433 *** (12.7971) 0.59 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0002   (-0.1147) 0.7309 *** (3.8032) 0.41 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0034   (-1.0971) 1.8961 ** (2.3815) 0.50 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0008   (-0.7941) 0.6438 *** (3.6397) 0.43 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0005   (-0.4586) 0.6194 *** (4.2828) 0.49 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0021 * (-1.8) 0.9743 *** (9.7033) 0.44 
5 Factor               
Zero - SIR -0.0005   (-0.5949) 0.8389 *** (7.9938) 0.66 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0016   (-1.2291) 0.4445 * (1.7797) 0.41 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0018   (-1.0884) 3.0072 ** (2.5482) 0.64 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0012   (-1.3263) 0.3019 * (1.7993) 0.59 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0014   (-1.3819) 0.3702 ** (2.0117) 0.56 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0025 * (-1.7276) 1.1035 *** (5.933) 0.46 
8 Factor               
Zero - SIR -0.0010   (-0.9791) 0.8573 *** (8.1835) 0.67 
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0012   (-0.9781) 0.3999   (1.6532) 0.49 
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0024   (-1.2243) 3.1439 *** (2.6819) 0.66 
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0012   (-1.4943) 0.2821 * (1.7487) 0.61 
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0012   (-1.3212) 0.3277 * (1.943) 0.57 
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0023   (-1.4039) 1.0808 *** (6.5652) 0.46 
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3.7 Summary 
Short selling has always been viewed as a controversial activity and short sellers 
have been blamed for manipulating shares, as evident by the temporary ban in 2008 on 
financial sector securities by regulators during the financial crisis. However, short 
selling can be viewed as a strong negative sentiment and evidence in previous literature 
have highlighted short sellers as being able to detect financial fraud even before 
revelations. Furthermore, high SIR has also been associated with negative equity 
performances. Nonetheless, there has so far been no literature to measure the impact of 
short selling on the performance of bond returns. I study here the effect of short selling 
on U.S bond returns in the context of fines. Such events of fines are material events as it 
has also been associated with drop in share prices. Using hand collected data of fines 
and for a 12 year sample period, I provide evidence high short selling at the 60
th
 to 80
th
 
percentile, in the context of fines induces negative underperformances in bond returns 
by an average of 20 basis points p.m. In short, this means that the 2
nd
 highest SIR 
portfolio in my sample has negative underperformances. Surprisingly, the 1
st
 highest 
SIR portfolio does not show any statistical significant results. Interestingly, Karpoff and 
Lou (2010) find that among firms that have been misrepresenting their financials for 12 
months,  it is at only the 75
th
 percentile of abnormal short interest will be publically 
revealed 8 months sooner than a firm at the 25
th
 percentile. This shows that my results 
also compares to theirs at the 60
th
 to 80
th
 percentile which has negative 
underperformances. Furthermore, the results for the lower SIR portfolios were expected 
as they do not also show any statistical significance. This confirms that high short 
selling in the context of fines has a direct link to bond returns (i.e. higher short selling 
after a fine induces negative bond returns). In addition, I find that the 
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underperformances are more profound for portfolios with longer remaining years to 
maturity. This coincides with the view that SRI investors with long-term investment 
horizon mindset would consider negative events detrimental in bonds that have longer 
remaining years to maturity.  
I also test whether short selling in the context of fines has a larger effect during 
crisis periods. I can confirm my hypothesis that there is a larger underperformance of 
bond returns during crisis periods than in non-crisis periods. This conveys that investors 
find short selling during crisis periods to have more significance, independent from low 
or high short selling. Thus, negative sentiments of investors during crisis periods are 
clearly much more detrimental to the performances of company’s bond returns.  
I also examine firms that have short selling regardless if they have a fine and my 
results indicate that portfolios with zero short interest outperforms and low short selling 
(0 to 20th percentile) have underperformances in bond returns. Thus when there is no 
short selling which in turn would indicate “good” sentiment there is outperformance on 
the bond returns. The results of the negative underperformances of on the lower SIR 
portfolio confirm that only higher SIR ratios after fines induce higher negative bond 
returns. Using also sample of bonds regardless of their cash flow features, I find that 
now the highest SIR percentile portfolio underperforms by 25 basis p.m. The above 
results clearly indicate that short selling after fines, especially when it is high, has a 
negative impact on bond returns. My results are robust to different benchmarks and 
liquidity levels. Though there are somewhat mixed results when value weighted, overall 
conclusion still remains unchanged as there are still underperformances after 
announcements of fines or settlements on bond returns.  
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This chapter shows that stock market sentiment (using short interest ratios) 
especially in the context of fines does affect corporate bond returns i.e. high investor 
sentiment in equities has a direct effect on corporate bond prices. Firms should be 
aware that their illegal actions during crisis period would be even more detrimental to 
their bond returns. Investors are less lenient to firms that incur monetary fines during 
crisis periods than non-crisis periods. This study finds that short selling ratio is a viable 
indicator to measure the link between sentiment and bond returns. Nevertheless, this 
study only holds for the US market and whether the results hold in non-US markets 
warrants further investigation. 
  
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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4. A Comparative Event Study: The Impact of Fines on 
Credit Default Swaps and Stocks 
4.1 Introduction 
In 2007, just before the financial crisis, the outstanding notional size of the CDS 
market was just over $60 trillion
41
. The credit derivatives market was then stained by 
the financial crisis in 2008, where the majority of the mortgage backed securities were 
backed by Credit Default Swaps (CDS) as a form of insurance
42
. 10 years later, the 
CDS market has been hovering just about $10 trillion. Even though the CDS market is 
not at the level from its former glory days, it is now growing as investors are appealing 
to CDS for its characteristics of tracking the likelihood of default of a company and also 
to protect their bonds from losses
43
.   
 
In 2015, the automaker Volkswagen was fined by the U.S Environmental Agency 
for evading government pollution controls. The impact of this fine on Volkswagen was 
seen twofold, firstly by the drop of their share price by 45% and secondly by widening 
of their 5 year CDS spreads by 125% from 60 basis points (bps) to 135 bps
44
. This is 
very similar to British Petroleum (BP) that also had a continued drop of its share price 
and widening of their CDS price after the explosion at the Gulf of Mexico (Fodor and 
                                                 
41
 “ The rise and fall of the hottest financial product in the world” available at 
http://www.businessinsider.de/rise-and-fall-of-cds-market?r=US&IR=T (accessed 31
st
 May 2017) 
42
 The housing market was initially insured by billions of dollars of CDS from AIG. However, following 
AIG’s bailout in September 2008, “the scrutiny of the CDS market and the manner in which the contracts 
were written and cleared changed substantially. Specifically, the bailout of AIG led to calls for increased 
transparency and regulation” (Jenkins, Kimbrough et al. 2016) 
43
 “Credit default swap activity heats up” available at https://www.ft.com/content/c47dce8e-ca9f-11e5-
be0b-b7ece4e953a0 (accessed 1st March 2017) 
44
 “Volkswagen credit spreads soar after EPA charges with evading pollution controls” available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2015/09/21/volkswagencreditspreadssoarafterepachargescowithe
vadingpollutioncontrols/#6d97ac6c3e9e (accessed 20
th
 October 2016)  
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Stowe 2012). There is huge amount of literature that measure the impact of illegalities 
on stock markets and findings from literature indicate that stock prices do react 
negatively to announcements of illegal behaviours of companies (Wallace and Worrell 
1988; Baucus and Near 1991; Davidson, Worrell et al. 1994; Karpoff, John R. Lott et 
al. 2005; Karpoff, Lee et al. 2005; Arnold and Engelen 2007; Kouwenberg and 
Phunnarungsi 2013; Zeidan 2013; Song and Han 2015).  Furthermore, in my previous 
two chapters, I examine the impact of illegalities on both stock and bond markets and 
also find underperformance after announcement of illegalities
45
. Prior studies have 
either only examined rating announcement (Hull, Predescu et al. 2004; Micu, Remolona 
et al. 2004; Norden and Weber 2004; Wengner, Burghof et al. 2015) or earnings 
announcements (Greatrex 2009; Jenkins, Kimbrough et al. 2016) on CDS prices. I find 
there is a gap in literature in understanding the impact of illegalities, especially fines on 
CDS, which I examine in this chapter. 
 
A CDS is essentially an insurance contract in which a protection buyer and seller 
agree on a premium which is paid on a regular basis until the contract expires or when 
the credit event actually materializes. The credit event can be a pre-determined event 
stated in the contract ranging from bankruptcy, default or even to restructuring. When a 
credit event is triggered, the settlement of this CDS contract depends on the agreed 
terms between protection buyer and seller. This could range from physical settlement 
where the protection seller has to buy the underlying security (either a bond or loan) 
back from the buyer or a cash settlement where the protection buyer receives the 
difference between the bond value at the time of settlement and the bond’s nominal 
                                                 
45
 Even though in my previous chapter on bonds I make a comparison that the bonds also indicates 
underperformances after illegalities. It is important to note that because of the difference in the sample 
time frames, there is no arbitrage opportunity which exists when comparing the results in this chapter on 
CDS with the previous chapter on bonds.   
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value in cash (Weistroffer, Speyer et al. 2009). The premium of the CDS is called the 
“spread”46 and is usually a measure of risk whereby higher spreads indicate higher 
credit risks associated with the underlying reference entity or firm (Greatrex 2009). In 
essence, the protection seller assesses the credit risk of the reference entity and decides 
on the premium accordingly. There is also counterparty risk between the protection 
seller and buyer
47
. The CDS market has several ways to mitigate this risk post the 
financial crisis. The most important is the market infrastructure provided by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) which has several frameworks 
in place and is used by market participants significantly to reduce the potential losses 
arising from the default of a counterparty in a swap or derivative contract and another 
way is by collateralization (Arora, Gandhi et al. 2012). Figure 3 below represents a 
diagram explaining the mechanisms of a CDS payment structure: 
Figure 3 CDS payment structure adapted from Weistroffer et al., (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 “CDS “prices,” as measured in the market, represent the size of the premium paid by the buyer of 
protection and are generally known as CDS “spreads.” CDS spreads change over time based on supply 
and demand for particular CDS contracts. CDS spreads are analogous to insurance premiums and 
similarly reflect market participants’ assessment of the risk of a default or credit event associated with 
the underlying obligation” Flannery, M. J., J. F. Houston, et al. (2010) 
47
 Counterparty credit risk is when “a firm selling credit protection might enter financial distress itself 
and be unable to meet its contractual obligations, thus there is a risk that the protection seller may not 
perform” Longstaff, Mithal et al (2003) 
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The CDS credit risk profile is known to be similar to corporate bonds where it is 
exposed to credit risk without owning the underlying bond.  Nevertheless, CDS spreads 
have many advantages over corporate bond yields. Firstly, CDS spreads reflect pure 
credit risk whereas bond yields take into account interest rate risk, secondly there is no 
requirement for a benchmark risk-free rate to estimate CDS spreads and finally  bonds 
yields are at times conformed to embedded options such as call features (Callen, Livnat 
et al. 2009). In addition, Blanco et al.,(2005) find that CDS prices are much better in 
explaining credit risk than bond spreads and Zhu (2006) discovers that the CDS market 
often moves ahead of the bond market in price adjustment. Furthermore, Stulz (2010) 
states that the CDS market is more liquid than the bond market and hence is a better 
market to investigate a company’s credit risk than the bond market. 
The illegal behaviours of firms can be considered a default risk because the negative 
impact of this behaviour results in fines and thereby alsocash flows and firm value. 
Using four major events
48
 from the financial crisis, Huang et al., (2012) find that CDS 
markets reacts more rapidly to negative shocks than to positive one. Hence, taking into 
account the growth in the CDS market and that the changes of CDS spreads are deemed 
as a measure of risk, this study aims to investigate whether illegal behaviours of 
companies especially after fines affect CDS spreads in the market. This study uses daily 
CDS quotes from Datastream for a sample of 121 United States (US) large cap firms 
from the period 2009 to 2012. 
 
                                                 
48
 They used four key events of the financial crisis during 2007 and 2008 which are 1) the Bear Stearns 
collapse 2) the acquisition of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan 3) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  revealed 
financial difficulties 4) AIG announced serious liquidity difficulty and Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 
11   
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My study extends the growing empirical research on illegalities especially on CDS. 
To my knowledge, the paper by Kölbel and Busch (2013) is the only one that measures 
the impact of illegal behaviors of firms on CDS and they find that negative media 
attention causes a significant increase in CDS spreads.  My paper differs significantly 
from theirs in several ways. Firstly, their paper is based on negative news retrieved 
from prominent international newspapers. Instead my study involves a dataset of purely 
fines taken from the SEC 10-K fillings database for US listed companies. Secondly, 
their study is based on a panel regression model to find the relationship between CDS 
spreads and negative news using quarterly and yearly data. Whereas, using daily data, I 
examine the immediate impact of the fines (pre and post) using an event study 
methodology which is a widely used methodology to examine price effect after 
announcements. Thirdly, their study only measures all types of negative news in one 
category, while I separately measure the impact of different types of ESG plus LT fines 
including different legal stages of the fines and fines per market cap. Fourthly, their 
study is based on 5 year and 10 year CDS spreads, while I measure different levels of 
CDS spreads up to 30 years.   
 
Additionally, the unique aspect of this study is that I measure the impact of 
illegalities on CDS spreads and also compare it to short-term stock returns. I find two 
studies which have examined and compared the impacts of events using the traditional 
event study methodology on both CDS spreads and stock returns (Norden and Weber 
2004; Greatrex 2009). My study differs from those studies significantly as I examine 
impact of announcement of fines whereas those studies examine earnings and ratings 
announcements. If equity and CDS markets are connected, then informational events 
should impact both markets as seen with examples from BP and VW (i.e. after the fine, 
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the stock prices drops and CDS spreads increase). Moreover, there is also literature that 
examines the bi-directional information between these two asset classes. For instance, 
Norden and Weber (2009),  using a VAR model, find that the stock market informs the 
CDS market whereas Longstaff, Mithal et al.(2003) using a closed-form model for 
valuing CDS within a reduced-form framework find that both the CDS and stock 
market inform the bond market.  
 
This study makes a number of contributions. Firstly, I add to the current 
understanding how the credit market uses announcements of fines as information. 
While prior event studies have focused on credit market responses to rating or earnings 
announcements, my focus on the pre and post announcements of fines sheds lights on 
how the credit market absorbs and reacts to illegality news especially when a monetary 
fine is imposed. Secondly, this paper also adds to the literature on anticipation as I find 
that that the credit market anticipates illegality news which would be of interest to 
regulators. Furthermore, this analysis is beneficial to traders who are interested in fines 
as an information type and could use this in their analysis and trading. This is also very 
useful for institutional holders such as pension funds (who have large holdings in US 
public listed firms) and are interested in understanding the difference in perception of 
the credit and stock markets reactions on ESG plus LT fines and fines in different 
industries.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of the related literature and the hypotheses development. Section 3 provides 
description of the fines and CDS data and the event study methodology. Section 4 
presents the results of the CDS and stock market responses to illegal behaviours events.  
Section 4 provides the limitations of this study and Section 5 concludes. 
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4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Related literature of the impact of announcements/news on CDS spreads 
 It is important to understand the context of probability of default and how it 
affects firm value and the pricing of CDS.  There are two seminal theories which 
explain this; the Merton structural model and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
suggests that stock markets always reflects all relevant information especially 
incorporating default probability information of firms. Merton (1974) introduced his 
structural model that analyzes credit risk of firm’s debt and its probability of meeting 
financial obligation. This was further enhanced by Black and Scholes (1973) who 
created the Black and Scholes model which could derive the discount to be applied to a 
corporate bond because of the possibility of default. In essence, these finance theories 
indicate that once the condition of a firm deteriorates, this increases the probability of 
default on the firm’s bonds which in turn in an efficient market would lead stock and 
bond prices to go down and inevitably CDS spreads to increase (Fung, Sierra et al. 
2008). Longstaff et al., (2005) find that the majority of the CDS spreads changes are 
due to changing default risk. In relating this to illegality and CDS, news on fines 
imposed on companies contains new information about the future cash flow of the firms 
and thus affects firm value. This would in turn decrease the firm’s ability to service its 
debt obligations as well as its expectations of its future cash flows taking into account 
that the fines would have to be paid in cash at most times. Thus, the default which is 
driven by this firm value process would then increase the price of a CDS.   
  The impact of new information such as ratings announcement on CDS prices 
has been researched extensively. (Hull, Predescu et al. 2004; Micu, Remolona et al. 
2004; Norden and Weber 2004) examined CDS changes and find significant reaction to 
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ratings announcements and reviews for downgrade and that there is already anticipation 
of these announcements beforehand. Norden and Weber (2004) not only measured CDS 
market changes to rating announcements but also to the stock market. They find that 
both the stock and CDS markets not only anticipate rating downgrades, but also review 
for downgrade by three major rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch). Contrary to 
those findings, Finnerty et al., (2013) find that credit rating upgrades have a significant 
impact on CDS spreads even though they are not as well anticipated as downgrades. 
The studies above indicate there is anticipation of rating announcements even before the 
actual announcement, therefore Norden (2008) further investigated if and how exactly 
public and private information affects the CDS market response to rating 
announcements.. He finds that the CDS market significantly reacts to rating 
downgrades and even stronger to reviews of downgrade. He further adds that it is the 
intensity and content of daily corporate news and private information (under certain 
conditions) which influences CDS prices. Galil and Soffer (2011) also confirm the 
previous studies that CDS spreads change abnormally following announcements of 
rating changes and rating reviews. However, they add that the market is more sensitive 
to negative news and that CDS spread changes are greater surrounding negative events 
than surrounding positive events. A more recent study by Wengner et al., (2015) 
examined the impact of S&P rating events on CDS spreads of firms from 2004 to 2011. 
They find that both credit downgrades and upgrades have an impact on the CDS spread 
of event and non-event firms on the event date. However, downgrades are more 
anticipated than upgrades. 
 
Since the studies above have only looked at corporate CDS, there are others 
studies which examines whether the results above also hold for sovereign CDS. 
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Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) examined the effect of sovereign credit rating change 
announcements on the CDS spreads of the event countries, and their spillover effects on 
other emerging economies’ CDS premiums. They find that surrounding a two day 
period of the event, positive events have a greater impact on CDS markets and are more 
likely to have a spillover effect on to emerging countries. They also indicate that 
markets are able to anticipate negative events. Blau and Roseman (2014) investigated a 
cross-country effect between sovereign US credit rating downgrades with European 
CDS spreads. They find a surge in European CDS spreads during the ten-day period 
surrounding the U.S. downgrade. Kim et al.,(2015) measured the impact of domestic 
and spillover macroeconomic news from U.S, the Eurozone and China on national 
sovereign CDS spreads and spread volatility over the period from November 2007 to 
March 2012. Similarly to corporate CDS spreads, they find that better than expected 
news tend to reduce sovereign CDS spreads, whilst worse than expected news increases 
spreads.   
 
In addition to credit ratings announcements and macroeconomic news, there is 
also literature that measure the impact of earnings on CDS spreads. Callen et al., (2009) 
find that earnings (changes) are negatively correlated with one-year CDS changes but 
not with longer term changes. Their results suggest that positive (negative) earnings 
convey favorable (unfavorable) information primarily about short-term default risk. 
Similar to credit rating announcements, Greatrex (2009) examines the impact of 
earnings announcements and finds that the CDS market anticipates negative earnings 
surprises as prices being to adjust prior to the actual announcement date. The market 
also responds more strongly to negative news than to positive news. This makes sense 
as CDS is a form of protection, therefore spreads increase quickly during negative news 
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to adjust for the higher risk, whereas during positive news which indicates a better 
outlook for a firm, the reactions to change might be slower. 
 
Most importantly, I find only Kölbel and Busch (2013) which investigates the 
effect of negative media regarding CSR on credit risk. Their study is not based on an 
announcement effect, rather using panel regressions they examine the relationship 
between credit spreads and news. Their results indicate that negative media attention 
causes a significant increase in credit default swap spreads.  
4.2.2 Related literature on the relationship between CDS and other asset classes 
There are also numerous studies that measure the relationship between CDS and 
other assets classes (i.e. stocks and bonds).  Using weekly data, Longstaff et al., (2003) 
examined the relationship between US firm’s CDS spread changes, corporate bond 
yields and stock returns. They find that CDS spreads and stock returns often lead 
changes in corporate bond yields, indicating that information reaches first to credit 
derivatives and stock markets before the corporate bond market. Norden and Weber 
(2009), using a VAR analysis, measured the relationship between daily and weekly 
CDS spreads, stock returns and bond yields of European firms. They find that the CDS 
market is significantly more sensitive to the stock market than the bond market.  Using 
a sample of firms from North America and Europe instead, Forte and Pena (2009) also 
find that stocks lead CDS and bonds more frequently than vice versa. Fung et al.(2008) 
examined the U.S stock market and CDS market for the period of 2001 to 2007 and find 
that lead-lag relationship between the U.S. stock market and the CDS market depends 
on the credit quality of the underlying reference entity.  Using daily and weekly data, 
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Hilscher et al.(2015), find that informed traders are primarily active in the equity 
market rather than the CDS market.   
I find two similar studies that have examined impacts of events on both CDS 
spreads and stock returns using event study methodology. Norden and Weber (2004) 
analyzed the response of stock and CDS markets to rating announcements from 2000 to 
2002 and find that both markets anticipate rating and reviews of downgrades.  Greatrex 
(2009) measured the reaction of CDS spreads based on earnings announcements from 
2001 to 2006 and compared the results with equity returns. She finds that CDS spreads 
increase (decrease) upon the announcement of unexpected negative (positive) news and 
that the CDS market anticipates negative earnings.  Using a market model, the author 
also finds that the stock market’s reaction to negative earnings surprises is similar to the 
CDS market.  
 
4.2.3 Hypotheses Development 
 Pursuant to the studies in the previous section, I find so far no literature that 
measures the impact of fines on CDS spreads. I find evidence of CDS spread changes 
after a fine especially from the BP and VW case. Callen et al.(2009), investigated 
earnings on CDS and they state that “In structural models, the price of credit derivates 
is a function of the likelihood and severity of financial distress (the credit event), and 
the more profitable is the firm, the less likely it is to suffer from financial distress”. 
Following their reasoning, it can be deduced that illegalities play a role in structural 
models when a fine is imposed to a firm which in turn reduces cash flows and the 
profitability of the firm. Depending on the size of the fine, it can have a strong impact 
on the default risk of the firm. Any negative news due to illegal behaviours of a firm 
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would result in a drop in its share price, consequently a lower firm value and an 
increase in CDS spread. Thus, my first hypothesis is that CDS in general should react to 
fines: 
 
H1: Investors react with increases in CDS spread changes after announcements on 
illegalities  
 
Secondly, most of the reviewed studies only measure five year maturity of the 
senior unsecured CDS changes as they indicate that it is by far the most popular, 
commonly traded and most liquid (Hull, Predescu et al. 2004; Micu, Remolona et al. 
2004; Norden and Weber 2004; Blanco, Brennan et al. 2005; Forte and Pena 2009; 
Norden and Weber 2009; Ismailescu and Kazemi 2010; Galil and Soffer 2011; 
Finnerty, Miller et al. 2013). Kölbel and Busch (2013) examined 5 year CDS spreads 
and 10 years CDS spreads as a robustness and find that their results are similar in 
indicating that negative media attention to CSR issues raises credit risk spreads. 
However, Callen et al.(2009), measured the different maturity levels (one year, five 
year and ten year) of CDS spreads and they find only the levels of one year CDS 
spreads are inversely related to quarterly earnings. This indicates that higher profits 
(positive information) signify lower default risk but only in the short run.  Thus, as fines 
relates to negative news, thus signifying higher default risk, the changes in CDS spreads 
should be more evident with longer term maturities
49
.  Furthermore, announcement of 
illegal violations can be considered as long-term event risks as implications of 
violations usually have longer time frames for regulatory enforcements. Furthermore, as 
most of the studies indicate that the CDS market is able to anticipate news before even 
                                                 
49
 Short-term if they have less than 5 years remaining years to maturity, medium term if they have 5 to 10 
years remaining years to maturity and long-term if they have more than 10 years remaining to maturity 
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announcement (Hull, Predescu et al. 2004; Micu, Remolona et al. 2004; Norden and 
Weber 2004), I also expect the same for news on illegalities. Hence, my second 
hypotheses are stated as below: 
 
H2a: Investors react stronger (higher spread changes) on higher CDS maturities 
compared to lower CDS maturities after announcements on illegalities  
H2b: Investors in the CDS market are able to anticipate news of illegalities even before 
announcements 
  
 Third, I also investigate whether firms with higher fines per market cap have a 
larger reaction compared to firms with lower fines per market cap. Defaults of 
corporations (reference entity) are the most common events CDS contracts are written 
against (Cherny and Craig 2009). Thus it is only rational that the CDS market would 
expect firms with larger fines per market cap to be more in financial distress. Relating 
this also to my second chapter, I find firms with larger fines to have more 
underperformances compared to firms with lower fines in the long-term. Thus, it is only 
rational to assume that this would have a similar reaction in the short-term for both the 
CDS and stock market.  Even Karpoff, John R. Lott et al. (2005) measure the size of  
the legal penalties imposed on environmental violations and find that firms’ losses in 
share value are related to the size of the fine and damage award eventually imposed by 
regulators or the courts. Hence, my third hypotheses are stated as below: 
H3a: Investors in the CDS market react negatively (increase in spreads) to firms with 
higher fines per market cap compared to lower fines per market cap after 
announcements on illegalities  
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H3b: Investors in the stock market react negatively (decrease in returns) to firms with 
higher fines per market cap compared to lower fines per market cap after 
announcements on illegalities  
 
Fourth, most of the studies examined reactions to announcement of news/ events 
on CDS prices that are relatively final (i.e. rating/ reviews of downgrades, 
macroeconomic news, earnings announcements) (Hull, Predescu et al. 2004; Micu, 
Remolona et al. 2004; Norden 2008; Callen, Livnat et al. 2009; Galil and Soffer 2011; 
Kim, Salem et al. 2015). However, news of illegalities are unique as they involve 
various legal stages before a “one-set” final fine amount is either imposed to or 
accepted by firms. Refer to figure 2 in chapter 2 for the various stages of the legal 
process. The initial allegation period (Pending) usually involves informing the market 
of the illegal behaviour of the company with an expected fine amount. However, the 
allegation could then be pending various legal outcomes (Confirmed Violation but 
pending other Matters - CVPM) such as a retrial, fairness hearing, resettlement etc. 
Only at the final stage (Confirmed violation) would the company have either agreed or 
accepted a set fine amount. Rationally, as CDS is an insurance contract, the spreads 
should be higher at the initial stage so investors can “prepare” for any possibility of 
default in the future.  Thus on a realistic assumption, it is the initial violation stage that 
CDS investors would react to (i.e higher spreads) compared to other stages. This 
reaction would be similar to the one in the stock market as illustrated in Chapter 2.4.3. 
Though fines are detrimental to stock returns, at times the confirmation of fines may be 
viewed positively, if the market expected worse and/or the market is relieved to have 
simply been removed from the uncertainty. Karpoff et al., (2005) find that the stock 
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price reactions to initial announcements on environmental fines capture most of the 
firm’s total loss in market value. Hence my fourth hypotheses are stated as below: 
 
H4a: Investors in the CDS market react negatively (increase in spreads) at the initial 
stage of the violations after announcements on illegalities  
H4b: Investors in the stock market react negatively (decrease in returns) at the initial 
stage of the violations after announcements on illegalities  
 
Fifth, it is important to examine market reaction of these CDS prices on different 
industries. Investors in different industries have different tolerance levels to risk and 
hence would not have the same reaction to news. There are only a few studies that have 
measured industry effects on CDS. Jorion and Zhang (2007) examined the impact of 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcies on CDS spreads and show that intra-industry 
effects depend on the type of credit event. Huang et al. (2012), examined the impact of 
four major events (three negative and one positive) of the financial crisis on the CDS 
market across two industries, financial and non-financial. They find that CDS spreads 
of financial firms jump before and after the default events of financial institutions with 
negative shocks and while negative news continues, the CDS spreads of non-financial 
firms rises as a result of the key default of financial firms. Wengner et al.(2015), 
examined the impact of S&P rating events on CDS spreads across industries. Findings 
in their study suggest that market reaction to rating events should not be generalized but 
should rather be examined on an industry level. Daniels and Jensen (2005), find that the 
CDS market is segmented across industries and market reactions to rating 
announcements differ at the industry level. I assume the same for investors in the stock 
market. Hence my fifth hypotheses are stated as below: 
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H5a: Investors in the CDS market react negatively (increase in spreads) only in certain 
industries after announcements on illegalities  
H5b: Investors in the stock market react negatively (decrease in returns) only in certain 
industries after announcements on illegalities  
 
Finally, despite the fact that there are numerous event studies that measure the 
impact of illegalities on stock returns (Wallace and Worrell, 1988, Baucus and Near, 
1991, Davidson et al., 1994, Karpoff et al., 2005a, Karpoff et al., 2005b, Zeidan, 2013, 
Song and Han, 2015, Kouwenberg and Phunnarungsi, 2013, Arnold and Engelen, 
2007), I find no studies that have measured the impact of different ESG and LT issues 
on CDS spreads. I find the study by Sun and Cui (2014) slightly related in linking 
default risk with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). They find that CSR helps 
firms reduce the risk of falling into default. Nonetheless that study does not measure the 
actual impact using an event study on CDS spreads. Thus in this study I examine which 
individual ESG plus LT issue is more of a concern to CDS investors using the European 
Federation of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS) standards. No one to my 
knowledge has used the EFFAS standards on all four ESG plus LT criteria’s to measure 
violations. I consider the LT issues key to be added to ESG because companies usually 
pursue corporate sustainability with both an agenda to reduce ESG risk but also to 
increase their long-term viability i.e. increase their profits. Hence, examining the LT 
separately from ESG issues would be crucial in understanding whether the CDS market 
considers LT issues that affect companies as a concern. For example, the LT could 
relate to innovation (i.e. patents) that would affect the long-term revenue generation of 
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the company. I also measure this to the stock market reaction. Hence my sixth 
hypotheses are stated as below: 
H6a: Investors in the CDS market react negatively (increase in spreads) only on 
certain ESG plus LT issues after announcements on illegalities  
H6b: Investors in the stock market react negatively (decrease in returns) only on 
certain ESG plus LT issues after announcements on illegalities 
4.3 Data and Methodology  
4.3.1 Credit default swap spreads and illegality data 
 My sample is based on daily corporate CDS data from 2009 to 2012 for U.S 
firms and is extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream (Datastream) database. 
Jenkins et al. (2016), also used CDS prices from Datastream and argue “it has a better 
advantage of allowing to capture the change in CDS spreads on individual security 
basis than the change in issue price on two different CDSs issued on the same reference 
asset”.  Datastream provides CDS spreads for various types of currencies (i.e. USD, 
Euro Australian, Japanese Yen, Norwegian Krone) and seniority (i.e. Senior unsecured, 
Subordinated unsecured). As most contracts are U.S dollar dominated, for consistency I 
removed all other currencies and only retained U.S dollar contracts and only senior 
unsecured CDS data (Ismailescu and Kazemi 2010). I use the mid-rate spread between 
the entity and the relevant benchmark curve and the rate is expressed in basis points 
(bps). Though most literature only use the five-year CDS as it is the most commonly 
quoted level, in this study I analyze all the various levels of maturities from 6 months to 
30 years to understand whether there are any significant variances between these 
different maturity levels after an event. The CDS spreads are also categorized into 
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seven different industry levels according to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes. The illegal behaviors event dataset is similar to the previous two chapters which 
is hand collected data of violations of MSCI Large Cap U.S firms from the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) 10-k fillings. The initial sample from 2009 to 2012 
consisted of 164 numbers of firms and 556 numbers of fines. However, once I matched 
the fines data with the available CDS data, my final sample consisted of 121 numbers of 
firms and 471 numbers of fines. Refer to table 8.9 in the appendix for a detailed 
overview of the sample size and table 8.10 for the composition of CDS data per firm. 
4.3.2 Event Study Methodology 
In this section, I explain the methodology used in my analysis to measure the 
impact of illegal behaviours on the changes of CDS spreads. Following the seminal 
paper by MacKinlay (1997) who stated that “ the usefulness of the event study…can be 
constructed using security prices over a relatively short period of time”, I thus conduct 
the analysis using the traditional event study methodology
50
. Firstly, I define the event 
which in my case is the daily dates of the violations of firms as per SEC filings. 
Secondly, I select the estimation window period which is the period prior to the event 
and the event date is normally not included in the estimation. I have chosen 250 days as 
the estimation window to obtain the coefficient estimates which is similar to Greatrex 
(2009) who also used this period to measure CDS spread changes. Finally, an event 
window is chosen which in my case is 20 days before and 20 days after the event, 
totaling to 41 days and is referred as [-20,+20].  This is a market model which is 
                                                 
50
 In the previous two chapters, I had used the CAPM, FF and Carhart models using the portfolio method 
to examine the impact of fines on long-term returns. However, in this chapter as I intend on measuring 
the short –term impact of fines on both CDS and equities, the standard market model using the event 
study methodology is the most appropriate. Additionally, this event study model is commonly used in 
literature (as per section 4.2) where short-term CDS spreads are examined.. 
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commonly used in stock market literature and takes into account. The estimation and 
observation windows do not overlap as per Figure 4 below which provides the 
description of the event periods: 
 
Figure 4 Event study timeline adapted from MacKinlay (1997) 
 
 
 
 
I employ a market model that is “a statistical model which relates the return of any 
given security to the return of the market portfolio”(MacKinlay 1997). This means that 
I regress the daily CDS spread changes on an overall CDS market. The market model is 
as per below: 
                             (4.1) 
 where        is the change of the daily CDS spread for the firm i at date t. 
      is the daily change of the CDS market and since I do not have an equivalent 
CDS index, I calculated my own CDS index by equal weighting the mean CDS spread 
of all the firms in my sample at date t.        are the parameters of the model and     is 
the zero mean disturbance term. I then proceed to calculate the abnormal spread 
changes (ASC) using the following formula: 
                                  (4.2) 
-270 -20 +20 0 
Estimation Window Event Window 
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However, most current CDS literature that employ an event study methodology 
use instead an index-adjustment based model (Hull, Predescu et al. 2004; Norden and 
Weber 2004; Greatrex 2009; Ismailescu and Kazemi 2010; Galil and Soffer 2011; 
Huang, Shen et al. 2012; Finnerty, Miller et al. 2013; Wengner, Burghof et al. 2015). 
Since CDS spreads are not returns, employing a market model may not be accurate and 
considering that an overall CDS market exchange index is not accessible and that I have 
to create my “own” index, Finnerty et al.(2013) and Huang et al., (2012) indicate that 
using a simple average of CDS spreads would be preferable instead. Thus, I employ a 
ratings based index-adjustment model which will remove any systematic effects from 
an individual firm’s spread changes. The formula used to calculate the index-adjustment 
based model is per below: 
               -          =                                     (4.3) 
 where similarly to the market model,        is the change of the daily CDS 
spread for the firm i at date t. However, instead the         is now calculated by equal 
weighting the mean CDS spread level of firms within two separate rating categories for 
the firms at date t.        is the daily change of the rating based index. Following  
Huang et al. (2012), I use the credit ratings assigned by S&P to determine the two rating 
categories, investment grade (AAA to BBB-) and speculative grade (BB+ and below). 
Finally, cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASC) are calculated by summing up 
the daily ASC within the event window starting at    and ending at    as per the 
formula below: 
                
  
    
        (4.4)  
 I also conducted a short-term event study on stock returns for comparison 
purposes. Similar to Greatrex (2009) I use a market model and a market adjusted model 
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with an estimation period of 250 days with an event window totaling to 41 days and is 
referred as [-20,+20]. The market model is estimated as per the model below: 
                          (4.5) 
 where     is the daily log return of the firm i at date t.     is the market 
portfolio which I have created by equal weighting the portfolio log returns in the sample 
portfolio from 2009 to 2012.         are the parameters of the model and     is the zero 
mean disturbance term. The market model abnormal return is estimated as per the 
model below: 
                              (4.6) 
 where      is the abnormal stock return of the firm i at date t. The market 
adjusted abnormal returns is estimated as per the model below: 
                        (4.7) 
Similar to the CDS, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated by summing up 
the daily AR within the event window starting at    and ending at    as per the formula 
below: 
              
  
    
        (4.8) 
Following Huang, Shen et al.(2012), CASCs and CARs are computed within seven 
pre and post event windows [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] with 
cross-sectional test statistics (t-test) by “dividing average event-period residual by its 
contemporaneous cross-sectional standard error”(Boehmer, Masumeci et al. 1991). 
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4.4 Empirical Results: Analyzing CDS spread changes and stock market 
returns 
4.4.1 Overall Market reaction and by CDS maturity level  
In this section, I analyze the impact of illegalities on overall market reaction and 
on the different maturity levels of CDS. I separate the maturities into six different 
levels, i) Less than 1 year, ii) between 2 and 5 years iii) between 6 and 10 years iv) 
above 10 years vi) only 5 years and vii) all maturity levels.  
Tables 4.1 to 4.3 report the results of the cumulative abnormal spread changes 
(CASC) response to illegalities. Examining the results in Table 4.1, I find increase in 
CDS spread changes (post event) on three out of six levels of maturity. This confirms 
the first hypothesis that there are increases in CDS spreads after announcements of 
illegality.  CASC for firms with less than 1 year maturity are statistically significant at a 
5% and 10% level for the [0, 1] and [0, 2] announcement windows respectively. CASC 
for firms between 6 and 10 years and All maturity levels are statistically significant at a 
10% level at [0, 1] announcement windows. This indicates CDS investors react 
immediately the day after the news of illegalities. The changes in the spreads for the 
less than 1 year maturity is +1.6 basis points, between 6 and 10 years maturity is +1.1 
basis points and all maturity is +1.1 basis points for the [0, 1] announcement windows.  
My second hypothesis is that investors react stronger (higher spread changes) on 
higher CDS maturities compared to lower CDS maturities after announcements on 
illegalities. The results show that the increase in CDS spreads is evident in short-term, 
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medium term and on all levels of maturities
51
. Indicating, regardless of the level of 
maturity, CDS investors react immediately after announcements of fines. This makes 
sense as CDS has insurance like characteristics and should have a mechanism to protect 
all types of bonds regardless of maturity.  
However, I find that the results are only evident to a market-model and when an 
index-adjusted model is used, the reactions to the illegal behaviour news (post event) 
show no statistical significance (as per table 4.2). These results are interesting, as the 
index adjusted investment grade ratings model indicates that investors do not perceive 
fines for firms with high quality ratings (i.e. more stable) to be of a concern. This is also 
evident with the co-efficient sign post event on all levels of maturity being negative. 
The results on the speculative grade ratings model in table 4.3 also show statistically no 
significance pre and post events. 
Supporting Norden and Weber (2004) I also find that the CDS markets 
anticipate the news even before announcements on five out of six levels of maturity. 
This supports my hypothesis 1b that the CDS market anticipates illegality news even 
before announcements. In the market model, I find statistically significant larger spread 
changes before announcements at the [-5,-1] announcement window for five different 
maturity levels
52
 and also at the [-10,-1] announcement window for two maturity 
levels
53
. I observe that the changes in spreads at pre-event announcement for the [-5,-1] 
announcement window is approximately between +2.1 and +3.5 basis points and for the 
[-10,-1] announcement window approximately between +4.1 basis points and +5.1 basis 
points. This is significantly larger than the post-announcement period spread change. I 
                                                 
51
 Short-term if they have less than 5 years remaining years to maturity, medium term if they have 5 to 10 
years remaining years to maturity and long-term if they have more than 10 years remaining to maturity 
52
 Less than 1 year, between 6 and 10 years, above 10 years, only 5 years and all maturity levels. 
53
 Above 10 years and only 5 years maturity levels 
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find that maturities of only 5 years and above 10 years have statistically significant pre 
announcement effects but no significant reaction post announcement. However, in the 
index -adjusted model based on the investment grade ratings, I find that there is only a 
negative spread change for the less than 1 year maturity pre-event announcement 
window of [-5,-1] and [-10,-1]. None of the post event announcement window for both 
the index-adjusted models shows any statistical significance. 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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Table 4.1 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) Around Illegal Events based on CDS maturity level (Market Model) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on CDS maturity level of less than 1 year, between 2 and 5 years, between 6 and 10 
years, above 10 years, only 5 years and all levels of maturity over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are calculated 
using a market-model. N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, 
and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Market - model CASCs                               
All CASCs 
(bps) 467 2.2114   2.9070**   1.1241   1.0568*   1.2403   2.1667   5.6000 
t-test   (1.2283)   (2.0245)   (1.4994)   (1.776)   (1.3938)   (1.276)   (1.2343) 
t-test p-val   0.2193   0.0429 
 
0.1338   0.0757 
 
0.1634   0.2020   0.2171 
Less than 1 Year 
CASCs 
(bps) 467 -5.1673   2.1082*   1.0145   
1.5814*
*   1.0261*   1.8026   5.2600 
t-test   (-1.5895)   (1.645)   (1.2382)   (2.2263)   (1.6832)   (1.6146)   (1.3765) 
t-test p-val   0.1119   0.1000 
 
0.2157   0.0260 
 
0.0923 
 
0.1064   0.1687 
Between 2 and 5 Years CASCs 
(bps) 466 1.9019   2.6849   1.0723   0.9352   0.9821   1.8255   5.2745 
t-test   (0.9431)   (2.0935)   (1.6324)   (1.8381)   (1.3867)   (1.2474)   (1.2094) 
t-test p-val   0.3456   0.0363   0.1026   0.0660   0.1655   0.2123   0.2265 
Between 6 and 10 Years CASCs 
(bps) 467 3.8235   2.4064*   1.0374   1.0696*   1.7661   3.1625   6.7644 
t-test   (1.5283)   (1.7168)   (1.3665)   (1.6889)   (1.3164)   (1.3003)   (1.3044) 
t-test p-val   0.1265   0.0860 
 
0.1718   0.0912 
 
0.1880   0.1935   0.1921 
Above 10 Years CASCs 
(bps) 467 5.0774*   2.6621*   0.9985   0.9882   1.7382   3.1319   6.9440 
t-test   (1.776)   (1.7999)   (1.2382)   (1.4723)   (1.2046)   (1.231)   (1.3141) 
t-test p-val   0.0757 
 
0.0719 
 
0.2157   0.1410   0.2284   0.2183   0.1888 
Only 5 Years CASCs 
(bps) 434 4.0819*   3.4827**   1.1187   0.9135   1.2615   2.3708   6.2839 
t-test   (1.6567)   (2.2157)   (1.4807)   (1.5163)   (1.1963)   (1.1495)   (1.2283) 
t-test p-val   0.0976 
 
0.0267 
 
0.1387   0.1294   0.2316   0.2503   0.2193 
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Table 4.2 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) Around Illegal Events based on CDS maturity level (Index Adjusted Model based on 
Investment Grade Ratings) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on CDS maturity level of less than 1 year, between 2 and 5 years, between 6 and 10 years, 
above 10 years, only 5 years and all levels of maturity over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are calculated using a market-
model. N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate 
significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Index - adjusted model CASCs based on Investment Grade Ratings                     
All CASCs 
(bps) 404 0.3297   0.5021   -0.2620   -0.2144   -0.3571   -0.2618   -0.4243 
t-test   (0.2477)   (0.5535)   (-0.7427)   (-0.5941)   (-0.8575)   (-0.3918)   (-0.5838) 
t-test p-val   0.8044   0.5799   0.4576   0.5524   0.3912   0.6952   0.5593 
Less than 1 Year CASCs 
(bps) 402 -2.5405***   -0.8847*   -0.4613   -0.0241   -0.3324   -0.5969   -1.2256 
t-test   (-3.15)   (-1.822)   (-1.4365)   (-0.0711)   (-0.826)   (-0.9446)   (-1.5604) 
t-test p-val   0.0016 
 
0.0685 
 
0.1509   0.9433   0.4088   0.3449   0.1187 
Between 2 and 5 Years CASCs 
(bps) 404 0.0174   0.3893   -0.2627   -0.1966   -0.3645   -0.2884   -0.7187 
t-test   (0.0129)   (0.4195)   (-0.7533)   (-0.5473)   (-0.8756)   (-0.4279)   (-0.9615) 
t-test p-val   0.9897   0.6749   0.4513   0.5842   0.3813   0.6687   0.3363 
Between 6 and 10 Years CASCs 
(bps) 402 -0.1486   0.0489   -0.3376   -0.0583   -0.1555   0.1969   0.2648 
t-test   (-0.197)   (0.0923)   (-0.9858)   (-0.1682)   (-0.3869)   (0.3345)   (0.3783) 
t-test p-val   0.8439   0.9264   0.3242   0.8664   0.6989   0.7380   0.7052 
Above 10 Years CASCs 
(bps) 402 0.5198   0.4170   -0.3672   -0.1498   -0.2651   0.1693   0.6718 
t-test   (0.6654)   (0.7394)   (-0.9863)   (-0.3968)   (-0.6086)   (0.2737)   (0.8901) 
t-test p-val   0.5058   0.4596   0.3240   0.6915   0.5428   0.7843   0.3734 
Only 5 Years CASCs 
(bps) 368 1.1477   1.1455   -0.1004   -0.0923   -0.1491   0.0829   -0.1052 
t-test   (0.8035)   (1.2134)   (-0.2858)   (-0.2597)   (-0.3653)   (0.1253)   (-0.1593) 
t-test p-val   0.4217   0.2250   0.7750   0.7951   0.7149   0.9003   0.8734 
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Table 4.3 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) Around Illegal Events based on CDS maturity level (Index Adjusted Model based on 
Speculative Grade Ratings) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on CDS maturity level of less than 1 year, between 2 and 5 years, between 6 and 
10 years, above 10 years, only 5 years and all levels of maturity over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are 
calculated using a market-model. N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The 
superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Index - adjusted model CASCs based on Speculative Grade Ratings                     
All CASCs (bps) 33 -61.8609   -12.8976   0.8672   7.3826   17.4896   44.5647   85.5277 
t-test   (-1.0271)   (-1.0593)   (0.0935)   (0.8045)   (0.8259)   (0.9085)   (0.9591) 
t-test p-val   0.3044   0.2895   0.9255   0.4211   0.4089   0.3636   0.3375 
Less than 1 Year CASCs (bps) 33 -139.0141   -12.9152   0.0383   12.4300   13.6673   43.6252   84.9165 
t-test   (-1.5869)   (-0.6867)   (0.0047)   (1.2233)   (0.9482)   (1.0807)   (1.002) 
t-test p-val   0.1125   0.4923   0.9963   0.2212   0.3430   0.2798   0.3164 
Between 2 and 5 Years CASCs (bps) 33 -63.0424   -15.7365   -0.5896   4.7305   12.6749   37.4036   81.2955 
t-test   (-0.9306)   (-1.0055)   (-0.0583)   (0.5529)   (0.6766)   (0.8189)   (0.9356) 
t-test p-val   0.3521   0.3147   0.9535   0.5803   0.4986   0.4129   0.3495 
Between 6 and 10 Years CASCs (bps) 33 -28.3410   -10.6259   2.2227   7.3017   23.1181   50.9760   89.0477 
t-test   (-0.512)   (-1.4325)   (0.2394)   (0.7652)   (0.8702)   (0.9067)   (0.9546) 
t-test p-val   0.6086   0.1520   0.8108   0.4441   0.3842   0.3645   0.3398 
Above 10 Years CASCs (bps) 33 -15.8646   -9.4740   3.2540   7.7204   25.3127   53.4151   91.0833 
t-test   (-0.3256)   (-1.3992)   (0.3584)   (0.7917)   (0.9069)   (0.9219)   (0.9661) 
t-test p-val   0.7448   0.1617   0.7201   0.4285   0.3645   0.3566   0.3340 
Only 5 Years CASCs (bps) 33 -45.5162   -11.7073   0.4547   5.7417   16.9017   43.2607   85.1354 
t-test   (-0.7485)   (-1.1652)   (0.048)   (0.6373)   (0.7646)   (0.857)   (0.9536) 
t-test p-val   0.4542   0.2440   0.9617   0.5239   0.4445   0.3914   0.3403 
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4.4.2 Market reaction by fines per market cap   
In this section, I examine the impacts of different illegalities of firms based on i) 
high fines per market cap (80
th
 to 100
th
 percentile) and ii) low fines per market cap (0 to 
20
th
 percentile). The results in table 4.4 on the CDS spread changes confirms my 
hypothesis that the CDS market would increase spreads for firms with higher fines per 
market cap compared to lower fines per market cap. As observed for the high fines per 
market cap firms, in the market model in Panel A, there are increases of +0.3 basis 
points and +0.4 basis points at the [0,1] and [0,2] event windows respectively. 
Additionally, even firms with higher investment grade ratings (Panel B) witness an 
increases in spreads of +0.4 basis points at the [0,2] event window. However, I do not 
find any post event CDS market reaction to the speculative grade rating model. In line 
with expectations, the lower fines per market cap do not exhibit any statistical 
significance. Even though, the increase in spreads is marginal, these results show that 
the CDS market reacts more to firms with higher fines per market cap. 
When examining the stock market results, one would also expect stock investors 
to react negatively to fines. The results in table 4.5, confirm my hypothesis that in the 
short-term there is also larger negative returns to firms with higher fines per market cap 
compared to lower fines per market cap. As seen in the market model (panel A) and in 
the market-adjusted model (panel B), the stock immediately decreases in returns in the 
[0,1] and [0,2],[0,5] event window respectively. Surprisingly, in the market model in 
panel A I find that firms with lower fines per market cap actually have positive returns. 
This result indicates that firm losses in share value are dependent on the size of the fine 
in perspective to size of the firm. In short, it can be observed that stock investors are 
taking into account the size of the fine when reacting to illegality news.  
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Table 4.4 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) Around Illegal Events based on Fines per Market Cap (Market, Index Adjusted Model 
based on Investment and Speculative Grade Ratings) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on low fines per market cap and high fines per market cap over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 
0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are calculated using a market-model (Panel A), Index Adjusted Investment Grade model (Panel B) and 
Speculative Grade model (Panel C). N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The 
superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Panel A: Market - model CASCs                               
Low Fines per Market Cap (0 to 20th 
Percentile) 
CASCs (bps)  277 0.0343   -0.3191   -0.0406   -0.1595   -0.1851   -0.3465   -0.3948 
t-test   (0.0954)   (-1.2538)   (-0.252)   (-0.5248)   (-0.5876)   (-0.8985)   (-1.1763) 
t-test p-val   0.9240   0.2099   0.8010   0.5997   0.5568   0.3689   0.2395 
High Fines per Market Cap (80th to 
100th Percentile) 
CASCs (bps)  352 0.1905   0.3375   0.2524   0.2547*   0.3670*   0.1910   -0.0208 
t-test   (0.4904)   (1.2612)   (1.48)   (1.7116)   (1.8021)   (0.7287)   (-0.0487) 
t-test p-val   0.6239   0.2072   0.1389   0.0870 
 
0.0715 
 
0.4662   0.9611 
Panel B: Index - adjusted model CASCs based on Investment Grade Ratings                     
Low Fines per Market Cap (0 to 20th 
Percentile) 
CASCs (bps)  273 0.0500   -0.3719   -0.0524   -0.2028   -0.2005   -0.4249   -0.3854 
t-test   (0.1564)   (-1.4624)   (-0.2814)   (-0.5984)   (-0.5745)   (-0.997)   (-1.0473) 
t-test p-val   0.8757   0.1436   0.7784   0.5496   0.5657   0.3188   0.2949 
High Fines per Market Cap (80th to 
100th Percentile) 
CASCs (bps)  201 0.2482   0.5307**   0.1382   0.2219   0.3719*   0.2098   -0.1559 
t-test   (0.5661)   (1.9709)   (0.7963)   (1.4247)   (1.6522)   (0.7439)   (-0.3191) 
t-test p-val   0.5713   0.0487 
 
0.4259   0.1542   0.0985 
 
0.4570   0.7496 
Panel C: Index - adjusted model CASCs based on Speculative Grade Ratings                     
Low Fines per Market Cap (0 to 20th 
Percentile) 
CASCs (bps)  16 -1.7692**   -1.4265*   -0.0984   0.4612   -0.2173   0.8731   -0.1193 
t-test   (-2.2092)   (-1.7429)   (-1.3818)   (1.2737)   (-0.2025)   (0.8121)   (-0.0907) 
t-test p-val   0.0272 
 
0.0814 
 
0.1670   0.2028   0.8395   0.4168   0.9278 
High Fines per Market Cap (80th to 
100th Percentile) 
CASCs (bps)  17 -1.0469   -2.0160*   0.9289   0.6042   0.4390   1.0233   1.6199 
t-test   (-0.9987)   (-1.8327)   (1.1542)   (0.7527)   (0.5101)   (1.3692)   (1.554) 
t-test p-val   0.3180   0.0668 
 
0.2484   0.4516   0.6100   0.1710   0.1202 
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Table 4.5 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around Illegal Events based on Fines per Market Cap (Market-model and Market-adjusted) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around illegal events based on low fines per market cap and high fines per market cap over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], 
[0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal returns are calculated using a market-model (Panel A) and market-adjusted model (Panel B). N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross 
sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5) (0,10) 
Panel A: Market - model 
CARs                             
Low Fines per Market Cap (0 to 
20th Percentile) 
CARs (in %) 277 -0.0028   0.0051*   0.0047   0.0075*   0.0074*   -0.0062 0.0007 
t-test 
 
(-0.5909)   (1.8076)   (1.2002)   (1.7947)   (1.7515)   (-0.8346) (0.0782) 
t-test p-val 
 
0.5546   0.0707 
 
0.2301   0.0727 
 
0.0799 
 
0.404 0.9377 
High Fines per Market Cap 
(80th to 100th Percentile) 
CARs (in %) 352 0.0025   0.0011   -0.0013   -0.0027*   -0.0016   -0.0028 -0.0008 
t-test 
 
(0.5911)   (0.3694)   (-0.7816)   (-1.792)   (-0.954)   (-1.1463) (-0.2443) 
t-test p-val 
 
0.5544   0.7118   0.4344   0.0731 
 
0.3401   0.2517 0.807 
Panel B: Market- adjusted model CARs 
 
                        
Low Fines per Market Cap (0 to 
20th Percentile) 
CARs (in %) 277 -0.0079   0.0009   0.0036   0.0055   0.0044   -0.012 -0.0082 
t-test 
 
(-1.3668)   (0.2956)   (0.9032)   (1.3122)   (1.0265)   (-1.4898) (-0.8063) 
t-test p-val 
 
0.1717   0.7675   0.3664   0.1895   0.3047   0.1363 0.4200 
High Fines per Market Cap 
(80th to 100th Percentile) 
CARs (in %) 352 0.0039   0.0002   -0.001   -0.0028   -0.0039*   -0.0053* -0.0046 
t-test 
 
(0.8375)   (0.0732)   (-0.5962)   (-1.6078)   (-1.8656)   (-1.824) (-1.1132) 
t-test p-val 
 
0.4023   0.9416   0.5511   0.1079   0.0621 
 
0.0681 0.2656 
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4.4.3 Market reaction by stages of legal process 
Here, I examine the impact of illegalities by the different legal stages on both 
CDS spreads and stock returns. I have three different categories i) Pending, ii) 
Confirmed but pending other matters (CVPM) and iii) Confirmed.  
The findings here are unusual, as pursuant to the results in table 4.6, I do not 
find as per my hypothesis that the pending stage for CDS has increases in spreads. In 
the market model, it is the confirmed stage which has an increase in spread of +2.1 
basis points at the [0,1] event window. In the investment grade model, the pending 
stage has a significant negative change at the [0,1] and [0,2] event window with-1.6 
basis and -1.6 basis points respectively. The CVPM has an increase in spread at the 
[0,1], [0,2] and [0,3] event window with +1.1, +1.0 and +1.4 basis points respectively. 
Subsequently, when the fine is at the CVPM and confirmed stage, the CDS market then 
reacts to the announcements with an increase in spreads to cover for any further losses. 
I find no statistically significant results after announcements for the index-adjusted 
speculative grade model as per table 4.7. 
On the stock market results, the CAR as per table 4.8 supports my hypothesis as 
in the market adjusted model, I find significant negative return at the pending stage in 
the [0,5] event window. In the market-model, I find a significant positive return at the 
confirmed stage in both [0,5] and [0,10] event window which is also as expected.  
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Table 4.6 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) around Illegal Events based on legal stages of illegalities (Market –model and Index 
Adjusted Model based on Investment Grade Ratings) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around illegal events based on three (Pending, Confirmed but Pending 
other Matters and Confirmed) legal stages of illegalities over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are calculated using a 
market-model (Panel A), an index-adjusted model based on investment grade ratings (Panel B). N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1) (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Panel A: Market - model CASCs                             
Pending 
CASCs 
(bps) 180 4.1894   3.7773   1.4613   0.4198 0.2263   1.4569   0.7397 
t-test   (1.0146)   (1.4236)   (1.0157)   (0.4234) (0.2203)   (0.8014)   (0.434) 
t-test p-val   0.3103   0.1545   0.3098   0.672 0.8257   0.4229   0.6643 
Confirmed but Pending other Matters 
CASCs 
(bps) 119 0.9675   0.9062   -0.2166   0.5752 0.3177   0.2781   -0.5982 
t-test   (0.8263)   (1.1833)   (-0.5511)   (1.5618) (0.7679)   (0.3912)   (-0.5316) 
t-test p-val   0.4086   0.2367   0.5816   0.1183 0.4426   0.6956   0.595 
Confirmed 
CASCs 
(bps) 173 1.0392   3.4559   1.7733   2.0631* 2.9884   4.3816   15.1618 
t-test   (0.4818)   (1.3141)   (1.3481)   (1.7028) (1.3665)   (1.0178)   (1.2276) 
t-test p-val   0.63   0.1888   0.1776   0.0886 0.1718   0.3088   0.2196 
Panel B: Index - adjusted model CASCs based on Investment Grade Ratings                   
Pending 
CASCs 
(bps) 161 1.5252   1.9311   -0.8065   -1.6354**  -1.5615**   -0.9512   -0.8694 
t-test   (0.518)   (0.9671)   (-1.2)   (-2.3459) (-1.9992)   (-0.6912)   (-0.5881) 
t-test p-val   0.6045   0.3335   0.2301   0.019 0.0456 
 
0.4895   0.5565 
Confirmed but Pending other Matters 
CASCs 
(bps) 101 0.4276   -0.1958   -0.1683   1.0965*** 0.9398**   1.4398**  
 
1.266 
t-test   (0.2227)   (-0.1461)   (-0.2395)   (2.8944) (2.1656)   (2.306)   (1.5608) 
t-test p-val   0.8238   0.8838   0.8107   0.0038 0.0303 
 
0.0211 
 
0.1186 
Confirmed 
CASCs 
(bps) 142 -1.0954   -0.6218   0.2887   0.4643 0.086   -0.6903   -1.122 
t-test   (-0.9406)   (-0.785)   (0.6865)   (0.7978) (0.1201)   (-0.6978)   (-1.054) 
t-test p-val   0.3469   0.4324   0.4924   0.425 0.9044   0.4853   0.2919 
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Table 4.7 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) around Illegal Events based on legal stages of illegalities (Index Adjusted Model 
based on Speculative Grade Ratings) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on three (Pending, Confirmed but Pending other Matters and Confirmed) legal stages of 
illegalities over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are calculated using an index-adjusted model based on speculative 
grade ratings (Panel C). N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, 
and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Panel A: Index - adjusted model CASCs based on Speculative Grade Ratings                     
Pending 
CASCs 
(bps) 12 -58.1692   -15.5115   -2.5319   -8.7861   -11.1516   -16.1411   8.8128 
t-test   (-1.0414)   (-0.8244)   (-0.7035)   (-1.3161)   (-1.1886)   (-1.1509)   (0.7316) 
t-test p-val   0.2977   0.4097   0.4818   0.1882   0.2346   0.2498   0.4644 
Confirmed but Pending other Matters 
CASCs 
(bps) 7 -4.8138*   -1.2214   1.1907   -0.1705   -0.0188   0.3662   -1.5854 
t-test   (-1.6526)   (-0.5585)   (0.3911)   (-0.0351)   (-0.0039)   (0.0617)   (-0.3003) 
t-test p-val   0.0984 
 
0.5765   0.6957   0.972   0.9969   0.9508   0.7639 
Confirmed 
CASCs 
(bps) 14 -93.5488   -16.4953   3.6188   25.0181   50.7934   118.6976   194.8399 
t-test   (-0.6991)   (-0.6943)   (0.1674)   (1.2094)   (1.0327)   (1.0328)   (0.9279) 
t-test p-val   0.4845   0.4875   0.8671   0.2265   0.3017   0.3017   0.3535 
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Table 4.8 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around Illegal Events based on industry categories (Market-model and Market-adjusted) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around illegal events based on three (Pending, Confirmed but Pending other Matters and Confirmed) legal stages of 
illegalities over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal returns are calculated using a market-model (Panel A) and market-adjusted model 
(Panel B). N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate 
significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively 
  
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Panel A: Market - model CARs                               
Pending CARs (in %) 180 0.0026   0.001   -0.0005   0.0002   0.0000   -0.0043   -0.0019 
  t-test   (0.739)   (0.3825)   (-0.2092)   (0.0946)   (-0.0016)   (-1.0635)   (-0.3613) 
  t-test p-val   0.4599   0.7021   0.8343   0.9246   0.9987   0.2876   0.7179 
Confirmed but Pending other Matters CARs (in %) 119 -0.0027   -0.0062***   -0.0001   0.0007   0.001   -0.0011   -0.0044 
  t-test   (-0.7952)   (-2.9129)   (-0.0724)   (0.4669)   (0.6333)   (-0.4984)   (-1.4209) 
  t-test p-val   0.4265   0.0036 
 
0.9423   0.6406   0.5265   0.6182   0.1553 
Confirmed CARs (in %) 173 0.0078*   0.0033   0.0023   0.0021   0.0027   0.0047*   0.0113 
  t-test   (1.9511)   (1.3522)   (1.2336)   (1.1104)   (1.131)   (1.6501)   (2.6048) 
  t-test p-val   0.051 
 
0.1763   0.2173   0.2668   0.2581   0.0989 
 
0.0092 
Panel B: Market- adjusted model CARs                               
Pending CARs (in %) 180 0.0017   -0.0019   -0.0008   -0.0016   -0.003   -0.0098**   -0.0079 
  t-test   (0.401)   (-0.6981)   (-0.3438)   (-0.7758)   (-1.1628)   (-2.2607)   (-1.4133) 
  t-test p-val   0.6884   0.4851   0.731   0.4379   0.2449   0.0238 
 
0.1576 
Confirmed but Pending other Matters CARs (in %) 119 -0.0029   -0.0083***   -0.0024   -0.0006   -0.0008   -0.0032   -0.005 
  t-test   (-0.7209)   (-2.847)   (-1.2354)   (-0.3035)   (-0.3952)   (-1.1409)   (-1.2303) 
  t-test p-val   0.471   0.0044 
 
0.2167   0.7615   0.6927   0.2539   0.2186 
Confirmed CARs (in %) 173 0.0044   0.0016   0.0004   0.0003   -0.0004   0.0002   0.0032 
  t-test   (1.0842)   (0.6024)   (0.1893)   (0.1637)   (-0.1424)   (0.0701)   (0.6969) 
  t-test p-val   0.2783   0.5469   0.8498   0.8699   0.8868   0.9441   0.4858 
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4.4.4 Market reaction by industry  
In this section, I analyze the impact of illegalities on different industries on both 
CDS spreads and stock returns. I have seven different industry categories i) mining, ii) 
manufacturing, iii) transportation & public utilities, iv) wholesale trade, v) retail trade, 
vi) finance, insurance and real estate and vii) services.  
Overall, I find supporting evidence in respect to both hypothesis 5a and 5b. 
Tables 4.9 to table 4.11 report the results of the cumulative abnormal spread changes 
(CASC) response and tables 4.12 to 4.13 report the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
to illegalities. Following the assumption that illegalities would drive CDS prices to rise, 
at both market and speculative grade model, I find only the mining industry CASC post 
announcement results has an increase in spreads with statistically significant results. In 
the market model, this is quite evident with increases on all the post announcement 
event windows of approximately between +4.9 and +7.3 basis points It is important to 
note that for lower quality credit ratings in the mining sector, the increase in spreads is 
larger between +9.8 basis points and +12.9 basis points for the [0,1],[0,2] and [0,5] 
announcement windows. I find no statistical significance in the index adjusted model 
based on the investment grade ratings. This shows that investors in the CDS market 
react negatively to illegalities in the mining industry, and even more so on firms with 
lower grade credit ratings.  
On the other hand, I observe that the services, wholesale trade, transportation & 
public utilities and surprisingly the finance industry have decreases in CDS spreads. In 
the market-model, services industry is significantly negative at the event window [0,5]. 
In the index-adjusted model based on investment grade ratings, I find significantly 
negative results for wholesale trade and finance, insurance and real estate at the event 
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window [0,2] and [0,10] respectively. In the index-adjusted model based on speculative 
grade ratings, I find transportation and public utilities to have significantly negative 
results at the [0,10] event window. 
On the stock market, examining the market-model CAR post announcement 
results, I find that it is only the manufacturing industry which has a short-term reaction 
to announcements of fines. There is significantly negative CAR at the [0,5] and [0,10] 
event  window and at the [0,2]  [0,5] and [0,10] event window in the market and 
market-adjusted model respectively.  On the other hand, the mining, transportation & 
public utilities and finance, insurance and real estate exhibit increases in share prices.  
Comparing the CASC and CAR results, it is observed that investors in both the 
CDS and stock market react differently in industries. Norden and Weber, (2004) argue 
that both markets do not react identically because stocks and CDS differ in several 
ways (i.e. cash vs derivatives, risk-return profile, exchange vs over the counter, market 
participant structure, etc.). This further supports Wengner et al.,(2015) and Jorion and 
Zhang (2007) that CDS market reaction should not be generalized but should rather be 
examined on an industry level. 
 
 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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Table 4.9 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) around Illegal Events based on industry categories (Market – model) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on seven (Mining, Manufacturing, Transportation & Public Utilities, Wholesale Trade, Retail 
Trade, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate and Services)  industry categories over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are 
calculated using a market-model. N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts 
***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10)   
Market - model CASCs                                 
Mining 
CASCs (bps) 27 1.6727   2.5449   1.4447   4.9503**   5.4983**   7.3339***   6.4554*   
t-test   (0.4105)   (1.0056)   (0.9045)   (2.4489)   (2.3777)   (2.7303)   (1.6739)   
t-test p-val   0.6815   0.3146   0.3657   0.0143 
 
0.0174 
 
0.0063 
 
0.0942 
 
Manufacturing 
CASCs (bps) 247 2.3262   4.0885*   1.7849   1.6021   2.1125   3.9697   11.6202   
t-test   (1.0467)   (1.9162)   (1.3687)   (1.5646)   (1.3028)   (1.2443)   (1.3463)   
t-test p-val   0.2952   0.0553 
 
0.1711   0.1177   0.1926   0.2134   0.1782   
Transportation & Public 
Utilities 
CASCs (bps) 66 -0.662   -0.0487   -0.3661   0.3345   -0.2171   -0.7687   -1.6565   
t-test   (-0.7036)   (-0.1023)   (-0.7577)   (0.7038)   (-0.272)   (-0.4598)   (-0.6713)   
t-test p-val   0.4817   0.9185   0.4486   0.4815   0.7856   0.6457   0.502   
Wholesale Trade 
CASCs (bps) 11 1.565   -0.3119   0.5592   -4.2295   -3.6461   -2.9214   0.6446   
t-test   (0.5833)   (-0.1433)   (0.418)   (-0.6984)   (-0.5859)   (-0.3832)   (0.0805)   
t-test p-val   0.5597   0.8861   0.676   0.4849   0.5579   0.7016   0.9359   
Retail Trade 
CASCs (bps) 27 6.6309*   4.2396   0.6885   -0.3751   -0.5733   0.1068   0.5074   
t-test   (1.651)   (1.4186)   (0.7084)   (-1.0584)   (-0.8826)   (0.1597)   (0.4094)   
t-test p-val   0.0987 
 
0.156   0.4787   0.2899   0.3775   0.8731   0.6823   
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate 
CASCs (bps) 87 3.34   2.3278   0.7918   0.0537   -0.0496   -0.3225   -3.2334   
t-test   (0.4704)   (0.5215)   (0.6067)   (0.0702)   (-0.0566)   (-0.2308)   (-1.5894)   
t-test p-val   0.6381   0.602   0.5441   0.944   0.9549   0.8175   0.112   
Services 
CASCs (bps) 6 -2.4806   -1.1232**   -1.1799*   -0.1007   -0.5805   -3.5887***   -0.8108   
t-test   (-0.7855)   (-2.2508)   (-1.8684)   (-0.1459)   (-1.2909)   (-2.7296)   (-0.3115)   
t-test p-val   0.4322   0.0244 
 
0.0617 
 
0.884   0.1967   0.0063 
 
0.7554   
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Table 4.10 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) around Illegal Events based on industry categories (Investment Grade Ratings) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on seven (Mining, Manufacturing, Transportation & Public Utilities, Wholesale Trade, 
Retail Trade, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate and Services)  industry categories over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes 
are calculated using an Index - adjusted model based on Investment Grade Ratings. N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values 
are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10)   
Index - adjusted model CASCs based on Investment Grade Ratings                       
Mining 
CASCs (bps) 20 -2.6689   0.1897   -1.1985   -0.2848   0.1807   0.9188   1.4373   
t-test   (-1.1976)   (0.1393)   (-0.9358)   (-0.2058)   (0.1654)   (0.7497)   (0.4294)   
t-test p-val   0.2311   0.8892   0.3494   0.8369   0.8686   0.4534   0.6676   
Manufacturing 
CASCs (bps) 217 0.0391   0.5066   -0.19   -0.0986   -0.2442   0.2541   0.6285   
t-test   (0.049)   (0.9352)   (-0.4185)   (-0.2424)   (-0.5033)   (0.3407)   (0.7278)   
t-test p-val   0.9609   0.3497   0.6756   0.8084   0.6148   0.7333   0.4668   
Transportation & Public Utilities 
CASCs (bps) 58 -0.7639   0.2632   -0.182   0.0338   0.575   0.8182   1.0062   
t-test   (-1.0685)   (0.5829)   (-0.5684)   (0.0766)   (1.1006)   (1.1358)   (1.0472)   
t-test p-val   0.2853   0.56   0.5698   0.9389   0.2711   0.256   0.295   
Wholesale Trade 
CASCs (bps) 7 0.0653   -0.7457   -0.5557**   -0.6802   -0.9378*   0.2045   0.5344   
t-test   (0.0263)   (-0.2802)   (-2.4889)   (-1.5206)   (-1.745)   (0.1125)   (0.503)   
t-test p-val   0.979   0.7793   0.0128 
 
0.1284   0.081 
 
0.9104   0.6149   
Retail Trade 
CASCs (bps) 18 10.1112   6.3686   1.6499   0.0304   -0.0439   1.6465   2.9813   
t-test   (1.4139)   (1.2842)   (1.0646)   (0.0544)   (-0.0451)   (1.0635)   (1.5486)   
t-test p-val   0.1574   0.1991   0.2871   0.9566   0.964   0.2875   0.1215   
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate 
CASCs (bps) 81 0.623   -0.2418   -0.7751   -0.7957   -1.5937   -3.229   -5.7044**   
t-test   (0.1031)   (-0.0587)   (-0.6677)   (-0.5883)   (-1.0374)   (-1.261)   (-2.2944)   
t-test p-val   0.9179   0.9532   0.5043   0.5563   0.2996   0.2073   0.0218 
 
Services 
CASCs (bps) 3 -3.5116   -5.3296   2.2941   2.3906   2.7338   1.2502   3.2459   
t-test   (-0.7696)   (-1.0695)   (1.092)   (1.1105)   (1.226)   (0.3546)   (1.2172)   
t-test p-val   0.4415   0.2849   0.2748   0.2668   0.2202   0.7229   0.2235   
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Table 4.11 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) around Illegal Events based on industry categories (Index Adjusted Model based on 
Speculative Grade Ratings) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on six (Mining, Manufacturing, Transportation & Public Utilities, Wholesale Trade, 
Retail Trade, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate)  industry categories over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are 
calculated using an Index - adjusted model based on Speculative Grade Ratings. N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values 
are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10)   
Index - adjusted model CASCs based on Speculative Grade Ratings                       
Mining 
CASCs (bps) 7 -2.9358   3.675   2.7826   9.7800**   10.0548*   12.8469*   6.7783   
t-test   (-0.526)   (0.6079)   (0.8281)   (2.1227)   (1.6741)   (1.7015)   (0.8449)   
t-test p-val   0.5989   0.5433   0.4076   0.0338 
 
0.0941 
 
0.0888 
 
0.3982   
Manufacturing 
CASCs (bps) 6 -326.2115   -81.1312   4.4974   41.867   97.5302   249.0491   478.5759   
t-test   (-0.9852)   (-1.2246)   (0.0889)   (0.8519)   (0.8425)   (0.9254)   (0.9766)   
t-test p-val   0.3245   0.2207   0.9292   0.3943   0.3995   0.3548   0.3288   
Transportation & Public Utilities 
CASCs (bps) 4 3.6619   0.7333   -5.1343   -3.1406   0.3483   3.4966   -13.584*   
t-test   (0.7194)   (0.2606)   (-1.042)   (-1.484)   (0.2126)   (1.0743)   (-1.9445)   
t-test p-val   0.4719   0.7944   0.2974   0.1378   0.8316   0.2827   0.0518 
 
Wholesale Trade 
CASCs (bps) 4 -3.7343   -2.0298   2.7269   -8.8475   -6.8582   -2.7852   7.058   
t-test   (-0.5989)   (-1.2583)   (0.8791)   (-0.6232)   (-0.4697)   (-0.1484)   (0.337)   
t-test p-val   0.5493   0.2083   0.3793   0.5332   0.6386   0.882   0.7361   
Retail Trade 
CASCs (bps) 10 -2.989   4.7902   0.8699   -1.1928   -2.5469   -5.6213   -5.1149   
t-test   (-0.8377)   (1.1677)   (0.3668)   (-0.4677)   (-0.7569)   (-0.7844)   (-0.8341)   
t-test p-val   0.4022   0.2429   0.7138   0.64   0.4491   0.4328   0.4042   
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate 
CASCs (bps) 2 -3.7186   3.5906   -0.6583   -3.3222   -4.9416   -17.106   -6.4801   
t-test   (-1.3375)   (1.0499)   (-0.3163)   (-1.471)   (-1.4705)   (-1.2579)   (-0.7181)   
t-test p-val   0.1811   0.2938   0.7518   0.1413   0.1414   0.2084   0.4727   
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Table 4.12 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around Illegal Events based on industry categories (Market–model) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around illegal events based on seven (Mining, Manufacturing, Transportation & Public Utilities, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate and Services)  industry categories over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal returns are calculated using a market-
model. N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance 
at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10)   
Market - model CARs                                 
Mining 
CARs (in %) 27 -0.011   -0.0096*   -0.0019   -0.0004   0.0014   -0.0012   0.0164*   
t-test   (-1.5536)   (-1.6896)   (-0.5148)   (-0.1094)   (0.3305)   (-0.2208)   (1.9111)   
t-test p-val   0.1203   0.0911 
 
0.6067   0.9129   0.7411   0.8253   0.056 
 
Manufacturing 
CARs (in %) 247 0.0016   -0.0032*   -0.0018   -0.0001   -0.0014   -0.0058*   -0.0068*   
t-test   (0.5271)   (-1.6488)   (-1.0891)   (-0.036)   (-0.6935)   (-1.8904)   (-1.8107)   
t-test p-val   0.5981   0.0992 
 
0.2761   0.9713   0.488   0.0587 
 
0.0702 
 
Transportation & Public Utilities 
CARs (in %) 66 0.0069*   0.0019   0.0034**   0.0035   0.0048   0.0056   0.0081*   
t-test   (1.8159)   (0.7394)   (2.0303)   (1.0497)   (1.4368)   (1.5323)   (1.6866)   
t-test p-val   0.0694 
 
0.4597   0.0423 
 
0.2939   0.1508   0.1254   0.0917 
 
Wholesale Trade 
CARs (in %) 11 0.01   0.0063   0.0021   0.0056   0.0048   -0.0024   0.0011   
t-test   (0.808)   (0.5425)   (0.2606)   (0.7826)   (0.7115)   (-0.4159)   (0.1049)   
t-test p-val   0.4191   0.5875   0.7944   0.4338   0.4767   0.6775   0.9164   
Retail Trade 
CARs (in %) 27 0.0132   0.0014   0.0006   -0.0031   -0.0033   0.0019   0.0105   
t-test   (1.6053)   (0.2536)   (0.2158)   (-0.9257)   (-0.8272)   (0.3842)   (1.315)   
t-test p-val   0.1084   0.7998   0.8292   0.3546   0.4081   0.7009   0.1885   
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
CARs (in %) 87 0.0018   0.0064*   0.0036*   0.0023   0.0057**   0.0084**   0.0137**   
t-test   (0.3345)   (1.722)   (1.8065)   (0.9739)   (2.0115)   (2.333)   (2.4448)   
t-test p-val   0.738   0.0851 
 
0.0708 
 
0.3301   0.0443 
 
0.0196 
 
0.0145 
 
Services 
CARs (in %) 6 0.0275   0.016   0.0126   0.0056   0.0062   0.012   0.0156   
t-test   (1.0484)   (1.1587)   (0.812)   (0.6175)   (0.5242)   (0.6264)   (0.4783)   
t-test p-val   0.2944   0.2466   0.4168   0.5369   0.6002   0.531   0.6324   
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Table 4.13 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around Illegal Events based on industry categories (Market-adjusted model) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around illegal events based on seven (Mining, Manufacturing, Transportation & Public Utilities, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate and Services)  industry categories over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal returns are calculated using a 
market-adjusted model. N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * 
indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5) (0,10)   
Market- adjusted model CARs                             
Mining 
CARs (in %) 27 -0.0099   -0.0099*   -0.0016   -0.001   -0.0006   -0.0051 0.0125   
t-test   (-1.4279)   (-1.6977)   (-0.4491)   (-0.256)   (-0.1264)   (-0.9588) (1.4047)   
t-test p-val   0.1533   0.0896 
 
0.6534   0.7979   0.8994   0.3376 0.1601   
Manufacturing 
CARs (in %) 247 0.0000   -0.0053**   -0.0031*   -0.0015   -0.004*   -0.0104*** -0.0126***   
t-test   (0.0082)   (-2.2692)   (-1.6982)   (-0.9262)   (-1.8786)   (-3.0561) (-2.9445)   
t-test p-val   0.9935   0.0233 
 
0.0895 
 
0.3544   0.0603 
 
0.0022 0.0032 
 
Transportation & Public Utilities 
CARs (in %) 66 0.0073   -0.0007   0.0011   -0.0001   0.0008   0.0024 0.0061   
t-test   (1.2522)   (-0.2106)   (0.4631)   (-0.015)   (0.2104)   (0.5054) (1.0123)   
t-test p-val   0.2105   0.8332   0.6433   0.988   0.8334   0.6133 0.3114   
Wholesale Trade 
CARs (in %) 11 0.0027   0.0018   0.0031   0.0063   0.0033   -0.008 -0.0048   
t-test   (0.1944)   (0.1244)   (0.3753)   (0.7467)   (0.3961)   (-0.8459) (-0.349)   
t-test p-val   0.8458   0.901   0.7074   0.4553   0.692   0.3976 0.7271   
Retail Trade 
CARs (in %) 27 0.0082   -0.003   -0.0042   -0.0063   -0.0061   -0.0044 0.0045   
t-test   (0.9077)   (-0.5016)   (-0.9635)   (-1.5562)   (-1.3365)   (-0.763) (0.4484)   
t-test p-val   0.364   0.616   0.3353   0.1197   0.1814   0.4455 0.6538   
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
CARs (in %) 87 -0.0018   0.004   0.0029   0.0016   0.0035   0.0052 0.0069   
t-test   (-0.3428)   (1.0948)   (1.4991)   (0.657)   (1.1937)   (1.351) (1.161)   
t-test p-val   0.7318   0.2736   0.1338   0.5112   0.2326   0.1767 0.2456   
Services 
CARs (in %) 6 0.0276   0.0153   0.0097   0.0031   0.0021   0.0064 0.0045   
t-test   (1.2645)   (1.292)   (0.6569)   (0.395)   (0.207)   (0.398) (0.154)   
t-test p-val   0.2061   0.1964   0.5112   0.6929   0.836   0.6906 0.8776   
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4.4.5 Market reaction by ESG plus LT 
Finally, in this section I analyze the impact of illegalities on ESG plus LT issues on 
both the CDS and stock market. Refer to table 4.14 to table 4.18 for the results of the 
CASC and CAR on each individual E,S,G and LT issue. Overall, I find supporting 
evidence in respect to both hypothesis 6a and 6b. Reviewing the market model for the 
CASC post event, I find environment to have a significantly positive change of +2.9 
basis points at [0,1] event window and governance a +2.0 basis points change at [0,5] 
event window. On the other hand, the CDS market reacts positively to long-term 
illegalities with LT having a significantly negative change of -1.6 and – 3.3 basis points 
at the [0,2] and [0,5] event window. These results are also only robust to the market-
model and when an index adjusted model is used, I find no significant reactions in any 
of the E,S,G or LT issue post announcement.  
The CAR results indicate that in the market-model post announcement, only LT is 
significantly positive at both [0,1] and [0,2] event window. In the market-adjusted 
model, I find significantly negative reactions for environment at the [0,1] and [0,1] 
event window and also for social at the [0,5] event window.  
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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Table 4.14 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) around Illegal Events based on ESG and LT issues (Market–model) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on Environmental, Social, Governance and Long-Term issues over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], 
[-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are calculated using a market-model. N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5) (0,10)   
Market - model CASCs                               
Environment 
CASCs (bps) 164 3.7508   6.0346*   2.4392   2.8983*   3.8896   7.3502 19.6496   
t-test   (1.1255)   (1.8838)   (1.2418)   (1.8639)   (1.5881)   (1.5359) (1.5159)   
t-test p-val   0.2604   0.0596 
 
0.2143   0.0623 
 
0.1123   0.1246 0.1295   
Social 
CASCs (bps) 105 -0.0387   0.5319   0.2041   -0.0594   -0.1186   -0.2003 -0.6669   
t-test   (-0.0319)   (0.6783)   (0.5865)   (-0.2194)   (-0.3198)   (-0.2939) (-0.569)   
t-test p-val   0.9746   0.4976   0.5575   0.8263   0.7491   0.7688 0.5693   
Governance 
CASCs (bps) 101 -2.5924**   -0.9824   0.3156   1.1897   1.2591   1.9845* -0.1225   
t-test   (-2.1849)   (-1.1891)   (0.4835)   (1.5901)   (1.4662)   (1.7423) (-0.0868)   
t-test p-val   0.0289 
 
0.2344   0.6287   0.1118   0.1426   0.0815 0.9308   
Long-Term 
CASCs (bps) 101 6.9182   4.3154   0.8804   -0.8948   -1.5849**   -3.3255** -4.6568**   
t-test   (1.137)   (1.1301)   (0.8496)   (-1.289)   (-1.9857)   (-2.273) (-2.1881)   
t-test p-val   0.2555   0.2584   0.3955   0.1974   0.0471 
 
0.023 0.0287 
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Table 4.15 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) around Illegal Events based on ESG and LT issues  (Investment Grade Ratings) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on Environmental, Social, Governance and Long-Term issues over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 
0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are calculated using an index-adjusted model based on investment grade ratings. N is the number of fines in the 
sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Index - adjusted model CASCs based on Investment Grade Ratings                     
Environment 
CASCs (bps) 146 -0.9214   0.8533   -1.1864**   -0.9108   -1.0363   -0.2204   0.5346 
t-test   (-1.0794)   (1.2546)   (-1.9652)   (-1.569)   (-1.5637)   (-0.2136)   (0.4412) 
t-test p-val   0.2804   0.2096   0.0494 
 
0.1166   0.1179   0.8308   0.6591 
Social 
CASCs (bps) 92 -0.1936   0.1854   0.3861   0.3901   0.5515   0.9868   0.661 
t-test   (-0.1469)   (0.2146)   (0.9145)   (1.2041)   (1.2863)   (1.5627)   (0.7036) 
t-test p-val   0.8832   0.8301   0.3605   0.2286   0.1983   0.1181   0.4817 
Governance 
CASCs (bps) 90 -4.9977**   -2.862*   -0.9812   0.0869   -0.5772   -0.9628   -2.77 
t-test   (-2.2969)   (-1.8634)   (-1.1054)   (0.0799)   (-0.4566)   (-0.5406)   (-1.3425) 
t-test p-val   0.0216 
 
0.0624 
 
0.269   0.9364   0.6479   0.5888   0.1794 
Long-Term 
CASCs (bps) 76 9.6753   4.1945   1.5811*   0.0349   0.1085   -1.0225   -0.8024 
t-test   (1.5799)   (1.0158)   (1.8068)   (0.0442)   (0.1235)   (-0.5322)   (-0.5372) 
t-test p-val   0.1141   0.3097   0.0708 
 
0.9647   0.9017   0.5946   0.5911 
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Table 4.16 Cumulative Abnormal Spread Returns (CASCs) around Illegal Events based on ESG and LT issues (Speculative Grade Ratings) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASCs) around illegal events based on Environmental, Social, Governance and Long-Term issues over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], 
[-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal spread changes are calculated using an index-adjusted model based on speculative grade ratings. N is the number of fines in 
the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Index - adjusted model CASCs based on Speculative Grade Ratings                     
Environment 
CASCs (bps) 11 -176.4736   -41.5564   2.8755   26.5522   58.3607   143.1357   262.5631 
t-test   (-0.9769)   (-1.1452)   (0.1037)   (0.9927)   (0.9241)   (0.975)   (0.982) 
t-test p-val   0.3286   0.2521   0.9174   0.3208   0.3554   0.3296   0.3261 
Social 
CASCs (bps) 3 -1.4831   -2.9473   -6.414   -12.5935   -12.7395   -12.458   -10.1936 
t-test   (-0.4694)   (-1.0014)   (-1.0441)   (-1.1909)   (-1.2039)   (-1.0397)   (-1.1344) 
t-test p-val   0.6388   0.3166   0.2964   0.2337   0.2286   0.2985   0.2566 
Governance 
CASCs (bps) 6 -2.1519   1.6166   0.2217   6.035   4.8979   8.858   6.8128 
t-test   (-0.3889)   (0.4451)   (0.0676)   (1.2611)   (0.8569)   (1.1471)   (1.0619) 
t-test p-val   0.6973   0.6562   0.9461   0.2073   0.3915   0.2513   0.2883 
Long-Term 
CASCs (bps) 13 -6.3723**   2.357   1.146   -3.606   -4.3062   -9.2023   -5.852 
t-test   (-2.3869)   (0.8457)   (0.8063)   (-0.8209)   (-0.9152)   (-1.2487)   (-0.8847) 
t-test p-val   0.017 
 
0.3977   0.4201   0.4117   0.3601   0.2118   0.3763 
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Table 4.17 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around Illegal Events based on ESG and LT issues (Market-model) 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around illegal events based on Environmental, Social, Governance and Long-Term issues over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 
2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal returns are calculated using a market-model. N is the number of fines in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the p-
values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Market - model CARs                               
Environment 
CARs (in %) 154 0.0038   -0.0004   -0.0019   -0.0013   -0.0027   -0.0003   0.0024 
t-test   (0.9999)   (-0.1624)   (-1.2698)   (-0.8693)   (-1.0832)   (-0.1158)   (0.5803) 
t-test p-val   0.3174   0.871   0.2042   0.3847   0.2787   0.9078   0.5617 
Social 
CARs (in %) 105 0.0004   -0.0054**   -0.0024**   -0.0013   -0.001   -0.0032   -0.0007 
t-test   (0.1441)   (-2.5211)   (-1.9986)   (-0.9013)   (-0.5803)   (-1.3142)   (-0.211) 
t-test p-val   0.8854   0.0117 
 
0.0457 
 
0.3675   0.5617   0.1888   0.8329 
Governance 
CARs (in %) 101 0.0044   0.0053   0.002   -0.001   0.0012   0.0017   0.0037 
t-test   (1.0384)   (1.6215)   (1.1475)   (-0.4865)   (0.4727)   (0.5588)   (0.7757) 
t-test p-val   0.2991   0.1049   0.2512   0.6266   0.6364   0.5763   0.4379 
Long-Term 
CARs (in %) 101 0.0037   0   0.0049   0.0074**   0.008**   0.0009   0.0039 
t-test   (0.6669)   (0.0087)   (1.4078)   (2.2869)   (2.3665)   (0.1607)   (0.5166) 
t-test p-val   0.5048   0.9931   0.1592   0.0222 
 
0.018 
 
0.8723   0.6054 
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Table 4.18 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around Illegal Events based on ESG and LT issues – (Market-adjusted model) 
 
The table below provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around illegal events based on Environmental, Social, Governance and Long-Term issues over the [-10,-1], [-5,-1], [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 
2], [0, 5] and [0, 10] event windows. The abnormal returns are calculated using a market-adjusted model. N is the number of firms in the sample. Cross sectional t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
and the p-values are reported below the CASCs. The superscripts ***,**, and * indicate significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Event Window   N (-10,-1)   (-5,-1)   (-1,0)   (0,1)   (0,2)   (0,5)   (0,10) 
Market- adjusted model CARs                             
Environment 
CARs (in %) 154 0.0034   -0.002   -0.0026   -0.0027*   -0.0051*   -0.0039   -0.0034 
t-test   (0.7804)   (-0.7063)   (-1.5873)   (-1.7568)   (-1.9331)   (-1.2909)   (-0.7456) 
t-test p-val   0.4352   0.48   0.1124   0.0789 
 
0.0532 
 
0.1968   0.4559 
Social 
CARs (in %) 105 -0.0012   -0.0062*   -0.0025   -0.0015   -0.0026   -0.0078**   -0.0022 
t-test   (-0.2661)   (-1.8331)   (-1.1952)   (-0.771)   (-1.1386)   (-2.3726)   (-0.4533) 
t-test p-val   0.7901   0.0668 
 
0.232   0.4407   0.2549   0.0177 
 
0.6503 
Governance 
CARs (in %) 101 0.0025   0.0044   0.0012   -0.0029   -0.0019   -0.003   -0.0039 
t-test   (0.5377)   (1.3232)   (0.6616)   (-1.402)   (-0.7051)   (-0.8975)   (-0.7582) 
t-test p-val   0.5908   0.1858   0.5082   0.1609   0.4808   0.3694   0.4483 
Long-Term 
CARs (in %) 101 0.0005   -0.0054   0.0011   0.0046   0.0042   -0.0034   -0.0025 
t-test   (0.0974)   (-1.6021)   (0.2957)   (1.3592)   (1.2222)   (-0.5466)   (-0.3218) 
t-test p-val   0.9224   0.1091   0.7675   0.1741   0.2216   0.5847   0.7476 
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4.5 Limitations 
Nevertheless, this study has its limitations. When running a traditional event study 
model, it is assumed that the events or information is usually an unexpected or 
unpredictable event which then produces a “shock” factor either positive or negative 
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997). This event is presumed to provide new information 
which would affect the health of the company i.e. the future profitability of the 
company. However, MacKinlay (1997) state it might be difficult to identify the exact 
date of announcements as one cannot be certain if the market was informed prior to the 
close of the market the prior trading date. The event data is also assumed to be accurate 
and precise and is not affected by other concurrent announcement. On the other hand, 
de Jong and Naumovska (2016) finds that there is a challenge in identifying 
(systematic) confounding events especially in event study methodologies when testing 
theories about investor’s reactions in finance and management research. As I do not 
have data prior to the fines i.e. rumors or information that might indicate or speculate a 
fine, in this chapter I run the event study models assuming that the fines are information 
that are exogenous, in short unforeseeable or unpredictable to measure the “shock” 
factor post the announcement of the fine. Though, I define here the announcements of 
fines as new information that would impact CDS spreads and equity returns, I am aware 
of the limitations that this brings. McWilliams, Siegel et al.(1999) state it is at times 
difficult for researchers to determine what prior information investors might have had 
and if there were any speculations prior to announcements and  thus by the time of an 
actual announcement, investors would have already capitalized information into the 
stock price. They further add that this can be mitigated though by examining “leakage 
events” information such as shareholder meetings, public forums, press releases and 
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news articles that might hint or indicate any potential discussion of the event. 
Therefore, this calls for further research to examine rumors priors to the fines data to 
examine whether the results in this study still hold and if investors react to these 
rumors. Additionally, due to CDS data availability only from 2009 to 2012, I note the 
limitations of the sample size and I am also unable to examine the effects of illegalities 
pre the financial crisis period, which would be another avenue for further research. 
4.6 Summary  
In this study, I examined the short-term impacts of illegalities on both the CDS 
market and stock market. Previous studies have measured the impact of CDS spread 
changes mostly on earnings announcements and negative credit rating events. I find 
only a few studies that comparatively measure the impact of events on both CDS and 
stock markets, furthermore to my knowledge none measured the impact of fines yet. 
Using my unique dataset of illegalities from the period of 2009 to 2012, I was able to 
run analyses to examine six different hypotheses. 
On overall I find the CDS market reacts to announcements of illegality with 
increases of CDS spreads. However, I find that the increase in CDS spreads is evident 
in short-term, medium term and even on all levels of maturities. This indicates that CDS 
investors react immediately after announcements of fines. Interestingly, I also find that 
the CDS markets anticipate the news even before announcements, as I observed larger 
spread changes pre–event. Hence, this supports studies that indicate CDS markets are 
able to anticipate news even before it happens. I am the first to examine CDS market 
anticipation of illegality news. I also examine the impact of fines per market cap and I 
observe that even though the results are marginal in terms of economic significance, 
both the CDS market and stock market reacts more to higher fines per market cap than 
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lower fines per market cap. This indicates that it is the higher fines that markets are 
concerned about. 
I also examine the different stages of legal processes on both the CDS and stock 
market. In the CDS market, I find negative spread changes at the initial stage and 
increase in spreads at the CVPM stage of the illegalities in the investment grade model. 
These results show that for companies with higher quality grade credit ratings, investors 
are more concerned when the allegations are being examined legally i.e. at the 
confirmed but pending other legal matters stage. Comparing the results in the stock 
market, I find a drop in stock returns at the pending stage and increase in stock price at 
the CVPM and Confirmed stage. This supports the rational that there is “shock” factor 
at the initial stage in the stock market.   
My results support my hypotheses that reactions of both CDS and stock investors 
are significant only in certain industries after announcements on illegalities. My post 
event results show that investors in the CDS market react negatively to illegalities in the 
mining industry, and even more so on mining firms with lower grade credit ratings. On 
the other hand, stock market investors react negatively more towards manufacturing 
firms. 
 Finally, I am the first to examine the impact of E, S, G plus LT issues on CDS 
markets. I find that investors in the CDS and stock market react only on certain ESG 
plus LT issues after announcements on illegalities. Specifically, the CDS spreads 
increase for environment and governance issues, whereas for stock returns a decrease in 
returns for environment and social issues is observed. This shows that both the CDS 
and stock market reacts negatively to environmental issues. Interestingly, both CDS and 
stock markets also react similarly to LT issues but with positive reactions. Zeume (2014 
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)find that firms actually benefit from the ability to use bribes. Therefore contrary to 
expectations that investors would react negatively to LT violation issues and this 
finding indicates that both the markets feel that LT violations are instead “beneficial” 
for the company in the short-term.  
Overall, I find similar to Greatrex (2009) that these results are sensitive to the 
choice of model used. The findings of this research are very interesting. Firstly, it 
shows that when examining impact of illegalities especially fines in the CDS market, it 
is important to examine individually the different stages of the illegalities. For instance, 
when examining overall illegalities by maturity type, the CDS market reacts negatively 
to all types of maturity level. However, when the fine is broken down into the types of 
legal stages, the CDS market instead does not react negatively on all the stages. Thus, 
this result is valuable for research in illegalities especially for academics, indicating that 
it is important to examine the different legal stages of illegalities.  Secondly, as the CDS 
market is able to anticipate news, investors in other markets should look to the CDS 
market first when examining illegalities. Regulators also could use this information to 
detect illegal behaviours of companies. Thirdly, the results on the ESG and LT issues, 
further affirm that environmental issues are a key concern to investors in both markets. 
However, LT issues on the other hand indicate that markets perceive this to benefit the 
company. Finally, firms should be aware that their illegal behaviours impacts their 
company value by drop in share prices and also increases in credit spreads which affects 
their credit worthiness and their future credit borrowing activities.   
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5. ETF Fund Flows and Index Returns: A Global Multi 
Asset Class Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The three previous chapters have examined three different asset classes (i.e. 
equity, bonds and credit default swaps). Those chapters have used a type of information 
specifically fines, to examine the impact investors have on returns and spreads. It is 
from this information of fines that has led investors to react. For that reason, 
information is deemed to be vital. Thus in this chapter I proceed to use another unique 
set of information, fund flow data, to examine the relationship between Exchange 
Traded Fund (ETFs) flows on returns on multi asset classes. The financial market has 
always been innovative with the creation of various products such as derivates, 
alternative risk transfer products, variants of tax-deductible equity and ETFs (Tufano 
2003). It is argued that the creation of new financial products is usually aimed at 
circumventing regulatory constraints (Silber 1983). The growth of Exchange Traded 
Products (ETPs) which constitutes ETFs, exchange traded commodities (ETCs) and 
exchange traded notes (ETNs), have been popular in the recent years as seen in Figure 5 
due to their benefits such as intraday trading, tax efficiency, low expense ratios and cost 
transparency in comparison to conventional mutual funds and closed-end funds 
(Charupat and Miu 2013).  
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Figure 5 Global ETP regional asset growth historically (AUM$bn) 
 
 
Source: ETF Annual Review and Outlook (Deutsche Bank Markets Research, 2016) 
 
 
In this study, I examine ETFs which permit investors to invest in portfolios that 
provide passive exposure to various asset classes while having intra-day pricing and 
efficient tax management (Svetina 2015). Demand for ETFs has grown in the last 
decade with assets in ETFs accounting to nearly 13% of total net assets managed by 
investment companies in 2016
54
. The growth of ETFs indicates that more and more 
investors are looking at this as a way of investment. ETFs have been around since 1993, 
with the very first known US ETF - Standard & Poor’s Depositary Receipts (SPDR) 
which tracked the S&P 500 index. The US has the largest ETF market constituting 
nearly 73% of total $3.5 trillion in ETF assets worldwide, followed by Europe with 
16%, Africa and Asia Pacific with 9% and other Americas with 3%
55
.   ETFs can be 
traded throughout the day on the stock exchange which is in contrast to mutual funds 
which can only be purchased at the end of the day. 
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ETFs are based on performances of an underlying index and not based on 
managerial expertise. Many investors choose to buy ETFs as a way to diversify 
portfolios. “ETFs are a great way to capture sector or asset-class exposure with very 
little expense,” quoted from the president and chief investment officer of Napa Valley 
Wealth Management
56
. One could hold ETFs in various different asset classes from 
stocks, bonds, commodities and currencies. ETFs were developed to allow investors to 
track the performances of an underlying index by buying or selling the ETF. The 
objective of the portfolio manager is to passively track the index and to ensure there is 
very low error (performance difference between the ETF fund and the underlying 
benchmark) with minimal cost to investors (Gallagher and Segara 2005). This passive 
ownership structure has been growing in the last 15 years and the demand from 
investors for a multi asset solution product has been growing tremendously
57
. 
Additionally, passive funds have been popular in recent years because of the high fees 
of active funds which at times provide dismal portfolio return
58
.Though there are some 
similarities between ETFs and mutual funds, such as both are passive in nature; 
investors are able to short sell an ETF which in contrary is not possible with index 
funds.  
 
 It is important to understand that the key difference between ETFs and mutual 
funds lies in its mechanisms. The main difference is that ETFs allows a combination of 
creation and redemption of shares via an in-kind redemption feature. ETF shares are 
                                                 
56
 “Why financial advisers prefer ETFs over mutual funds” Available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-financial-advisers-prefer-etfs-over-mutual-funds-2017-06-09 
(accessed 11th June 2017) 
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 Special ETF Research (Deutsche Bank Markets Research, 2015) 
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 “ The end of active investing?” available at https://www.ft.com/content/6b2d5490-d9bb-11e6-944b-
e7eb37a6aa8e accessed 11 June 2017 
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created when an Authorized Participant (AP), which is typically a large financial 
institution (i.e. self-clearing broker-dealers) and are the only ones that is authorized to 
deal with the fund, submits an order for units. In short, it is exchanging the underlying 
index assets for an equivalent share of the ETF. The redemption process is then the 
opposite, where the share of the ETF is given to the fund and receives in turn the 
underlying index assets. The in-kind feature basically means that it is a barter of 
equivalent securities and it is important to note that the APs have to buy (sell) the 
underlying assets before creating (redeeming) the ETF shares (Staer 2014). APs then 
sell the ETF shares in a secondary market to investors in the stock exchange. 
ETFs are supposed to track an underlying security and in theory not deviate 
from the underlying value. However, as it is traded on a stock exchange, the price of the 
ETF share is influenced by supply and demand and at times deviates from its 
underlying value. This creates actions where investors “may buy (sell) ETF shares or 
sell (buy) the underlying securities or do both when an ETF is trading at a discount 
(premium)
59” which in turn brings the price of the ETF closer to its underlying value. It 
is basically arbitrage that sets the price back to equilibrium.  
 
In explaining the link between ETFs flows and returns I draw on traditional 
mutual fund literature to explain this relationship. There is extensive literature that 
explains the relationship between mutual fund flows and returns. For instance, Warther 
(1995), using monthly data cash flows on US mutual funds, find that aggregate security 
returns are highly correlated with concurrent unexpected cash flows into mutual funds, 
                                                 
59
 “2017 Investment Company Fact Book – A review of Trends and Activities in the Investment 
Company Industry” pg 64 Available at https://www.ici.org/pdf/2017_factbook.pdf (accessed 1st June 
2017) 
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though unrelated to concurrent expected flows. Edelen and Warner (2001) find positive 
association between aggregate daily flow and concurrent market returns in mutual 
funds60
.
 They also find aggregate flow follows market returns with a one-day lag. Both 
those studies show that there can be a relation between fund flows and returns Staer 
(2014) explains that these relation between fund flows and returns can be explained 
using information and price pressure hypothesis. The information hypothesis explains 
more on concurrent flows, where positive (negative) information shock positively 
(negatively) affects both flows and returns simultaneously. In terms of lagged flows, the 
price pressure hypothesis states that a contemporaneous price shock will be followed by 
a price reversal which would turn into a negative relation between past flows and 
returns
61
. Thus, in this study, I examine two research questions. Considering that ETFs 
track the market very closely, the first research question is to understand how much of 
the variation of market returns can be explained by fund flows into the respective ETF. 
My second research question aims at examining the relationship between lagged ETF 
fund flows and market returns. This study uses data of yearly fund flows from 51 
countries into ETFs in US, Europe, Asia Pacific and Rest of the World (RoW) from the 
period 2011 to 2015. 
 
I find two papers by  Kalaycıoğlu (2004) and Staer (2014) which are closely 
related in examining ETF fund flows and its underlying returns. However, my study 
differs from theirs significantly in several ways. Firstly, Kalaycıoğlu (2004) examines 
the impact of ETF flows on aggregrate and individual levels for five major ETF indices 
in the US and Staer (2014) only uses data from U.S ETFs.  Instead, I am the first to my 
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 For example, days with positive (negative) unexpected flow have estimated abnormal market returns 
of 25 (-25) basis points 
61
 “The price pressure hypothesis involves finding that there is a positive relation between the ETF flows 
and the concurrent underlying asset returns while also finding a negative relation between lagged flows 
and returns.” pg 3 Staer (2014)  
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knowledge to use a unique set of ETF fund flow data provided by Deutsche Bank which 
provides data of yearly fund flows from 51 countries into ETFs in US, Europe, Asia 
Pacific and Rest of the World (RoW). Secondly, both the studies only measure the 
relationship on equity indices returns, whereas this study examines three different asset 
classes, namely i) equity ii) bond and iii) future indices. Thirdly, the data period for 
Kalaycıoğlu (2004) is from 2000 to 2003 and Staer (2014) is from 1993 to 2010, 
whereas this study is based on a more recent dataset from 2011 to 2015.   
 
Using panel data regressions, I find the explanatory power of ETF fund flows is 
similar to macro-economic variables in explaining indices returns. I use macro-
economic variables as a comparison because they are widely used in asset pricing 
literature to explain stock returns (Asprem 1989; Wasserfallen 1989; Durham 2001; 
Flannery and Protopapadakis 2002; Rapach, Wohar et al. 2005; Birz and Lott Jr 2011). 
Secondly, I find that on equity indices based on statistical significance, lagged ETF 
fund flows into Europe have a positive relationship with equity index returns. On the 
contrary, I find a negative relationship between lagged ETF fund flows in the US with 
equity index returns. I find similar negative relationship of the lagged ETF fund flows 
into the US market for future indices which indicates a price pressure reversal effect. 
On the other hand, I find there is statistically no significant relationship between ETFs 
fund flows and bond index returns.  
 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on ETFs in numerous ways. 
Firstly, this paper adds to current ETF fund flow literature that to date only measures 
the relationships of ETFs in the US.  This study provides global scale trading reactions 
of ETFs especially into other regions. These results would be interesting for traders 
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especially those who are interested in understanding the movements of ETFs not just in 
the US but also globally. Secondly, this study adds to literature on asset allocation and 
pricing especially on variability. The results explains that ETF fund flows even on a 
global scale explain only about 18 percent of variability in returns for equity indices, 60 
percent on bond indices and 14 percent on future indices, which is comparable to the 
variability of macro-economic news.   
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 is a literature 
review on ETF performance, asset allocation and variability, on price movements and 
macro-economic variables. In this section, I also describe in detail my research 
questions. Section 3 is the data and methodology. Section 4 reports the empirical results 
and section 5 concludes.  
5.2 Related Literature and Research Question Development 
5.2.1 Literature on ETFs and Performances 
There has been growing literature on ETFs in comparison to mutual funds. 
Elton, Gruber, Comer, & Li (2002) and Gastineau (2004) examined the performances of 
conventional indexed mutual funds relative to ETFs and they both indicate that there is 
relative performance weakness in ETFs due to inadequate information provided to 
portfolio managers and due to dividend reinvestments, where the dividends received are 
not reinvested but are held in  non-interest bearing accounts. This underperformance is 
also confirmed by Rompotis (2008) who regressed 16 ETFs from 2001 to 2002 and 
index funds return on his / her underlying benchmarks and finds that they do not 
achieve any excess return. This underperformance is even more evident when using 
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ETFs bid-ask return on the index return. The author indicates that ETFs and index funds 
are chosen by investors with different sets of behaviours. Conservative stock investors 
and institutional investors who do not use financial derivatives for hedging purposes 
might end up choosing ETFs instead of index funds.  
 
However, using ETFs and index funds data prior to 2006 from Vanguard , 
Rompotis (2009) finds that on average they present similar return and risk records. 
Using a sample size and time frame of 230 paired ETFs and index funds from 2002 to 
2010 respectively, Sharifzadeh & Hojat (2012) find that although 50 percent of the 
selected ETFs outperformed their index mutual fund counterparts, this outperformance 
was not statistically significant. They also conclude investor’s preference to choose 
either ETFs or index funds boils down to product characteristics and tax preferences. 
Svetina (2015) examined 629 ETFs in existence at the end of 2007 and find that 83% of 
all ETFs track indices which do not have corresponding index funds and on average 
also underperform benchmark indices. However, only 17% of ETFs which directly 
compete with index funds provide slightly better performances when compared to retail 
index funds and equivalent performance when compared to institutional index funds.  
The rational that investor preferences exist when choosing whether to use ETFs 
is tested by Huang & Guedj (2009). They compared ETFs with Open-Ended Mutual 
Funds (OEF) from 1992 to 2006 and find that both OEFs and ETFs do coexist in 
equilibrium but with different liquidity clienteles. ETFs are suited more for investors 
with longer term horizons who prefer narrower and less liquid underlying indexes. 
Agapova (2011), using monthly data of U.S funds from 2000 to 2004, measured 
whether ETFs and mutual funds act as substitutes. Using aggregate fund flows, the 
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study found that the substitute effect exists (though not perfect) and can also be 
explained by clientele effect. Their results suggest that ETFs may be preferred by tax-
sensitive investors while conventional funds would be preferred by tax-exempt 
investors or those insensitive to taxes. In addition, they indicate that on average, the 
flows to ETFs are positive and much higher compared to conventional index funds.  
 
A recent study by Staer (2014) investigates the relation between ETF flows and 
their underlying securities returns for 286 U.S equity ETFs. Using Bloomberg data from 
1993 to 2010, he finds that there is a strong positive relation between daily 
contemporaneous ETF flows and underlying stock returns. The magnitude of the 
relation as a response to one standard deviation flow shock varies between 7 to 52 basis 
points in the sub samples. The paper concludes that there is a price pressure effect 
related to flow activity. This study is contradictory to the findings by Kalaycıoğlu 
(2004) who also investigated the return flow relationship of ETFs and found no price 
pressure effect.  
 
The studies above have only been on US ETFs, but do the same hold for 
European ETFs? Blitz, Huij, & Swinkels (2012) investigated European index mutual 
funds and ETFs and found that they underperform their benchmarks by 50 to 150 basis 
points per annum. They indicate that it is the fund expenses and dividend taxes which 
result in the drag in the fund performances.  This result is similar to US ETF fund 
performances. On the other hand, Gallagher & Segara (2005) find that Australian ETFs 
are able to closely track their respective benchmarks. They find that the variation 
between the net asset values and the traded price of the ETFs is small. However, they 
 195 
 
indicate there is a lack of trading activity in Australian ETFs due to several reasons (i.e. 
ETF vehicles could erode fund managers market share if the distribution function is 
controlled by an independent party and an upfront fee requirement to enter the fund). 
5.2.2 Literature on Asset Allocation and Variability 
ETFs and their growth are based on underlying indices and the growth of multi-
asset ETFs has increased in the past years due to growing demand from investors. Thus, 
the link between ETFs and asset classes is inevitable. Investors are leaning towards a 
more diversified portfolio that would benefit them in reducing their portfolio risk. The 
diversified portfolio can be based on different asset allocation.  Investor’s preferences 
to different assets are based on their own mix of risk and return characteristics. 
Markowitz (1952) introduced the concept of portfolio theory whereby investors should 
actually not consider look at individual risk and returns of investments but only the 
incremental risk and return the investment adds to its portfolio. The theory indicates 
that there is a possible efficient frontier where investors are able to create maximum 
return given any preferred level of risk. Determining how much exposure an investor 
should have in each proponent of asset class is a crucial factor. This information is 
important to determine an investors overall effective asset mix (Sharpe 1992).  
An investor’s asset mix is derived from the various main asset classes such as 
equity, fixed income, private equity and even venture capital. Within these asset classes 
there are also sub-classes. For fixed income there are bills which are usually less than a 
year in maturity, medium term government bonds that are less than 10 years in 
maturity, long-term government bonds that are more than 10 years in maturity and 
corporate bonds with also different maturities. For equity there are small, medium and 
large capitalized stocks which carry different market sizes according to their inclusion 
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in a particular equity index or universe.  There are also value stocks that are based on 
high book to market ratios and growth stocks with low book to market ratios.  Choosing 
these different classes of assets even amongst its sub-classes is called “style investing”. 
Barberis & Shleifer (2003) indicate that investors pursue style investing because 
allocating funds in asset styles is much easier and less intimidating than choosing from 
thousands of listed securities and that the creation of various styles allows for 
comparison of the performances amongst similar money managers.  
How does an investor choose a certain style or determine which asset suits their 
portfolios? Canner, Gregory, & David (1994) examined advise on portfolio allocation 
amongst cash, bonds and stocks and find that the advice is inconsistent with mutual 
fund separation theorem (investors should hold portfolios comprised of risky assets 
with some percentage of risk-free assets). They rather find there is a human capital 
influence whereby aggressive investors are recommended to hold lower ratios of bonds 
to stocks than conservative investors. They also find an absence of the risk free asset 
and deviation from mean-variance preferences. Though in theory an optimal portfolio 
solution exists, in reality it is difficult to fully understand the rationale behind investors 
reasoning in choosing their asset mix. 
Asset allocation has always been in the forefront of investors mind. The next 
valuable question is how much variation in asset allocation explains its performance?  
The seminal paper by Gary et al. (1986) was the first to answer that question. They find 
that investment policies dominate investment strategies, explaining on average 93.6 
percent of variation in total plan return. Ibbotson & Kaplan (2000) argue that Gary, 
Hood, & Gilbert, (1986) results were not sensitive to each funds allocation policy. 
Hence, Ibbotson & Kaplan (2000) using cross section returns of 10 years of US mutual 
funds, found 90 percent of the variability in returns of a typical fund across time is 
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explained by policy, about 40 percent of the variation of returns among funds is 
explained by policy, and on average about 100 percent of the return level is explained 
by the policy return level. Ibbotson (2010) indicates that asset allocation is important, 
though it is difficult in explaining 90 percent of variation returns is caused by specific 
asset allocation mix. Ibbotson & Kaplan (2000) and Hensel, Ezra, & John (1991) also 
stated that most time-series variations come from a general market movement.  
5.2.3 Literature on Price Movement and Macro-economic Variables 
There is vast amount of literature that measures price movements of stocks and 
other asset classes due to macro-economic variables. Economic news has always been 
deemed to affect asset prices. The news of the changes to the macro-economic variables 
would have an impact on stock returns as it would affect firm’s fund flows and risk-
adjusted discount rates. Ross (1976) seminal paper introduced Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
(APT), which is a general asset pricing theory and was proposed as an alternative to the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The APT model states that asset prices can be 
predicted by measuring its asset return with various other common risk factors. The 
model uses linear combinations of independent macro-economic variables to predict the 
relationship between a portfolios returns and a return of a single asset. The conclusion 
that state variables relating to the economy would be able to affect asset prices is also 
consistent with other asset-pricing theories from (Merton 1973; Cox, Ingersoll et al. 
1985). Hence, it is common understanding that the returns of an asset are influenced by 
systematic economic variables.  
Chen et al., (1986) investigated which specific economic news (i.e the spread 
between long and short interest rates, expected and unexpected inflation, industrial 
production, and the spread between high- and low- grade bonds) is likely to affect 
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assets. They found that several of those economic variables
62
 were significant in 
explaining expected stock returns and conclude that stock returns are exposed to 
systematic economic news and are priced according to their exposures. Various other 
researchers also find there is a relationship and link between macroeconomic variables 
and stock price returns (Asprem 1989; Wasserfallen 1989; Durham 2001; Flannery and 
Protopapadakis 2002; Rapach, Wohar et al. 2005; Birz and Lott Jr 2011). Nonetheless, 
there still is a lack of common consensus of which macro-economic variables are the 
most important indicator. For instance, Flannery and Protopapadaki (2002) find no 
evidence of Industrial Production which is a popular measure to have predictive ability, 
yet they find other six variables that do. Birz and Lott Jr, (2011) find that Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and unemployment do affect stock returns, yet on the contrary 
Ghent (2010) find no statistical significant effect.  
The above research has indicated that macro-economic variables are significant 
and can to a certain extent explain stock returns. However, Chan et al.(1998), find 
otherwise. They find the performance of macro-economic factors to be disappointing 
and explain return co-variations poorly with the exception of default premium and term 
premium. Importantly, how much variability can economic variables actually explain 
stock price movement? Cutler et al. (1989), using structured Vector autoregressions 
(VAR), analyzed monthly stock returns from 1926 to 1985 to explore whether 
unexpected macroeconomic news can explain share price movements. Using seven 
different macro-economic variables
63
, they use the VAR models to identify the 
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unexpected component of each time series and to consider the explanatory powers of 
these “news” measures to explain stock returns. Their results indicated that macro-
economic news was only able to explain one fifth of the movements in stock prices. 
Their results are robust to even increasing the number of lagged values in the VARs. 
They further examine whether market moves are coincident with major world and 
political events and their results indicate that there is only a small effect on non-
economic news. They conclude their paper by stating that “it is difficult to explain as 
much as half of the variance in stock prices on the basis of publically available news 
bearing on fundamental values”(p14).  
5.2.4 Research Question Development 
This study contributes to literature by extending previous research which only 
looked at individual and aggregate ETF flows and index returns to a broader link 
between country ETF fund flows and index returns.  
These studies are important as they question the variability’s of returns to 
understand asset allocation in depth. Firstly, I intend to measure whether ETF fund 
flows have a better power to explain market movements in different asset classes than 
commonly used macroeconomic variables do. Cutler et al., (1989) find that it is difficult 
to explain more than one third of the return variance from macroeconomic news. I find 
that their paper confirms my notion that macro-economic variables alone are unable to 
fully explain the variations of stock price movements. Hence my first research question 
intends to find out the following: 
Research question 1: How much of the return variation of equity, bond and future 
indices can be explained by ETF fund flows compared to macroeconomic variables? 
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Staer (2014) examined the relation between ETF flows and their underlying 
securities returns using U.S equity ETFs and finds a strong positive relation. 
Kalaycıoğlu (2004) on the other hand finds a negative correlation between ETF flows 
and market returns based on five major US index ETFs. However, none of the studies 
have measured the relation between ETF fund flows and index returns on a global level 
as well on different asset classes. Thus, in my next research question, I intend on 
understanding whether last year’s ETF fund flows are able to predict next year’s index 
market movement based on global ETF fund flow data on equities, bonds and future 
indices. Hence my second research question intends to find out the following: 
Research question 2: What is the relationship between last year ETF fund flows and 
next year’s market returns on equities, bonds and future indices? 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
My data set contains ETF fund flow data, return indexes and macro-economic 
variables. The period of my data is yearly from 2011 to 2015. I retrieve my ETF fund 
flow data from Deutsche Bank Markets Research Synthetic Equity & Index Strategy, 
ETF Annual Review & Outlook 2014, 2015 and 2016 report. The report is publically 
available online at the Deutsche Asset Management website
64
 and is published yearly 
from 2014 onwards. Each year their report provides data of 3 prior years. The ETF 
report provides an industry overview of ETFs and the growth of the market. I use the 
ETF fund flow data provided in their report for developed and emerging markets which 
is also sourced from Reuters and Bloomberg. I use the ETF fund flows that were 
provided for 51 countries in Europe, Americas, Asia, Israel, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China) and Latin America. The report extensively provides ETF fund flow data of 
                                                 
64
 “ETF Annual Review” available at  https://etf.deutscheam.com/GBR/ENG/Downloadcenter/ETF-
Research (accessed 24 February 2016) 
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US, Europe, Asia Pacific and the Rest of the World (RoW) investors into other 
countries.  
Each respective country’s equity, bond and futures index returns were retrieved 
from Datastream.  Firstly, I retrieved each countries yearly bond index returns using the 
Total Return Index (RI) code which calculates the effect of re-investing all the gross 
coupons received back into the bonds of the index. For the yearly equity index returns, I 
also used RI which represents the theoretical aggregate growth in value of the 
constituents of the index. The index constituents are deemed to return an aggregate 
daily dividend which is included as an incremental amount to the daily change in price 
index. However, for the futures index returns, I used the yearly settlement price which 
is the price at which a contract is settled at the end of the trading day and is issued by 
the exchange. From the 51 countries, I was able to locate all equity indices but only and 
49 and 34 bond and future indices respectively. Secondly, I then converted each of 
these returns to continuously compounded returns using the following formula:                                           
                                                  
     
      
                                                                 (5.1) 
The above formula indicates that the natural logarithm (ln) is taken by dividing 
the index’ price in that year by the price of the previous year. Table 8.11 in the 
appendix provides the list of codes and names of the indices of the three different asset 
classes retrieved from Datastream. 
I used yearly data of macro-economic variables from the World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) database provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
65
. The 
data from WEO is available from 1980 to the present year and is released in April and 
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 “IMF Macro-economic data”  available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx (accessed 20 July 2016) 
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September/October each year. The database has a list of 31 macro-economic variables.  
For the purpose of this analysis, I used 7 macro-economic variables; Gross domestic 
product, current prices (U.S. dollars) (GDP), Gross domestic product based on 
purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP (GDP based on PPP), Implied 
PPP conversion rate (IMPLIED PPP), Inflation, average consumer prices in index 
(INFLATION), Volume of imports of goods and services in percent change (VOLUME 
of IMPORTS), Unemployment rate as a percent of total labor force 
(UNEMPLOYMENT), Current account balance in U.S. dollars (CURRENT  
BALANCE). Refer to table 8.12 in the appendix for the definitions of each of the 
variables. The final country-year observation of the sample consisted of a balanced 
panel data set with 204 country-year observations (N= 51 different countries and a 
period of T=4 years). Various subsets of these macroeconomic variables have been used 
in earlier studies (Chen, Roll et al. 1986; Asprem 1989; Cutler, James M. Poterba et al. 
1989; Wasserfallen 1989; Chan, Karceski et al. 1998; Flannery and Protopapadakis 
2002; Green 2004; Love and Payne 2009; Christiansen, Schmeling et al. 2012). 
As mentioned in the previous section in the research questions, I will be 
measuring four different types of models: 
Model 1: Log(Excess Indexi,t)= f(Marcoeconomic variablesi,t−1)     (5.2) 
Model 2: Log(Excess Indexi,t)= f(ETF Fund Flowsi,t−1)      (5.3) 
Model 3:Log(Excess Indexi,t)= f(ETF Fund Flowsi,t−1,Marcoeconomic variablesi,t−1)  
……………………………………………………………………………………   ..(5.4) 
I use three types of indices; equity, bond and future indices separately as the 
dependent variable. The Log (Excess Indexi,t) is calculated using the log of the return of 
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the index minus the global market which is the MSCI World Index
66
. The lagged 
macroeconomic variables and the ETF fund flows have already been described 
previously. The rational for having lagged variables is because I am measuring the 
causal effect of the ETF fund flows and with excess returns on indices, whereby the 
excess returns on indices are the effect and the ETF fund flows are the cause. In 
essence, it allows explanatory variables to have effects that extend beyond the current 
period and can also serve as a control for serial correlation. Staer (2014) also used 
lagged ETF flows to examine the effect on underlying stock returns. I use the macro-
economic as control variables.   
I run my analysis using panel data estimations (i.e cross-sectional time series 
data) with combinations of parametric approaches to ensure robustness of estimates. 
Before running my regressions, I have to choose either a fixed or random effects model. 
The fixed effect model assumes that there is only one true effect size whereas the 
random effect model allows the true effect size to differ (Borenstein, Hedges et al. 
2010). There has always been a debate on choosing the relevant model in econometrics. 
Allison (2006) state that there can be disadvantages of using a fixed effect model as 
“fixed effects estimates may have substantially larger standard errors than random-
effects estimates, leading to higher p-values and wider confidence intervals”(p.2). 
Furthermore, Baltagi (1988) state that both the “random and fixed effects models yield 
different estimation results, especially if T is small and N is large”(p.6). It is evident 
that both the fixed effects and random effects model represent different assumptions of 
data and therefore it is important that the appropriate model is chosen beforehand to 
ensure that the statistics is estimated correctly (Borenstein, Hedges et al. 2010). To 
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 The MSCI World Index, which is part of The Modern Index Strategy, is a broad global equity 
benchmark that represents large and mid-cap equity performance across 23 developed markets countries. 
https://www.msci.com/world (accessed 20 May 2016)  
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ensure I choose the right model, I proceed by conducting Hausman tests developed by 
(Hausman 1978). I run the Hausman test where the null hypothesis indicates that the 
random effect model is appropriate and the alternative hypothesis is that the fixed effect 
model is appropriate. This is a test to check whether the error terms in regressions are 
correlated with the regressors. The null hypothesis is that they are not related. If the p-
value provided is statistically significant then a fixed effect model shall be used. In 
table 5.1, I find that running the equity, future and bond returns on macroeconomics 
variables is appropriate under a random effect model. Referring to table 5.2 and 5.3, I 
find that the equity and future returns is appropriate under a fixed effects model, 
whereas for bond returns a random effects model is correct. In table 5.4, I find a random 
effect model is appropriate. In addition as there is a cross-section component to panel 
data, it can be deemed that they will be heteroscedasticity. Hence, I use the White 
diagonal robust coefficient covariance estimator (adjusted for panel data) to adjust for 
heteroscedasticity. I account for time effects in the model by adding fixed effects 
(dummy variables) to ensure there are unbiased standard errors. 
Table 5.1 Hausman Test Results on Excess Equity, Future and Bond Index on 
Macroeconomic Variables 
As per equation 5.2, the table below explains the three different dependent variables (excess equity, excess future 
and excess bond indices) with explanatory macroeconomic variables run under a Hausman Test. The first 
column is the dependent variables, the second column is the Chi-Sq Statistic and the third column is the 
Probability. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. 
 
Chi-Sq. Statistic Prob. 
Ln Excess Equity 0.5587 0.4548 
Ln Excess Future 0.5892 0.4427 
Ln Excess Bond 0.0142 0.9050 
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Table 5.2 Hausman Test Results on Excess Equity, Future and Bond Index on ETF 
Fund Flows 
As per equation 5.3, the table below explains the three different dependent variables (excess equity, excess future 
and excess bond indices) with explanatory ETF fund flow variables run under a Hausman Test. The first column 
is the dependent variables, the second column is the Chi-Sq Statistic and the third column is the Probability. *, 
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. 
  Chi-Sq. Statistic Prob.  
Ln Excess Equity  9.4118 * 0.0516 
Ln Excess Future 15.2817 *** 0.0042 
Ln Excess Bond 1.4343   0.8382 
 
Table 5.3 Hausman Test Results on Excess Equity, Future and Bond Index on ETF 
Fund Flows and Macroeconomic Variables 
As per equation 5.4, the table below explains the three different dependent variables (excess equity, excess future 
and excess bond indices) with explanatory ETF fund flow variables and Macreconomic control variables run 
under a Hausman Test. The first column is the dependent variables, the second column is the Chi-Sq Statistic 
and the third column is the Probability. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % 
levels, respectively. 
  Chi-Sq. Statistic Prob.  
Ln Excess Equity  9.8009 * 0.0811 
Ln Excess Future 12.8747 ** 0.0246 
Ln Excess Bond 1.1812   0.9467 
 
5.4 Empirical Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive and Correlation Analysis 
Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics analysis for the main variables which 
includes the dependent and independent variables. The dependent variables on the 
excess equity, excess bond and excess future returns all have very similar ranging 
values for the mean returns. The standard deviations values also indicate good 
variability in returns. Comparing the mean variables for the fund flows for the four 
regions, I find that Rest of the World (RoW) mean values are very low compared to the 
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other three regions. This is due to the lack of many of the values for the individual 
countries. Looking at the macro-economic variables, two variables (inflation and 
unemployment rate) have minimum values of zero. This is also due the lack of 
information provided for individual countries inflation figures from Argentina for two 
years (2014 and 2015) and unemployment rate from India, Bangladesh, Qatar and 
United Arab Emirates.  
Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
The table below provides the descriptive statistics of the number of observations (Obs), the mean, the standard 
deviations (Std), the minimum and maximum values of the main variables examined 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Min Max 
Current account balance 255 7.91 88.97 -484.08 293.20 
Asia Pacific 255 376.05 2875.07 -14030.60 31348.20 
Europe 255 223.09 1901.85 -9937.50 18347.10 
RoW 255 19.80 269.95 -1881.30 2066.80 
US 255 309.90 1720.97 -3656.10 17313.50 
Excess Bond 255 -0.07 0.19 -1.89 0.68 
Excess Equity 255 -0.10 0.27 -3.14 0.40 
Excess Future 255 -0.10 0.15 -0.88 0.36 
GDP  255 1397.61 2675.36 120.68 17947.00 
GDP based on PPP 255 1821.62 3278.95 -1.59 19392.36 
Implied PPP 255 273.80 1151.53 0.13 7682.40 
Inflation 255 148.45 154.57 0.00 1410.97 
Unemployment rate (%) 255 7.57 5.30 0.00 27.48 
Volume of imports of goods and services 255 4.25 6.84 -28.26 40.79 
. 
 Table 5.5 examines the correlations between the main variables and independent 
variables. Overall the results show not very high values (more than 0.8) to indicate any 
multicollinearity, with the exception to GDP based on PPP variable which has a value 
of 0.9. However, I proceed to use this variable as the GDP based on PPP is an important 
variable to measure GDP not only per country but also how it compares to other 
countries and considering that in this study I am measuring the impact on different 
regions ETF fund flows. The GDP per PPP is used by the IMF to generate the World 
Economic outlook country group composites. Nevertheless, I still conducted a 
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robustness test by removing the GDP per PPP on each of the individual regression 
analysis. I find that the results are similar in terms of the signs, size and statistical 
significances on the main ETF fund flow variables for all four regions which are the 
main variables that are being examined in this study. 
 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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Table 5.5 Correlation Analysis  
The table below describes the correlation matrix for the dependent variables excess equity, excess bond and excess future. It also provides the independent variables correlation matrix for 
the ETF Asia Pacific, ETF Europe, ETF RoW (Rest of the World) and ETF US figures. Furthermore, it also provides the correlation matrix results for the macro-economic variables GDP, 
GDP based on PPP, Implied PPP, Inflation, Unemployment rate and Volume of imports of goods and services.  
Correlation 
Current 
account 
balance 
Excess 
Bond 
Excess 
Equity 
Excess 
Future 
Asia 
Pacific 
 
Europe  RoW  US GDP  
GDP 
based on 
PPP 
Implied 
PPP Inflation  
Unempl
oyment 
rate  
Volume 
of 
imports 
of goods 
and 
services 
Current Account Balance 1.00 
            
 
Excess Bond 0.02 1.00                        
Excess Equity 0.05 0.10 1.00                      
Excess Future 0.06 0.25 0.40 1.00                    
Asia Pacific 0.10 -0.03 0.06 0.05 1.00                  
Europe -0.28 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.20 1.00                
RoW -0.18 0.05 -0.22 0.04 0.00 0.10 1.00              
US -0.28 -0.04 0.09 0.21 0.44 0.51 0.18 1.00            
GDP  -0.40 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.13 0.39 0.18 0.58 1.00          
GDP based on PPP -0.23 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.48 0.94 1.00        
Implied PPP -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 1.00      
Inflation -0.14 0.00 -0.14 -0.24 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.04 1.00    
Unemployment rate -0.17 -0.05 -0.03 -0.17 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 -0.05 1.00  
Volume of imports of goods and services 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.04 0.26 -0.09 -0.15 1.00 
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5.4.2 Regression Analysis 
5.4.3 Effects of Index Returns on Macroeconomic Variables and ETF Fund Flows 
Table 5.6 provides the results of the effects of the lagged macroeconomic 
variables on the logged excess equity, bond and future index returns respectively. All 
regressions are run using White diagonal standard errors to adjust for heteroscedasticity. 
Observing the results on the effect on excess equity returns, I find that GDP (US 
Dollars), GDP based on PPP and Inflation are all statistically significant. The lagged 
regressors have an explanatory return based on adjusted R-squared values of 5% and 
when there is a time effect it goes up to 19%.  For excess bond returns, I find that GDP 
and Current account balance are statistically significant. The explanatory power of the 
adjusted R-squared value is only 2% but increases dramatically to 62% with a time 
effect. For excess future returns, I find GDP, Inflation and Current account balance are 
statistically significant. The explanatory power of the adjusted R-squared value is 13% 
and increases to 21% with a time effect.   
 
Table 5.7 provides the results of the lagged ETF fund flows on logged excess 
equity, bond and future index returns respectively. Observing the results on the effect 
on excess equity, I find that ETF Europe and ETF US are both statistically significant 
with adjusted R-squared value of 5%. With a fixed time effect, I find that the adjusted 
R-squared values increases to 17% but the significances disappear. For excess bond 
returns, I find that only ETF Asia Pacific is significant and the adjusted R-squared value 
is very low at 1%. Similarly to the excess equity, the adjusted R-squared value increases 
with a time fixed effect to 59% and the significances also disappears.  For excess future 
returns, ETF Asia Pacific, ETF Europe and ETF US are significant and the adjusted R-
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squared value is 3%. As anticipated with a fixed effect, the adjusted R-squared value 
increases to 14% and only ETF US has statistical significance. Though, it is important 
to note that the explanatory power of the model is evidently due to the fixed effect 
applied. Therefore, ETF fund flows could by themselves provide very little explanation 
to the variation in returns.  
 
Thus, it can be observed that ETF fund flows provide a similar explanatory 
power of return variation compared to macroeconomic variables when measuring 
effects on return indices, nevertheless it should be noted the limitation that it is perhaps 
the fixed effect model that induces the explanatory power to increase. However, if I 
were to consider r-squared (instead of adjusted r-squared) values, then ETF fund flows 
would have a slightly higher variation in returns for equity and future indices at 
approximately 40 percent compared to macroeconomic variables explaining 
approximately 20 percent. Nevertheless, adjusted r-squared values are important in 
regressions as “it takes into account the loss of degrees of freedom associated with 
adding extra variables”p.110 (Brooks 2008). 
 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank]
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Table 5.6 Panel Regression Results of Excess (Equity, Bond and Future) Indices on Macroeconomic Variables 
The table below reports the estimated coefficients from equation 5.2 using Random Effect Panel on the dependent variable which is the logged excess equity (Panel A), bond (Panel B) 
and future(Panel C) returns and independent variables which is the lagged macro-economic independent variables (GDP, GDP based on PPP, Implied PPP, Inflation, Volume of 
imports of goods and services, unemployment rate and current account balance) and t-statistics in parentheses. The regressions are run using white diagonal standard errors & 
covariance. The sample runs from FY2011 to FY2015.  Panel A represents the results run without a period effect and Panel B represents the results with a period effect. Robust 
standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. The number of observations (N) is also listed below. 
 
Independent Variables Panel A: Ln Excess Equity   Panel B: Ln Excess Bond   Panel C: Ln Excess Future 
  (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2) 
Constant -0.06275** 
 
-0.04786* 
 
-0.08346*** 
 
-0.07256*** 
 
-0.08202*** 
 
-0.07469*** 
  (-2.0726) 
 
(-1.6811) 
 
(-3.9394) 
 
(-4.5957) 
 
(-3.4281) 
 
(-3.2149) 
GDP (U.S. dollars)(-1) 0.00004** 
 
0.00003* 
 
-0.00004*** 
 
-0.00004*** 
 
0.00004*** 
 
0.00004** 
  (2.43450) 
 
(1.9341) 
 
(-3.1023) 
 
(-4.2647) 
 
(2.6023) 
 
(2.467) 
GDP based on PPP(-1) -0.00002** 
 
-0.00002 
 
0.00003 
 
0.00003 
 
-0.00002 
 
-0.00002 
  (-2.0868) 
 
(-1.5876) 
 
(2.9342) 
 
(4.3769) 
 
(-1.6199) 
 
(-1.5575) 
Implied PPP(-1) 0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00001 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
  (-0.135) 
 
(0.3881) 
 
(0.3298) 
 
(1.2974) 
 
(0.1185) 
 
(0.4973) 
Inflation, average consumer prices(Index) (-1) 0.00000*** 
 
0.00000*** 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000*** 
 
0.00000*** 
  (-3.0589) 
 
(-3.2246) 
 
(-0.7585) 
 
(-0.8585) 
 
(-3.1047) 
 
(-3.2707) 
Volume of imports of goods and services(-1) -0.00197 
 
-0.00585* 
 
-0.00034 
 
-0.00300 
 
-0.00003 
 
-0.00202 
  (-0.6223) 
 
(-1.8715) 
 
(-0.2012) 
 
(-2.3736) 
 
(-0.0161) 
 
(-1.2616) 
Unemployment rate(Percent of total labor) force (-1) -0.00213 
 
-0.00248 
 
-0.00037 
 
-0.00060 
 
-0.00376 
 
-0.00387 
  (-0.7715) 
 
(-0.901) 
 
(-0.1984) 
 
(-0.3461) 
 
(-1.4343) 
 
(-1.4379) 
Current account balance(U.S. dollars)(-1) 0.00018 
 
0.00019 
 
-0.00028** 
 
-0.00028*** 
 
0.00027* 
 
0.00028* 
  (1.1874) 
 
(1.1524) 
 
(-2.4077) 
 
(-2.935) 
 
(1.9126) 
 
(1.9591) 
R-squared 0.08365   0.23227   0.05655   0.64374   0.16474   0.25420 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04801   0.18889   0.01986   0.62361   0.13226   0.21206 
Cross-Section Fixed Effects or Random Effects Random   Random   Random   Random   Random   Random 
Period Effects (Time) N   Y   N   Y   N   Y 
Number of Observations (N) 188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
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Table 5.7 Panel Regression Results of Excess (Equity, Bond and Future) Indices on ETF Fund Flows 
The table below reports the estimated coefficients from equation 5.3 using Fixed and Random Effect Panels on the dependent variable which is the logged excess equity 
(Panel A), bond (Panel B) and future (Panel C) returns and independent variables which is the lagged ETF fund flows (Asia Pacific, Europe, RoW and US) and t-statistics in 
parentheses. The regressions are run using white diagonal standard errors & covariance. The sample runs from FY2011 to FY2015. Column (1) represents the results run 
without a period effect and Column (2) represents the results with a period effect. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. The number of observations (N) is also listed below. 
 
Independent Variables Panel A: Ln Excess Equity   Panel B: Ln Excess Bond Panel C: Ln Excess Future 
  (1)   (2)   (1)   (2) (1)   (2) 
Constant -0.07405*** 
 
-0.07425*** 
 
-0.09221*** 
 
-0.09373*** -0.09140*** 
 
-0.09243*** 
  (-5.6714) 
 
(-5.9932) 
 
(-10.6077) 
 
(-17.464) (-8.714) 
 
(-9.0655) 
Asia Pacific(-1) 0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
-0.00001** 
 
0.00000 -0.00001*** 
 
-0.00001 
  (-0.4503) 
 
(-0.2933) 
 
(-2.0066) 
 
(-1.2667) (-4.5596) 
 
(-3.1242) 
Europe(-1) 0.00001*** 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 0.00001*** 
 
0.00000 
  (3.2524) 
 
(1.3269) 
 
(1.4208) 
 
(0.8147) (2.7456) 
 
(1.6014) 
RoW(-1) 0.00005 
 
0.00003 
 
-0.00002 
 
0.00001 0.00002 
 
0.00003 
  (1.4646) 
 
(1.0994) 
 
(-0.6308) 
 
(0.8608) (0.6226) 
 
(1.063) 
US(-1) -0.00001** 
 
-0.00001 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 -0.00001* 
 
-0.00001*** 
  (-2.2941) 
 
(-1.5953) 
 
(0.1502) 
 
(-0.668) (-1.745) 
 
(-1.5997) 
R-squared 0.30342   0.40504   0.02789   0.60384 0.28893   0.37817 
Adjusted R-squared 0.05097   0.17276   0.00836   0.58969 0.03122   0.13540 
Cross-Section Fixed Effects or 
Random Effects Fixed   Fixed    Random   Random Fixed   Fixed 
Period Effects (Time) N   Y   N   Y N   Y 
Number of Observations (N) 51 
 
51 
 
51 
 
51 51 
 
51 
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5.4.4 Effects of ETF Fund Flows on the movements of Index Returns 
The results of the previous section indicate that ETF fund flows and 
macroeconomic variables have a comparable power in explaining the return variability 
of equity, bond and future indices. In this section, I analyse the panel regression results 
to measure the relationship between last year’s ETF fund flows and next year’s 
movements on equities, bonds and future indices. This is to understand the effects of 
ETF fund flows into different regions (Asia Pacific, Europe, Rest of the World, and US) 
and the performance of the markets (return indices). I use macro-economic variables as 
control variables in the panel data regression analysis.  
As per table 5.8 I find that in the equity indices, the adjusted r-squared values 
without and with a period effect are relatively low at 0.10 and 0.22 respectively. 
Analyzing the results with the period effect, ETF Europe fund flows have a positive 
coefficient sign indicating that when there is more fund flow into European ETFs, the 
market is positive in the next year. On the other hand, I find a negative coefficient sign 
for US ETF fund flows indicating that when there are more fund flows into the US, the 
market is negative in the next year. This result is quite interesting as one would expect 
intuitively if there are more fund flows into the market, the market should react also 
positively in the next year. A potential explanation could be similar to Staer (2014) who  
examined US equity ETFs and found a strong positive relation between daily 
contemporaneous ETF flows and underlying stock returns suggesting price pressure 
effect related to flow activity, but most importantly he found that 38% of the flows 
shock’s price change is reversed after five days which supports the price pressure 
causing the return effect.  This suggests that negative relation between lagged fund 
flows and returns in the US market is consistent with the price pressure hypothesis. This 
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is however contradictory to Kalaycıoğlu (2004) who found  no price pressure effects on 
market returns originating from US ETF flows. He states due to the small portion of the 
ETF market (in the year 2004), it would be unlikely to cause price impact flow
67
. 
Similarly, I find this result in Europe where a potential explanation is that ETFs in 
Europe only constitute 16% of the ETF market where else the US has the largest ETF 
market of 73%
68
. 
For the bond indices I find the adjusted r-squared values without a period effect 
are relatively low at 0.03 and with a period effect high at 0.62. Analyzing the results 
with the period effect, I find there is statistically no significant relationship between 
ETFs fund flows and bond index returns. Here, I find there is no significant relationship 
between ETF fund flows and performances on a bond level. 
Reviewing the results on future indices, I find the adjusted r-squared values 
without and with a period effect are relatively low at 0.09 and 0.17 respectively. Similar 
to the results in the equity index with a period effect, I find a negative coefficient sign 
for US ETF fund flows indicating that when there are more fund flows into the US, the 
market is negative in next year’s future indices. In an efficient market, the returns on 
stock indices and stock index future should be correlated (Stoll and Whaley 1990). Here 
I find similar reactions of the ETF fund flows into the US market for both equity indices 
and future indices. This indicates that there is a price pressure effect causing the return 
effect in the following year.  
 
                                                 
67
 It is important to note that his study was based on 2004 and the US ETF market has since then grown. 
68
 “2017 Investment Company Fact Book – A review of Trends and Activities in the Investment 
Company Industry” pg 58 Available at https://www.ici.org/pdf/2017_factbook.pdf (accessed 1st June 
2017) 
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Table 5.8 Panel Regression Results of Excess (Equity, Bond and Future) Indices on ETF Fund Flows and Macro-Variables 
The table below reports the estimated coefficients using equation 5.4 from Fixed and Random Effect Panels on the dependent variable which is the logged excess equity (Panel A), bond (Panel B) and 
future (Panel C) returns and independent variables which are the lagged ETF fund flows (Asia Pacific, Europe, RoW and US) and control variables which are the macro-economic variables and t-
statistics in parentheses. The regressions are run using white diagonal standard errors & covariance. The sample runs from FY2011 to FY2015. Column (1) represents the results run without a period 
effect and Column (2) represents the results with a period effect. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. 
Independent Variables Panel A: Ln Excess Equity   Panel B: Ln Excess Bond   Panel C: Ln Excess Future 
 
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2) 
Constant 0.53638*** 
 
0.24919 
 
-0.08336*** 
 
-0.07228*** 
 
0.09139 
 
0.00628 
 
(3.0852) 
 
(1.3609) 
 
(-3.91) 
 
(-4.5714) 
 
(0.5447) 
 
(0.0363) 
Asia Pacific(-1) -0.00001** 
 
0.00000 
 
-0.00001* 
 
0.00000 
 
-0.00001** 
 
-0.00001 
 
(-2.0178) 
 
(-0.7924) 
 
(-1.7961) 
 
(-1.2115) 
 
(-2.3003) 
 
(-1.4218) 
Europe(-1) 0.00001*** 
 
0.00001** 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00001* 
 
0.00000 
 
(3.9707) 
 
(2.1203) 
 
(1.5534) 
 
(1.3313) 
 
(1.7109) 
 
(1.1116) 
RoW(-1) 0.00006 
 
0.00004 
 
-0.00002 
 
0.00001 
 
0.00003 
 
0.00003 
 
(1.5864) 
 
(1.3404) 
 
(-0.527) 
 
(0.8569) 
 
(0.9053) 
 
(1.1564) 
US(-1) -0.00002*** 
 
-0.00002*** 
 
0.00001 
 
0.00000 
 
-0.00002** 
 
-0.00002* 
 
(-2.7829) 
 
(-2.9384) 
 
(1.0129) 
 
(-0.0899) 
 
(-1.9804) 
 
(-1.8814) 
GDP (U.S. dollars)(-1) -0.00013* 
 
-0.00018* 
 
-0.00004*** 
 
-0.00004*** 
 
-0.00008 
 
-0.00006 
 
(-1.8799) 
 
(-1.9175) 
 
(-3.4851) 
 
(-4.4749) 
 
(-0.7968) 
 
(-0.5331) 
GDP based on PPP(-1) 0.00001 
 
0.00011* 
 
0.00003*** 
 
0.00003*** 
 
0.00011 
 
0.00010 
 
(0.1544) 
 
(1.6609) 
 
(3.7669) 
 
(4.7007) 
 
(1.552) 
 
(1.3317) 
Implied PPP(-1) -0.00012 
 
0.00006 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00001 
 
0.00009 
 
0.00013 
 
(-1.0874) 
 
(0.6356) 
 
(0.3021) 
 
(1.2849) 
 
(0.8675) 
 
(1.5684) 
Inflation, average consumer prices(Index) (-1) 0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000* 
 
0.00000** 
 
(-1.523) 
 
(-1.5096) 
 
(-0.5959) 
 
(-0.8247) 
 
(-1.7811) 
 
(-2.1719) 
Volume of imports of goods and services(-1) -0.00153 
 
-0.00480 
 
-0.00022 
 
-0.00301** 
 
0.00056 
 
-0.00153 
 
(-0.4312) 
 
(-1.4441) 
 
(-0.1289) 
 
(-2.369) 
 
(0.2792) 
 
(-0.7848) 
Unemployment rate(Percent of total labor) force (-1) -0.04796*** 
 
-0.03231** 
 
-0.00042 
 
-0.00066 
 
-0.03327** 
 
-0.02554* 
 
(-3.1265) 
 
(-1.9892) 
 
(-0.2233) 
 
(-0.3789) 
 
(-2.3209) 
 
(-1.6931) 
Current account balance(U.S. dollars)(-1) 0.00106 
 
0.00089 
 
-0.00018* 
 
-0.00024** 
 
0.00016 
 
-0.00001 
 
(1.3818) 
 
(1.0933) 
 
(-1.7413) 
 
(-2.572) 
 
(0.1866) 
 
(-0.0068) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07691 
 
0.22074 
 
0.02733 
 
0.61898 
 
0.08291 
 
0.16261 
Cross-Section Fixed Effects or Random Effects Fixed 
 
Fixed 
 
Random 
 
Random 
 
Fixed 
 
Fixed 
Number of Observations (N) 188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
 
188 
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5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I extended the literature on ETF fund flows and return 
performance. I study ETF fund flows on a global level using 51 different countries from 
2011 to 2015 to understand whether they provide a better explanation of variation of 
index returns than macro-economic variables and I also examine the relationship 
between last year’s ETF fund flows and next year’s market returns on indices. I am the 
first to my knowledge to use a unique set of ETF fund flow data on a global level 
provided by Deutsche Bank.  
My first research question sets to explain whether ETF fund flows have better 
explanatory powers in explaining index returns compared to macroeconomic variables. 
Most of the reviewed literature on returns and macro-economic variables indicate that 
macro-economic news is only able to explain very little of the movements in stock 
prices. My findings indicate that using a panel data model, the explanatory powers of 
ETF fund flows are similar to macro-economic variables in explaining indices returns.  
My second research question is aimed at analyzing the relationship between last 
year’s ETF fund flows and next year’s market returns on equities, bonds and future 
indices. I find that on equity indices based on statistical significance, lagged ETF fund 
flows into Europe have a positive relationship with equity index returns. I find a 
negative relationship between ETF fund flows in the US with equity index returns. I 
find similar negative relationship of the ETF fund flows into the US market for future 
indices. However, in examining the bond indices, I find there is statistically no 
significant relationship between ETFs fund flows and bond index returns, but the 
macro-economic variables have a 60% explanatory power. A potential explanation is 
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that the bond ETF fund flows are considerably lower compared to the ETF equity 
market
69
.  
The findings show that ETF fund flows are also quite comparable to macro-
economic variables in explaining indices returns. Thus, investors could use ETF as 
information to understand market movements especially globally. Additionally, when 
other regions invest into ETFs in the US, the equity and future market moves in the 
opposite direction is interesting as it shows there is a price pressure causing a return 
effect in the US market. However, this is not seen with the European market, whereby 
there is still a positive effect between lagged ETF fund flows and next year’s equity 
market movements. This indicates that the European market does not have any price 
pressure reversal effect. ETF traders could use this information especially on equity and 
future indices, as it shows the different impact ETF fund flows have on regional indices. 
In addition, due to the benefits of ETFs, regulators should also learn how and if flows 
shift markets and ease the creation of ETFs (approval for ETF sponsors have taken 
about a year
70
) to ensure the growth of ETF products in the market and to promote the 
benefits of ETFs. This study though has some limitations as my data is only yearly and 
I do not claim that I have exhausted all the significant macro-variables that are 
influential, though the variables chosen in this study have also been used in various 
other studies. In addition, the potential reverse causality between ETF fund flows and 
returns have not been investigated. This can be an area for future research to understand 
if a two-way causal relationship between ETF fund flows and returns exists. 
                                                 
69
 In 2015, US ETF equity cash flows was $173,920 million and  ETF fixed income was $59,944 million 
(source: ETF Annual Review 2016” available at 
https://etf.deutscheam.com/GBR/ENG/Downloadcenter/ETF-Research (accessed 24 February 2016) 
70
 “Here Come ETF regulations and why the Industry is happy about it” Available at  
https://www.wsj.com/articles/here-come-etf-regulations-and-why-the-industry-is-happy-about-it-
1488770041 (accessed 11 June 2017) 
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6. Conclusion 
6.1 Summary of the findings of the thesis  
The core question that is addressed in this thesis relates to understanding new 
information types which would help investors to understand the impact on their 
portfolios especially on different asset classes. In this thesis, I answer that question 
using four empirical analyses based on unique hand-collected data on fines and on ETF 
flow data which to my knowledge is the first to be examined. I examine fines as new 
information because illegal behaviors of companies have clear detrimental impact on 
company reputation resulting even in resignations of senior management such as the 
case of VW. I also examine fines as important information because it relates closely to 
the area of Responsible Investment (RI). RI has grown in the last few years in an 
astonishing rate evident by the huge scale of investors signing up to the UNPRI. The 
UNPRI has grown consistently since it started in 2006 from initially only 100 numbers 
of signatories to 1500 in April 2016 with assets under management amounting to USD 
62 trillion
71
. Therefore, more and more investors are keen on incorporating ESG issues 
into investment analysis and decision-making processes. This indicates that investors 
are now more inclined to understand the impact ESG issues have on their portfolio 
returns. Thus, understanding the impact ESG fines have on portfolios would benefit 
investors tremendously. I also examine ETF fund flows as information because it would 
be keen to understand the relationship between ETFs and various global indices 
especially on different asset types. Investor behavior has also been changing towards a 
more long-term focused horizon rather than short-term. From those four empirical 
studies, I examine five major questions. 1) Do fines have a long-term negative impact 
                                                 
71
 https://www.unpri.org/about accessed 29 April 2017 
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on equity return? 2) What is the impact on returns of ESG plus LT fines? 3) Is there an 
inter-link effect in the context of fines between equity and fixed income? 4) What is the 
short-term impact of fines on CDS spreads and equity returns? 5) What is the 
relationship between last year ETF fund flows and next year’s market returns on 
indices? 
I answer questions (1) and (2) in the empirical Chapter 2. The study in this 
chapter examines the impact of fines on long-term returns using hand-collected data 
from SEC filings from the period 1994 to 2012 for US large capitalization companies. 
Time-series regressions were run using both equal and value weighted portfolios 
following CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart models. The main findings of this chapter 
suggests that when holding shares of firms with monetary fines for one year there are 
negative underperformances of between 29 and 57 basis points p.m and the results are 
robust to different weighting metrics. Most importantly, I find that firms with higher 
fines per firm size (based on market capitalization) have a larger underperformance 
compared to firms with lower fines. I also investigate the different legal stages of the 
fines and find that initial announcements of the violations have larger negative returns 
compared to other legal stages. What is even more interesting is that using 
classifications of ESG and LT aspects, I find investors perceive environmental issues on 
all different legal stages of violations to be a cause of concern and with larger 
underperformances compared to social, governance and long-term issues. Furthermore, 
not all not all ESG plus LT issues are relevant in all industries. However, it is important 
to note that I find the manufacturing industry exhibits outperformance with statistical 
significance on the confirmed violations but still pending other matters legal stage. A 
potential explanation could be that the market perceives a better outcome on the fines 
on manufacturing companies when the violation is subject to legal procedures. Overall, 
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from the findings from this chapter I advocate that companies should be more legally 
responsible.  
My empirical chapter 3 answers the major question (3) about the link between 
equity and fixed income in the context of fines and further adds to the originality 
contributions of this thesis. In this study, I use short selling after announcements of 
illegal violations to a sample of 691 US firms on 4661 bond returns from the period 
2000 to 2012 using a multi-index bond model. Using different levels of quintiles, I find 
that the second highest percentile, after a fine or settlement induces negative 
underperformances in non-callable bond returns by an average of 20 basis points p.m. 
However, when I split the sample in the middle into two time periods, I find that it is 
the first half of the period that induces the negative underperformances. I also examine 
whether there is a difference between periods of crisis and non-crisis and the investment 
horizons of the bonds in terms of their remaining years to maturities to provide an 
accurate description of the relationship between these two asset classes. Firstly, the 
results are interesting as it indicates that investors penalize companies more during 
crisis periods indicating that illegalities are more detrimental to companies during 
periods of uncertainty. Secondly, I find that bonds with longer years to maturities 
exhibit underperformances compared to bonds with lower years to maturities which 
actually outperforms. This finding coincides with the understanding that RI investors 
are more concerned about the performances of longer term bonds.   
These results are robust to different benchmarks, value weightings and also 
liquidity measures. Moreover, I also run a series of additional analysis. Firstly, using a 
control sample which includes all companies regardless if it has a fine, I find that there 
is outperformance on companies that have no short selling and underperformances only 
with companies with lowest short selling. Thus when there is no short selling which in 
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turn would indicate “good” sentiment there is outperformance on the bond returns. The 
underperformance on the lowest short selling portfolio results, affirms the main findings 
as it shows that only higher short selling in the context of fines induces larger 
underperformances on bond returns. Secondly, as I had only examined non-callable 
bonds, I test whether the results would hold with bonds with all characteristics and 
features. The results indicate that the highest short selling portfolio underperforms at 25 
basis p.m. 
 Similar to the results in the preceding chapter 2 on equity returns, overall I also 
find underperformances in the context of fines on bond returns. The findings in this 
chapter are interesting to investors who are keen to understand the inter-market link 
between assets. More importantly, in this chapter it shows that not only equity investors 
are feeling the pinch of illegal behaviors of companies but bond investors too. Inter-
market theory states that at times of panic or uncertainty, both bonds and stocks fall. 
Here I show, there is evidence of a direct relationship between bonds and stocks after 
violations. 
. In chapter 4 I examine the impact of fines on risk, specifically credit risk.  I 
answer the major questions (2) and (4) which relate to understanding the impacts of 
fines on CDS spreads and also the impact on different ESG plus LT issues on 121 US 
large capitalization companies from the period 2009 to 2012 using event study models. 
Most importantly, I comparatively measure the impact of events on CDS spreads and 
equity returns. This study is highly interesting as I find no literature in the area of 
illegalities that have directly measured the impact of fines on CDS spreads. Firstly, the 
empirical results show that the CDS market reacts to news of illegalities on short-term, 
medium term and even on all levels of maturities. Secondly, most studies indicate CDS 
markets are able to anticipate news which is also corroborated by my results that 
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indicate the CDS market anticipates illegality news even before announcements. 
Thirdly, I also find that both the CDS and stock market reacts more to firms with higher 
fines per market cap. Fourthly, based on the different legal stages of the fines, CDS 
markets reacts negatively at the final stage (confirmed) compared to the stock market 
which reacts negatively at the initial stage (pending) of the fine. Fifthly, in terms of 
industry expectations, CDS and stock markets react only negatively to fines in mining 
and manufacturing companies respectively. Both the CDS and stock markets react 
negatively to environmental issues. However, for long-term issues, surprisingly both 
markets react positively.  
 On an overall perspective, these results verify the notion that illegal behaviors 
can induce a strong perception of default risk of a company which results in increases in 
spreads after announcements of fines. These results are especially interesting for 
academics who are interested in research on illegalities. Furthermore, investors in other 
markets should look to the CDS market first especially when there are increases in 
spreads even before any illegality announcements are made. This is a possible hint that 
the CDS market is already aware of potential defaults and thus has factored this into 
CDS prices.  
 The previous three empirical chapters have all looked at fines as information for 
investors. In chapter 5, I examine the relationship between ETF fund flows and returns 
on indices as information that investors could use to track their fund performances. I 
also examine whether ETF fund flows provide better explanation of market return 
variations than commonly used macro-economic variables. Using a novel set of ETF 
fund flow data retrieved from Deutsche Bank, I was able to run analysis using panel 
data estimations on 51 countries worldwide.  
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Firstly, examining the empirical results, my findings indicate that the 
explanatory powers of ETF fund flows are similar to macro-economic variables in 
explaining indices returns. In essence they both provide similar adjusted r-squared 
values indicating similar goodness fit to the model. Secondly, when examining the 
relationship between ETF fund flow data on different regions, the empirical results are 
on overall mixed. For instance, on equity indices returns, the results show that when 
there is an increase of fund flow into Europe ETFs, the equity market returns increase in 
the next year. However, this is the opposite for lagged ETF fund flows into the US, 
where I find an inverse relationship for both equity and future indices returns. There are 
no statistically significant results for ETF fund flows and bond indices. The overall 
results here are quite interesting for investment managers as this provides information 
that indicates ETFs are very similar to macro-economic variables and managers can use 
ETF fund flows movements to examine possible future movements of indices. 
In summary, the main findings of this thesis have great implications for 
institutional investors, companies, researchers and also regulators. The most important 
conclusion that can be drawn from this thesis is that fines are detrimental not only on 
the short run but also long run to the performances of company returns.  Review of the 
empirical studies indicates a strong investor reaction to corporate illegalities and 
institutional investors should be aware of the negative impacts of having companies 
with fines in their portfolios. Additionally, investors could look at CDS market behavior 
when examining illegalities as they are able to anticipate news. Regulators should 
ensure that adequate controls and procedures are in place to deter corporate illegalities. 
Furthermore, information on global ETF fund flows provides a better understanding on 
the movements of various global indices especially on different asset classes. Overall, 
this thesis contributes to the growing literature on corporate illegalities and on ETFs.  
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This thesis shows that the impact of fines is not just limited to one asset class such as 
equities but extends to the bond and credit default markets. This research would 
especially benefit RI investors who are not only keen on understanding the impact 
external information has on their portfolios but to also advocate a sense of corporate 
legal responsibility which would hopefully lead to the betterment of company behavior. 
6.2 Suggestion for future research  
Even though there is vast amount of literature in the area of illegalities that 
intends to measure the impact violations have on short-term equity returns, there still 
seems to lack attention and research on long-term returns. With the exception of Baucus 
and Near (1991) and Baucus and Baucus (1997) that measured long-term impact of 
illegalities, though their papers differ from mine in various ways. Firstly,  their data is 
based only on convicted firms. Secondly, they measure accounting data and market 
returns using covariance procedures and thirdly their data sample is from 1963 to 1981. 
I not only examine equity returns but also extend the analysis to bond returns. My 
methodology is based on Carhart models and multi-index bond models. Academics 
could further examine the long-term impacts using panel data regressions and having 
dependent variables and independent variables to measure what actually drives fines on 
companies instead of a portfolio method. This calls for future research to further 
enhance my understanding of the long-term impact of illegalities. 
  In an efficient market, prices would reflect all relevant information in any point 
of time. However, if there is a semi-strong form view in the markets, then any new 
additional information would results in prices changes. Following the information 
content hypothesis, there should be price reactions on the daily basis of excess returns if 
there is a new risk level associated with the new announcement of violation. In this 
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thesis, I also measure daily announcements of CDS spread changes and equity returns 
and I find immediate reactions. As in my CDS results, I find that the CDS market has 
already anticipated illegal announcement news even before announcements. However, 
as I do not have data prior to fines due to dataset limitations to examine rumors or 
speculations using news data, this would be an interesting avenue in research to 
understand what kind of rumors prior to fines are investors more concerned about and 
also how strong is the impact of rumors or even private information compared to actual 
announcements.  
 The underlying datasets of this thesis is purely based on publicly available 
information. Most of the information given is for large public listed companies and thus 
another intriguing area to examine would be if the reactions of investors on illegal 
behaviors of companies are the same for non-public listed companies. This would be 
interesting to measure the reputation differences companies have being listed or non-
listed and the tolerance levels of investors. Thus, measuring corporate reputation based 
on the types of disclosure requirements of companies especially on their illegal 
behaviors would be a fascinating area for academics to research on. 
 Although I have examined the impact of new information such as fines and 
flows on overall market reactions, I have not measured whether this information has 
different reactions by different types of investors, i.e. institutional or individual. 
Investor trading behavior has always been an interest both academically and practically 
especially by the type of investors. Public information is always available to investors 
thus investigating the trading behaviors and patterns of different types of investors 
would be beneficial in understanding which type of investors is actually more 
concerned about violations of companies and also fund flows into ETFs. Inferring the 
different types of trading behaviors of various types of investors can be accomplished 
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using either trading size, by institutional ownership or even by actual trades (Nofsinger 
2001).  
 
 
 
 
[This section has been intentionally left blank] 
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Appendix to Chapter 1 
Table 8.1 Overview of Dataset, Source, Sample Size and Frequency in each Chapter 
The table below provides a detailed description of the data used in each chapter as well as the source, sample size (period) and the frequency of the data 
Chapter Chapter Title Main Data Source of Data Sample Size (Period) Frequency 
2 Corporate Legal Responsibility and Stock Returns Monetary Fines SEC 10-K Fillings 1994 to 2012 Yearly 
2 Corporate Legal Responsibility and Stock Returns Equity Returns (Returns Index) Datastream 1994 to 2012 Monthly 
2 Corporate Legal Responsibility and Stock Returns Market Capitalization (Market 
Value) 
Datastream 1994 to 2012 Monthly 
2 Corporate Legal Responsibility and Stock Returns ESG plus Long-Term criteria EFFAS 1994 to 2012 - 
2 Corporate Legal Responsibility and Stock Returns Short Interest Ratios Bloomberg 2002 to 2012 Monthly 
3 Inter-market Link of Illegality: Measuring the Effect 
of Short Selling in the context of Fines on Fixed 
Income 
Short Interest Ratios Bloomberg 2000 to 2012 Monthly 
3 Inter-market Link of Illegality: Measuring the Effect 
of Short Selling in the context of Fines on Fixed 
Income 
Bond Returns (Total Return Index) Datastream 2000 to 2012 Monthly 
3 Inter-market Link of Illegality: Measuring the Effect 
of Short Selling in the context of Fines on Fixed 
Income 
Bond Volume TRACE 2002 to 2012 Intraday 
4 A Comparative Event Study: The Impact of Fines on 
Credit Default Swaps and Stocks 
CDS Spreads Datastream 2009 to 2012 Daily 
4 A Comparative Event Study: The Impact of Fines on 
Credit Default Swaps and Stocks 
Equity Returns (Returns Index) Datastream 2009 to 2012 Daily 
5 ETF Fund Flows and Index Returns: A global multi 
asset class analysis 
ETF Fund Flows Deutsche Bank 2011 to 2015 Yearly 
5 
ETF Fund Flows and Index Returns: A global multi 
asset class analysis Macroeconomic Variables 
World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) 2011 to 2015 Yearly 
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8.2 Appendix to Chapter 2 
Table 8.2 Sample Size and % of US Firms in the MSCI World Large Cap Universe 
The table below describes the number of US firms per year in the sample 
and the columns “% of US firms” is in comparison to the rest of the firms 
in the MSCI World Large Constituents 
Year Number of Firms  % US firms  
1994 to 1997 1452 29.3% 
1998 to 2001 1516 36.4% 
2002 to 2005 844 38.9% 
2006 to 2009 1036 36.1% 
2010 to 2012 825 36.9% 
Subtotal 5673   
 
Table 8.3 List of relevant SIC codes 
The table below depicts the type of industry based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code 
2 Digit SIC Code Industry 
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing 
      [40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   
[70xx-89xx] Services 
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Table 8.4 Total Number of Violations per Industry 
The table below reports the total number of violations by the type of industry. The type of industry is based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. These violations are 
categorized according to the two digit SIC code and are based on the hand-collected data from the SEC filings. 
 
2 Digit SIC Code Industry 
Total 
Violations 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002   
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  84 22 12 17 2 6 4 8 9 4   
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing   544 91 61 71 51 41 53 59 62 55   
[40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 249 43 34 28 18 18 27 43 18 20   
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   31 2 2 1 4 3 8 2 4 5   
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   114 12 10 8 5 12 16 13 14 24   
[70xx-89xx] Services 44 2 1 1 3 8 9 8 9 3   
  Total 1066 172 120 126 83 88 117 133 116 111   
                          
2 Digit SIC Code Industry 
Total 
Violations 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  86 5 4 3 9 18 7 3 12 18 7 
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing   603 53 60 46 59 63 48 70 80 62 62 
[40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 188 16 13 14 18 19 19 16 27 28 18 
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   84 2 8 7 11 15 4 6 8 12 11 
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   265 28 27 23 23 19 30 13 34 36 32 
[70xx-89xx] Services 78 7 11 18 7 6 10 5 3 5 6 
  Total 1304 111 123 111 127 140 118 113 164 161 136 
  Subtotal 2370 283 243 237 210 228 235 246 280 272 136 
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Table 8.5 Total Number of Violations per Stage (Initial Allegations) 
The table below reports the total number of violations by the type of stage (initial allegations). The type of industry is based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. These 
violations are categorized according to the two digit SIC code and are based on the hand-collected data from the SEC filings. 
 
2 Digit SIC Code Industry 
Total 
Violations 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002   
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  35 14 5 4 2 3 3 3 0 1   
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing   197 50 18 15 10 18 20 24 18 24   
[40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 121 20 15 14 6 6 12 23 13 12   
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   9 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 3 1   
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   32 6 1 2 0 3 9 3 6 2   
[70xx-89xx] Services 17 1 1 0 2 6 3 0 4 0   
  Total 411 92 40 35 22 36 49 53 44 40   
                          
2 Digit SIC Code Industry 
Total 
Violations 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  38 2 2 2 4 2 5 0 7 10 4 
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing   211 21 18 13 24 23 19 32 26 13 22 
[40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 91 8 7 3 8 10 12 9 15 12 7 
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   28 0 2 2 5 4 2 1 0 6 6 
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   83 11 8 2 4 4 6 3 18 12 15 
[70xx-89xx] Services 11 0 1 3 3 2 0 1 0 0 1 
  Total 462 42 38 25 48 45 43 46 67 53 55 
  Subtotal 873 134 78 60 70 81 92 99 111 93 55 
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Table 8.6 Total Number of Violations per Stage (Confirmed but Pending other Matters) 
The table below reports the total number of violations by the type of stage (Confirmed but Pending other Matters). The type of industry is based on the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) Code. These violations are categorized according to the two digit SIC code and are based on the hand-collected data from the SEC filings. 
 
2 Digit SIC Code Industry 
Total 
Violations 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002   
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  14 2 1 4 0 1 0 2 3 1   
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing   73 10 12 7 5 4 5 10 10 10   
[40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 26 1 3 3 1 2 6 8 1 1   
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   25 3 2 1 3 3 3 4 2 4   
[70xx-89xx] Services 9 1 0 0 0 1 2 3 1 1   
  Total 149 17 18 16 9 11 17 27 17 17   
                          
2 Digit SIC Code Industry 
Total 
Violations 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 0 
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing   154 8 8 10 6 16 12 15 23 31 25 
[40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 29 2 1 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 7 
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   18 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   44 0 3 8 4 4 3 0 3 8 11 
[70xx-89xx] Services 25 1 4 6 1 2 5 1 1 1 3 
  Total 278 15 19 30 16 29 24 21 30 46 48 
  Subtotal 427 32 37 46 25 40 41 48 47 63 48 
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Table 8.7 Total Number of Violations per Stage (Confirmed) 
The table below reports the total number of violations by the type of stage (Confirmed). The type of industry is based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. 
These violations are categorized according to the two digit SIC code and are based on the hand-collected data from the SEC filings 
2 Digit SIC Code Industry 
Total 
Violations 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002   
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  35 6 6 9 0 2 1 3 6 2   
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing   274 31 31 49 36 19 28 25 34 21   
[40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 102 22 16 11 11 10 9 12 4 7   
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   33 1 2 0 2 3 0 2 1 4   
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   57 3 7 5 2 6 4 6 6 18   
[70xx-89xx] Services 18 0 0 1 1 1 4 5 4 2   
  Total 519 63 62 75 52 41 46 53 55 54   
                          
2 Digit SIC Code Industry 
Total 
Violations 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  40 1 2 1 5 14 2 3 4 5 3 
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing   238 24 34 23 29 24 17 23 31 18 15 
[40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 68 6 5 8 7 6 5 4 10 13 4 
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   64 0 3 3 4 9 1 3 7 6 3 
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   138 17 16 13 15 11 21 10 13 16 6 
[70xx-89xx] Services 42 6 6 9 3 2 5 3 2 4 2 
  Total 590 54 66 57 63 66 51 46 67 62 33 
  Subtotal 1109 117 128 132 115 107 97 99 122 116 33 
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Table 8.8 Total Number of Firms with Violations per Industry 
The table below reports the total number of firms with violations per Industry. The type of industry is based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. These 
violations are categorized according to the two digit SIC code and are based on the hand-collected data from the SEC filings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Digit SIC Code Industry Total Firms 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002   
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  51 8 7 12 2 5 3 6 4 4   
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing   396 53 49 50 38 37 42 42 46 39   
[40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 174 26 26 21 13 16 19 24 15 14   
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   51 2 1 1 4 3 7 2 2 5   
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   96 12 8 6 5 10 13 12 11 19   
[70xx-89xx] Services 39 2 1 1 3 7 8 7 8 2   
  Total 807 105 93 92 69 81 99 95 87 86   
                          
2 Digit SIC Code Industry Total Firms 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
[10xx-14xx]  Mining  72 5 3 3 9 16 3 2 10 15 6 
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing   396 37 44 33 44 46 33 41 48 41 29 
[40xx-49xx] Transportation and Public Utilities 156 13 8 12 17 16 16 15 20 22 17 
[50xx-59xx] Retail and Wholesale Trade   117 2 5 7 9 11 6 3 7 9 11 
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   185 19 17 16 19 17 23 11 19 24 20 
[70xx-89xx] Services 63 5 10 13 7 3 8 4 3 5 5 
  Total 989 82 89 87 111 116 92 78 113 123 98 
  Subtotal 1796 187 182 179 180 197 191 173 200 209 98 
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Figure 6 Detailed EFFAS Classification Explanation 
The figure below depicts examples of the KPIs provided in the EFFAS KPIs version 3.0. The objective of 
the KPIs is to propose the basis for the integration of ESG data into corporate performance reporting. The 
KPIs sets out overall requirements for the presentation of ESG guidelines for the presentation and 
structure as well as minimum requirements for content to be disclosed. For each of the 114 subsectors 
following the Dow Jones Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) lists of KPIs were defined. The first 
column provides the name of the KPI, the second column identifies the specific KPI whereby E would 
relate to Environmental, S for Social, G for Governance and V for Long-Term (LT) Viability. The third 
column indicates the level of company disclosure where Scope 1 (Entry level), Scope II (Mid level) and 
Scope III (High Level). The fourth column is the specification which provides a detailed explanation of 
the KPI. For the purpose of this study, I use the KPI identifiers (E,S,G and LT) to match my dataset of 
violations. 
 
KPI Spez.-ID SCOPE Specification 
Accidental oil/gas 
spills 
E25-02 III Total amount of costs incurred 
through accidental oil spills amount 
including remediation and fines 
Fatalities & Injuries S04-03 II Total number of fatalities in 
relation to FTEs 
Dimensions of 
pending legal 
proceedings 
G01--1 II Amount in monetary terms i.e. 
currency in controversy, dispute 
from legal proceedings 
Litigation Risk V01.01 I Expenses and fines on filings, law 
suits related to anti-competitive 
behaviour, anti-trust and monopoly 
practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of KPI 
Identifier of 
KPI 
Level of 
Disclosure 
Specification of 
KPI 
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Table 8.9 Variable Description and Data Sources 
The table below describes in the first column the variable name, second column the description as provided by 
the data provider, the third column the data provider and the last column in the code used to extract the 
information 
Variable Description Data Source Code 
Short Interest Ratio 
The total number of shares an investor has 
sold short divided by the average daily 
trading volume for a specific time period 
Bloomberg  Short_Int_Ratio 
Total Assets 
Represent the sum of total current assets, 
long-term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other 
investments, net property plant and 
equipment and other assets. 
Datastream WC02999 
Institutional Ownership 
The percentage of total shares in issue of 
holdings of 5% or more held as long-term 
strategic holdings by investment banks or 
institutions seeking a long-term return. 
Note that holdings by Hedge Funds are not 
included. 
Datastream NOSHIC 
Turnover by Volume 
This shows the number of shares traded for 
a stock on a particular day. The figure is 
always expressed in thousands. 
Datastream VO 
Cash & Equivalents 
 Represents Cash & Due from banks for 
banks, cash for insurance firms and cash & 
short-term investments for all other 
industries 
Datastream WC02005 
Current Assets 
Represents cash and other assets that are 
reasonably expected to be realized in cash, 
sold or consumer within one year or one 
operating cycle. 
Datastream WC02201 
Current Liabilities 
Represent debt or other obligations that the 
company expects to satisfy within one year 
Datastream WC03101 
Short-Term Debt 
 Represents that portion of debt payable 
one year including current portion of long-
term debt and sinking fund requirements of 
preferred stock or debentures 
Datastream WC03051 
Depreciation, Depletion 
and Amortization 
i) Depreciation represents the process of 
allocating the cost of a depreciable asset to 
the accounting periods covered during its 
expected useful life to a business. It is a 
non-cash charge for use and obsolescence 
of an asset. 
ii) Depletion refers to cost allocation for 
natural resources such as oil and mineral 
deposits. 
iii) Amortization relates to cost allocation 
for intangible assets such as patents and 
leasehold improvements, trademarks, 
bookplates, tools and film cost. 
Datastream WC01151 
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8.3 Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table 8.10 Description of Number of Bonds and Firms by Remaining Years to Maturity 
The table below provides the number of bonds and unique firms in each level of Short Interest Ratio 
Percentile by the different remaining years to maturity for each bond. All bonds are in U.S dollars and 
have no callable features (call, put, sinking fund, and convertibility)   
 
Years to Maturity Zero 
0 to 
20th 
20th to 
40th  
40th to 
60th 
60th to 
80th  
80th to 
100th Total 
  Panel A: Breakdown by Number of Bonds   
Low (Less than 2 years) 126 84 155 119 107 81 672 
Short(2 to 7 years) 189 264 419 293 233 206 1604 
Medium(7 to 15 years) 150 197 413 275 154 78 1267 
Long (15 years and 
above) 33 197 308 264 166 150 1118 
Total 498 742 1295 951 660 515 4661 
 
Panel B: Breakdown by Number of Unique Firms 
 Low (Less than 2 years) 9 23 34 26 31 19 142 
Short(2 to 7 years) 11 42 52 49 45 37 236 
Medium(7 to 15 years) 10 31 43 39 32 22 177 
Long (15 years and 
above) 5 24 28 31 28 20 136 
Total 35 120 157 145 136 98 691 
 
Table 8.11 Overview of Barclays US Indices 
The table below displays the codes and source for each US index used in the model. 
Code Source  Index 
LHAGGBD Datastream Barclays United States Aggregate 
LHTR20Y Datastream Barclays United States Treasury 20 or More Year 
LHUT1T3 Datastream Barclays United States Treasury 1-3 Years 
LHYIELD Datastream Barclays United States Corporate High Yield 
LHMNBCK Datastream Barclays United States Mortgage Backed Securities 
LHIGAAA Datastream Barclays United States Aggregate Corporate AAA 
MSUSAML Datastream MSCI USA 
S&PCOMP Datastream S&P 500 
USEURSP Datastream USD-EUR exchange rate 
UKDOLLR Datastream USD-GBP exchange rate 
JAPYNUS Datastream USD-JPY exchange rate 
FRTCM3M Datastream US Treasury 3 Month - Middle Rate 
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Table 8.12 Overview of Barclays Global Indices 
The table below displays the codes and source for each Global index used in the model. 
Code Source  Index 
LHMGAGG Datastream Barclays Global Aggregate 
LHTR1T3 Datastream Barclays Treasury 1-3Y 
LHMGHYD Datastream Barclays Global High Yield 
LHGAAAA Datastream Barclays Global AGG AAA 
LHGAMOR Datastream Barclays Global AGG Mortgages 
LHT7T20 Datastream Barclays Treasury 7-20 Years 
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Table 8.13Equal Weighted Results (Full Sample and First Half from 2000 to 2006 period) 
The table below displays the regression results of the 8 factor monthly alphas, market, duration, default, option, equity, USD-EUR, USD-GBP and USD-YEN variables which are adjusted 
based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors. The portfolios are equally weighted. The table displays the adjusted R-square for each portfolio. Significance levels are presented as *,** and 
*** for 10%,5% and 1% significance level respectively. The value in the parentheses represents the values of the T-statistics 
Portfolio Alpha   Market   Duration   Default   Option   
MSCI 
USA   
USD-
EUR   
USD-
GBP   
USD-
YEN   
Adj 
R2 
EW Full Sample Period                                       
Zero - SIR -0.0005   0.8173 *** 0.0963   0.0099   -0.0884   0.0389   0.0694   -0.0646   0.0153   0.71 
  (-0.6823)   (6.3057)   (1.424)   (0.1981)   (-0.3592)   (1.6001)   (1.4235)   (-1.2891)   (0.5608)     
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0014   1.0695 *** -0.0705   -0.1116   -0.0146   -0.0134   -0.0325   0.0599   0.0751   0.57 
  (-1.2293)   (4.1258)   (-0.9082)   (-1.6365)   (-0.0549)   (-0.3042)   (-0.549)   (0.8884)   (1.3263)     
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0008   1.0850 *** -0.0321   -0.0538   0.2561   -0.0128   -0.0056   -0.0433   -0.0173   0.66 
  (-1.0219)   (3.5857)   (-0.4127)   (-0.7002)   (0.7939)   (-0.3437)   (-0.1471)   (-0.7969)   (-0.3965)     
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0010   0.9459 *** -0.0365   -0.0625   0.2749   0.0195   0.0091   -0.0378   -0.0665 * 0.66 
  (-1.2958)   (7.927)   (-0.6912)   (-1.5764)   (1.3377)   (0.6681)   (0.1639)   (-0.9124)   (-1.7297)     
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0020 * 0.6427 *** 0.0887   0.0872   0.1512   0.0192   -0.0290   0.0619   0.0190   0.55 
  (-1.9389)   (4.5429)   (1.1166)   (1.1705)   (0.4864)   (0.6508)   (-0.5247)   (1.5172)   (0.3829)     
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0003   0.9258 *** -0.0722   0.0595   0.1338   -0.0088   -0.1044 * 0.0130   0.0116   0.49 
  (-0.2527)   (7.6092)   (-1.371)   (0.9192)   (0.5294)   (-0.2083)   (-1.9258)   (0.2213)   (0.3044)     
EW First Half 2000 to 2006                                       
Zero - SIR -0.0010   0.5323 * -0.0104   0.0917   0.5769   -0.0274   -0.0620   0.0880   -0.0078   0.54 
  (-0.9051)   (1.9463)   (-0.1153)   (0.9392)   (1.2357)   (-0.9541)   (-1.0611)   (1.4785)   (-0.2614)     
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0008   1.0995 *** -0.0047   -0.0213   -0.0993   -0.0746   -0.1396 * 0.0548   0.2243 ** 0.58 
  (-0.5488)   (3.4049)   (-0.0291)   (-0.1771)   (-0.2432)   (-1.1021)   (-1.7435)   (0.5434)   (2.2765)     
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0012   0.8576 *** 0.0444   -0.0631   0.4468   0.0297   -0.0532   0.0456   -0.0205   0.71 
  (-1.2215)   (2.8864)   (0.3706)   (-0.5454)   (0.7787)   (0.6549)   (-0.4885)   (0.5877)   (-0.3355)     
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0003   0.4728 *** 0.0383   0.0319   0.8077 *** -0.0466   0.0069   0.0002   -0.0150   0.81 
  (-0.3149)   (2.7739)   (0.5762)   (0.7249)   (3.0202)   (-1.5718)   (0.1324)   (0.0041)   (-0.475)     
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0024   0.6773 ** 0.2354 * 0.2176 * -0.2905   -0.0346   0.0649   0.0141   0.0152   0.57 
  (-1.6273)   (2.4383)   (1.7464)   (1.8291)   (-0.7444)   (-0.8637)   (0.577)   (0.1532)   (0.2013)     
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0032   1.6802 *** -0.3773 * 0.0725   0.1459   0.0554   -0.1841   0.0939   -0.0451   0.41 
  (-1.4378)   (3.3925)   (-1.7937)   (0.5229)   (0.2943)   (0.7926)   (-1.2377)   (0.8593)   (-0.538)     
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Table 8.14Equal Weighted Results (Second Half  2007 to 2012 and Crisis Period) 
The table below displays the regression results of the 8 factor monthly alphas, market, duration, default, option, equity, USD-EUR, USD-GBP and USD-YEN variables which are adjusted 
based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors. The portfolios are equally weighted. The table displays the adjusted R-square for each portfolio. Significance levels are presented as *,** and 
*** for 10%,5% and 1% significance level respectively. The value in the parentheses represents the values of the T-statistics 
Portfolio Alpha   Market   Duration   Default   Option   
MSCI 
USA   
USD-
EUR   
USD-
GBP   
USD-
YEN   
Adj 
R2 
EW Period 2007 to 2012                                       
Zero - SIR -0.0003   1.0266 *** 0.1140 * -0.0094   -0.4480 ** 0.0341   0.1183 *** -0.1118 ** 0.0446   0.85 
  (-0.2482)   (9.8215)   (1.731)   (-0.1861)   (-2.0236)   (1.1104)   (3.055)   (-2.0711)   (1.3714)     
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0014   1.0171 *** -0.1201   -0.2154 ** 0.0907   0.0358   -0.0171   0.0905   -0.0079   0.58 
  (-0.7096)   (3.0091)   (-1.2579)   (-2.2661)   (0.2611)   (0.6449)   (-0.2741)   (1.2601)   (-0.1392)     
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0001   1.2579 *** -0.0682   -0.0475   0.0097   -0.0786   0.0514   -0.0982   -0.0277   0.61 
  (0.082)   (3.116)   (-0.6309)   (-0.4613)   (0.0256)   (-1.5401)   (1.2322)   (-1.3797)   (-0.4673)     
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0013   1.0429 *** -0.0381   -0.0926   0.1074   0.0527   0.0000   -0.0819   -0.0918   0.60 
  (-1.0929)   (9.0829)   (-0.6541)   (-1.45)   (0.3164)   (1.463)   (0.0003)   (-1.399)   (-1.4752)     
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0019   0.5684   0.0182   -0.0195   0.5169   0.0879   -0.0907   0.1058   -0.0130   0.57 
  (-1.0175)   (3.6333)   (0.2774)   (-0.3911)   (1.2119)   (2.374)   (-1.7401)   (2.196)   (-0.1792)     
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0008   0.9996 *** -0.0977 ** 0.0102   -0.1286   -0.0573   -0.0710 * 0.0248   0.0146   0.70 
  (0.7462)   (8.9096)   (-2.1972)   (0.1438)   (-0.4327)   (-1.3325)   (-1.7865)   (0.4302)   (0.3458)     
EW Recession Periods                                       
Zero - SIR 0.0003   0.8057 *** 0.1843 * 0.0015   -0.2734   0.0529   0.0273   -0.0162   -0.0099   0.76 
  (0.1106)   (5.3867)   (1.9887)   (0.0331)   (-0.9357)   (1.4975)   (0.2863)   (-0.2295)   (-0.1893)     
0 to 20th Percentile -SIR -0.0099 * 1.5561 *** -0.1038   -0.105   -0.6066   -0.1787 *** -0.0355   -0.0182   0.1304   0.5 
  (-1.9609)   (4.104)   (-0.5949)   (-1.0113)   (-1.2498)   (-3.3401)   (-0.176)   (-0.1027)   (0.812)     
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0002   0.8227 *** -0.0463   -0.1044 * 0.3758   -0.0363   0.1126   -0.0522   -0.1349 *** 0.8 
  (-0.0912)   (4.9237)   (-0.575)   (-1.729)   (0.8658)   (-0.7483)   (1.272)   (-0.5899)   (-3.7647)     
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0039 * 1.0851 *** 0.0341   -0.0732   0.2878   0.0082   -0.089   -0.0037   -0.0701   0.61 
  (-1.7263)   (3.3197)   (0.268)   (-1.3421)   (0.5463)   (0.2044)   (-0.6885)   (-0.0407)   (-0.737)     
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0065 ** 0.7456 ** 0.2602 * 0.1141   0.2333   -0.0095   -0.2619 * 0.2656 *** 0.1365   0.59 
  (-2.2428)   (2.6835)   (1.7804)   (0.9481)   (0.39)   (-0.2159)   (-1.9333)   (3.8964)   (1.1994)     
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0007   0.7561 ** -0.1532   0.0663   0.6355   -0.0099   -0.0492   -0.028   0.0019   0.51 
  (0.2074)   (2.5169)   (-1.0599)   (0.6064)   (1.3255)   (-0.1363)   (-0.3553)   (-0.2493)   (0.0246)     
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Table 8.15Equal Weighted Results (Non-Crisis Periods and Low Years to Maturity (YTM)) 
The table below displays the regression results of the 8 factor monthly alphas, market, duration, default, option, equity, USD-EUR, USD-GBP and USD-YEN variables which are adjusted based 
on Newey-West (1987) standard errors. The portfolios are equally weighted. The table displays the adjusted R-square for each portfolio. Significance levels are presented as *,** and *** for 
10%,5% and 1% significance level respectively. The value in the parentheses represents the values of the T-statistics 
Portfolio Alpha   Market   Duration   Default   Option   
MSCI 
USA   
USD-
EUR   
USD-
GBP   
USD-
YEN   
Adj 
R2 
EW Non - Recession Periods                                       
Zero - SIR -0.0005   0.8201 *** 0.032   0.0683   0.0906   -0.0085   0.0369   -0.0573   0.0481   0.63 
  (-0.5903)   (3.2578)   (0.3912)   (0.6475)   (0.1957)   (-0.2667)   (0.7459)   (-0.8615)   (1.4923)     
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0001   0.7908 *** -0.0109   -0.0782   0.3772 * 0.0597 ** -0.0366   0.0287   0.0466   0.75 
  (-0.2)   (6.6795)   (-0.2105)   (-1.1906)   (1.7455)   (2.4688)   (-0.7443)   (0.7238)   (1.2195)     
20th to 40th Percentile -SIR -0.0027 ** 1.6242 *** -0.0709   0.1246   -0.1632   -0.0279   -0.0848   0.0175   0.0104   0.7 
  (-2.518)   (3.1808)   (-0.5717)   (0.912)   (-0.3046)   (-0.5723)   (-1.633)   (0.305)   (0.2361)     
40th to 60th Percentile-SIR 0   0.9042 *** -0.0657   0.0092   0.2671   -0.0202   -0.0188   -0.008   -0.0308   0.69 
  (0.0246)   (5.183)   (-1.2278)   (0.154)   (1.0554)   (-0.6199)   (-0.4634)   (-0.186)   (-1.1993)     
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0005   0.5693 *** 0.0915   0.1656 ** 0.1262   -0.0037   0.007   0.001   0.0259   0.51 
  (-0.4774)   (4.4677)   (1.1133)   (1.9865)   (0.5793)   (-0.1746)   (0.1115)   (0.0196)   (0.8125)     
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0014   1.2732 *** -0.0288   0.0103   -0.5545 ** 0.0469   -0.1073   0.068   -0.0117   0.48 
  (-0.9478)   (4.932)   (-0.3427)   (0.1585)   (-2.1339)   (1.1101)   (-1.2098)   (0.8568)   (-0.2233)     
EW-LOW YTM                                       
Zero - SIR 0   0.8463 *** -0.0472   0.0086   0.0132   0.0198   -0.0132   -0.0217   0.0169   0.78 
  (0.0422)   (11.237)   (-1.353)   (0.3257)   (0.0997)   (1.0761)   (-0.3839)   (-0.6142)   (0.7101)     
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0002   0.3189 ** 0.1126 ** 0.1358 *** 0.3909 ** -0.0585 *** 0.0478   0.0182   -0.0309   0.68 
  (-0.2208)   (2.4171)   (2.5797)   (2.9069)   (2.4213)   (-3.0854)   (1.5894)   (0.6652)   (-1.0291)     
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0015   0.5233 *** -0.0945 *** -0.0402   0.0587   -0.017   -0.0588 * 0.0142   0.0321   0.4 
  (1.6165)   (3.8472)   (-2.679)   (-1.0276)   (0.3523)   (-0.8263)   (-1.8428)   (0.4976)   (0.8777)     
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR 0.0016 ** 0.7524 *** -0.1906 *** -0.1315 ** -0.1335   0.0184   -0.0175   -0.0561 * 0.0555 * 0.49 
  (2.2346)   (4.6028)   (-3.8342)   (-2.1085)   (-0.5822)   (0.7534)   (-0.7454)   (-1.854)   (1.6883)     
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR 0.0001   0.6106 *** -0.0222   0.0429   0.0039   0.001   0.0617   -0.0632   -0.0428   0.57 
  (0.1027)   (4.6128)   (-0.5413)   (1.0807)   (0.0228)   (0.0431)   (1.6205)   (-1.4467)   (-1.2205)     
80th to 100th Percentile -SIR 0   0.9001 *** -0.0413   -0.0413   -0.0898   0.0554 ** 0.0066   -0.0404   -0.0432 * 0.79 
  (-0.0062)   (9.0965)   (-1.2279)   (-1.1418)   (-0.5441)   (2.0698)   (0.2184)   (-1.2252)   (-1.7075)     
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Table 8.16 Equal Weighted Short and Medium Years to Maturity (YTM) 
The table below displays the regression results of the 8 factor monthly alphas, market, duration, default, option, equity, USD-EUR, USD-GBP and USD-YEN variables which are adjusted based 
on Newey-West (1987) standard errors. The portfolios are equally weighted. The table displays the adjusted R-square for each portfolio. Significance levels are presented as *,** and *** for 
10%,5% and 1% significance level respectively. The value in the parentheses represents the values of the T-statistics 
Portfolio Alpha   Market   Duration   Default   Option   
MSCI 
USA   
USD-
EUR   
USD-
GBP   
USD-
YEN   
Adj 
R2 
EW Short YTM                                       
Zero - SIR -0.0002   0.8864 *** -0.0296   0.0094   0.2535   0.0091   -0.0036   0.0357   0.0032   0.68 
  (-0.2418)   (10.3813)   (-0.8658)   (0.1855)   (1.2799)   (0.4739)   (-0.1131)   (1.0316)   (0.1433)     
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0005   0.728 *** -0.0345   -0.045   0.289   0.0282   -0.0653 * 0.0703   0.0194   0.67 
  (-0.6686)   (5.1566)   (-0.6871)   (-0.9071)   (1.6526)   (1.1438)   (-1.6714)   (1.2983)   (0.5806)     
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR -0.0002   0.6061 *** -0.0127   -0.0139   0.2916 * 0.0119   -0.0363   0.0679   -0.0019   0.7 
  (-0.3425)   (5.16)   (-0.2884)   (-0.3057)   (1.771)   (0.6201)   (-0.9437)   (1.3731)   (-0.0653)     
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0004   0.7846 *** -0.0867 *** -0.1316 *** 0.2522 * 0.0281 * 0.0297   -0.0478   -0.0392   0.71 
  (-0.5818)   (8.1044)   (-2.6835)   (-3.8399)   (1.9399)   (1.9531)   (0.7706)   (-1.0096)   (-1.507)     
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0005   0.7736 *** -0.131 ** -0.0097   0.2502   0.0319   -0.0872 ** 0.0409   0.0263   0.55 
  (-0.6745)   (6.6536)   (-2.3013)   (-0.1786)   (0.928)   (1.4063)   (-2.3739)   (0.9494)   (0.578)     
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0015 * 1.1243 *** -0.1711 *** -0.0567   -0.0804   0.014   -0.1581 *** 0.0482   0.0555   0.54 
  (1.7324)   (6.5958)   (-3.0767)   (-0.8651)   (-0.2751)   (0.2721)   (-2.6252)   (0.764)   (1.3664)     
EW Medium YTM                                       
Zero - SIR -0.0003   0.7762 *** 0.2039 *** 0.0528   -0.0285   0.0371 * 0.0416   -0.0399   -0.0082   0.82 
  (-0.642)   (4.8583)   (3.6928)   (1.2668)   (-0.0934)   (1.8255)   (1.2625)   (-0.8992)   (-0.2656)     
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0021   1.0772 *** 0.0275   0.0155   -0.0336   -0.0437   -0.0104   -0.0036   0.1109   0.46 
  (-1.3483)   (3.9915)   (0.2944)   (0.1245)   (-0.1055)   (-0.8543)   (-0.143)   (-0.0678)   (0.9611)     
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0   1.4171 *** -0.0418   -0.111   -0.0824   -0.0186   0.0887   -0.1602 * -0.0446   0.7 
  (-0.0375)   (3.8343)   (-0.4138)   (-1.2652)   (-0.2305)   (-0.3356)   (1.3278)   (-1.9234)   (-0.6218)     
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0016   1.015 *** 0.0602   -0.1334 ** -0.0601   0.0379   0.021   -0.0017   -0.0053   0.63 
  (-1.5016)   (6.9017)   (0.9691)   (-1.99)   (-0.1695)   (1.4401)   (0.352)   (-0.0299)   (-0.1001)     
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0007   0.7142 *** 0.2142 ** 0.0894   0.1749   0.0227   -0.0212   0.0554   -0.0443   0.59 
  (-0.7308)   (5.0362)   (2.4385)   (1.1398)   (0.6495)   (0.9479)   (-0.5318)   (1.62)   (-1.4833)     
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR 0.0008   1.0939 *** -0.1336 *** -0.0216   -0.0319   -0.0103   -0.12 ** 0.0245   0.0207   0.62 
  (1.0119)   (9.4684)   (-2.9183)   (-0.3911)   (-0.1334)   (-0.2938)   (-2.3707)   (0.4281)   (0.6203)     
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Table 8.17 Equal Weighted Long Years to Maturity (YTM) 
The table below displays the regression results of the 8 factor monthly alphas, market, duration, default, option, equity, USD-EUR, USD-GBP and USD-YEN variables which are adjusted based 
on Newey-West (1987) standard errors. The portfolios are equally weighted. The table displays the adjusted R-square for each portfolio. Significance levels are presented as *,** and *** for 
10%,5% and 1% significance level respectively. The value in the parentheses represents the values of the T-statistics 
Portfolio Alpha   Market   Duration   Default   Option   
MSCI 
USA   
USD-
EUR   
USD-
GBP   
USD-
YEN   
Adj 
R2 
EW Long YTM                                       
Zero – SIR  -0.0013   0.5987 ** 0.1889   0.0907 ** 0.3095 ** -0.0058   0.1207 ** -0.0763 * 0.0215   0.86 
  (-1.6523)   (2.4746)   (1.625)   (2.2214)   (2.3633)   (-0.3384)   (2.5274)   (-1.8344)   (0.557)     
0 to 20th Percentile - SIR -0.0016   1.4177 *** 0.0252   -0.1957   -0.558   0.0234   0.0455   0.027   0.0611   0.57 
  (-1.1139)   (3.6436)   (0.2003)   (-1.4602)   (-1.2861)   (0.4132)   (0.8295)   (0.4704)   (1.0098)     
20th to 40th Percentile - SIR 0.0009   1.43 * 0.2075   -0.0478   -0.204   0.0587   0.0356   -0.1704   0.0722   0.6 
  (0.4435)   (1.8761)   (1.0269)   (-0.3006)   (-0.3142)   (0.9212)   (0.367)   (-1.5164)   (0.6882)     
40th to 60th Percentile- SIR -0.0026 ** 1.3644 *** 0.1236   0.0935   0.4286   0.0164   0.0727   -0.1175   -0.1095   0.6 
  (-2.2483)   (3.5354)   (0.8475)   (1.4373)   (1.0679)   (0.3656)   (0.4636)   (-0.95)   (-1.3843)     
60th to 80th Percentile - SIR -0.0031 ** 1.0026 *** 0.2616 *** 0.0384   -0.2535   0.0974 ** 0.0218   0.0586   0.0453   0.62 
  (-2.2349)   (5.8287)   (2.9254)   (0.3774)   (-0.6125)   (2.2539)   (0.3916)   (1.1383)   (0.707)     
80th to 100th Percentile - SIR -0.0011   0.8966 *** 0.15 ** 0.1754 ** -0.059   0.0067   0.0376   -0.0735   0.0074   0.47 
  (-0.5065)   (6.5635)   (2.3338)   (1.9993)   (-0.2034)   (0.1368)   (0.5789)   (-0.8863)   (0.1454)     
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8.4 Appendix to Chapter 4 
Table 8.18 Frequency of Illegal Announcements  
Panel A: Number of Unique Firms and Announcements of Violations in each Industry 
The table below depicts the type of industry based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code and the 
number of unique firms in each industry with the number of violations 
2 Digit SIC 
Code Industry 
Number of 
Firms 
Number of 
Violations 
[10xx-14xx] Mining 9 27 
[20xx-39xx] Manufacturing 47 247 
[40xx-49xx] Transportation & Public Utilities 23 66 
[50xx-51xx] Wholesale Trade 3 11 
[52xx-59xx] Retail Trade 13 27 
[60xx-67xx] Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 21 87 
[70xx-89xx] Services 5 6 
  Subtotal 121 471 
 
Panel B: Number ESG and Long-Term Violations per Year 
The table below depicts the number of violations in each respective 
environmental, social, governance and long-term violations. 
  Number of Violations per Year   
Type 2009 2010 2011 2012 Subtotal 
Environmental 36 45 45 38 164 
Social 13 35 26 31 105 
Governance 8 27 30 36 101 
Long-Term 20 22 27 32 101 
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Table 8.19: Composition of the CDS data set by Firm 
No. Company Name No of CDS Spreads 
1 3M CO 20 
2 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 20 
3 AES CORP 20 
4 AETNA 20 
5 AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES 18 
6 AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS 20 
7 ALCOA 10 
8 ALLERGAN 20 
9 ALTRIA GRP(PHILIP MORRIS) 30 
10 AMAZON.COM 10 
11 AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER 30 
12 AMERICAN EXPRESS 30 
13 AMERICAN TOWER CORP A 30 
14 
ANADARKO PETROLEUM 
CORP 20 
15 APACHE CORP 20 
16 AT&T 20 
17 BAKER HUGHES 20 
18 BANK NEW YORK CO 2 
19 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 30 
20 BAXTER INTERNATIONAL 20 
21 BECTON DICKINSON 20 
22 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY B 20 
23 BEST BUY CO 20 
24 BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP 30 
25 CARDINAL HEALTH 30 
26 CATERPILLAR 20 
27 CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP 30 
28 CHEVRON CORP 20 
29 CHUBB CORP 20 
30 CITIGROUP 30 
31 COLGATE-PALMOLIVE 30 
32 CONOCOPHILLIPS 20 
33 COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP 20 
34 CVS/CAREMARK 20 
35 DELL 30 
36 DISNEY (WALT) 30 
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No. Company Name No of CDS Spreads 
37 DOLLAR GENERAL CORP 10 
38 DOMINION RESOURCES 20 
39 DOW CHEMICAL CO 30 
40 DU PONT (E.I) DE NEMOURS 30 
41 DUKE ENERGY CORP 20 
42 EBAY 16 
43 EXELON CORP 20 
44 EXXON MOBIL CORP 20 
45 FEDEX CORP 20 
46 FIRSTENERGY CORP 20 
47 FORD MOTOR CO 20 
48 FPL GROUP 40 
49 FREEPORT MCMORAN C & G B 18 
50 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 29 
51 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP 27 
52 HALLIBURTON CO 20 
53 HERSHEY CO (THE) 20 
54 HESS 20 
55 HOME DEPOT 20 
56 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL 20 
57 IBM CORP 30 
58 INTEL CORP 30 
59 INT'L PAPER CO 30 
60 JOHNSON & JOHNSON 20 
61 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 40 
62 KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 20 
63 L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HLDGS 20 
64 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 20 
65 LORILLARD 20 
66 LOWE'S COS 20 
67 MARATHON OIL CORP 20 
68 MARSH & MCLENNAN COS 20 
69 MCKESSON CORP 30 
70 MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS 30 
71 MEDTRONIC 30 
72 MERCK & CO 40 
73 MERRILL LYNCH & CO 30 
74 METLIFE 30 
75 MICROSOFT CORP 30 
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No. Company Name No of CDS Spreads 
76 MONSANTO CO 20 
77 MORGAN STANLEY 27 
78 MOTOROLA 59 
79 NOBLE ENERGY 20 
80 NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP 30 
81 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP 20 
82 OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 20 
83 ORACLE CORP 20 
84 PEABODY ENERGY CORP 20 
85 PEPSICO 20 
86 PFIZER 22 
87 PG&E CORP 20 
88 PHILIP MORRIS INT 10 
89 PNC FINL SERVICES GROUP 20 
90 PPL CORP 10 
91 PRAXAIR 20 
92 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 30 
93 PROGRESS ENERGY 20 
94 QUEST DIAGNOSTICS 20 
95 QWEST COMMUNI. INT'L 20 
96 RAYTHEON 20 
97 REPUBLIC SERVICES 20 
98 REYNOLDS AMERICAN 40 
99 SARA LEE CORP 20 
100 SCHERING-PLOUGH CORP 40 
101 SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP 20 
102 SEMPRA ENERGY 20 
103 SLM CORP 1 
104 SOUTHERN CO 20 
105 STAPLES 20 
106 TARGET CORP 20 
107 TJX COS 20 
108 UNION PACIFIC CORP 30 
109 UNITEDHEALTH GROUP 30 
110 US BANCORP 27 
111 VALERO ENERGY CORP 20 
112 VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS 30 
113 VIACOM B (NEW) 30 
114 WALGREEN CO 10 
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No. Company Name No of CDS Spreads 
115 WAL-MART STORES 20 
116 WASTE MANAGEMENT 30 
117 WELLPOINT 20 
118 WELLS FARGO & CO 30 
119 WILLIAMS COS 30 
120 XCEL ENERGY 20 
121 XEROX CORP 30 
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8.5 Appendix to Chapter 5 
Table 8.20  List of Codes and Name of Indices 
The table below provides description of the country and full name of the respective index, the source of the data and 
code retrieved and the associated asset class of the index. (NA indicates data that was not available) 
 
Country Full Name Source Code Asset Class 
Austria ATX - Austrian Traded Index Datastream ATXINDX  Equity Index 
Belgium MSCI BELGIUM Datastream MSBELGL Equity Index 
Denmark OMX Copenhagen (OMXC20) Datastream DKKFXIN Equity Index 
Finland OMX Helsinki (OMXH) Datastream HEXINDX Equity Index 
France France CAC 40 Datastream FRCAC40 Equity Index 
Germany DAX 30 Performance Datastream DAXINDX Equity Index 
Greece Athex Composite Datastream GRAGENL Equity Index 
Ireland Ireland Stock Exchange Overall (Iseq) Datastream ISEQUIT Equity Index 
Italy FTSE MIB Index Datastream FTSEMIB Equity Index 
Netherlands AEX Index (AEX) Datastream AMSTEOE Equity Index 
Norway Oslo Exchange All Share Datastream OSLOASH Equity Index 
Portugal Portugal PSI-20 Datastream POPSI20 Equity Index 
Spain IBEX 35 Datastream IBEX35I Equity Index 
Sweden OMX Stockholm 30 (OMXS30) Datastream SWEDOMX Equity Index 
Switzerland Swiss Market (SMI) Datastream SWISSMI Equity Index 
UK FTSE 100 Datastream FTSE100 Equity Index 
US Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Datastream S&PCOMP Equity Index 
Canada Standard and Poor's / Toronto Stock Exchange 60 Index Datastream TTOCOMP Equity Index 
Australia Standard and Poor's / Australian Stock Exchange 200 Datastream ASX200I Equity Index 
Hong Kong Hang Seng Datastream HNGKNGI Equity Index 
Japan TOPIX Datastream TOKYOSE Equity Index 
New Zealand Standard and Poor's / NZX 50 Datastream NZ50CAP Equity Index 
Singapore Straits Times Index Local Currency Datastream SNGPORI Equity Index 
Israel FTSE Israel Datastream WIISRLL Equity Index 
Brazil Brazil Bovespa Datastream BRBOVES Equity Index 
Russia Russia RTS Index Datastream RSRTSIN Equity Index 
India CNX Nifty (50) Datastream INNSE50 Equity Index 
China FTSE China Datastream WICINAL Equity Index 
Argentina MSCI Argentina Datastream MSARGTL Equity Index 
Chile MSCI Chile Datastream MSCHILL Equity Index 
Colombia MSCI Colombia Datastream MSCOLML Equity Index 
Mexico Mexico IPC (Bolsa) Datastream MXIPC35 Equity Index 
Peru MSCI All Peru Datastream MSAPRUL Equity Index 
Bangladesh Standard and Poor's Bangladesh Broad Market Index (BMI) Datastream IFFMBGL Equity Index 
Indonesia MSCI Indonesia Datastream MSINDFL Equity Index 
Malaysia FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Datastream FBMKLCI Equity Index 
Pakistan MSCI Pakistan Datastream MSPAKIL Equity Index 
Philippines MSCI Philippines Datastream MSPHLFL Equity Index 
South Korea MSCI Korea Datastream MSKOREL Equity Index 
Taiwan Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighed TAIEX Datastream TAIWGHT Equity Index 
Thailand Bangkok S.E.T. Datastream BNGKSET Equity Index 
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Country Full Name Source Code Asset Class 
Vietnam MSCI Vietnam Datastream MSVIETL Equity Index 
Egypt MSCI Egypt Datastream MSEGYTL Equity Index 
Kuwait Standard and Poor's Kuwait Shariah Kuwait Dinar Datastream SPSKWDL Equity Index 
Nigeria MSCI Nigeria Datastream MSNGRAL Equity Index 
Poland MSCI Poland Datastream MSPLNDL Equity Index 
Qatar Standard and Poor's Qatar Shariah Qatar Riyal Datastream SPSQARL Equity Index 
South Africa FTSE / JSE All Share Datastream JSEOVER Equity Index 
Saudi Arabia MSCI Saudi Arabia Domestic Investable Market Datastream MSISADL Equity Index 
Turkey MSCI Turkey Datastream MSTURKL Equity Index 
UAE FTSE United Arab Emirates Datastream WIUAEIL Equity Index 
Austria OTOB-ATX INDEX CONT. INDEX DEAD Datastream VTXCS04 Future Index 
Belgium Belfox-Bel20 Index Continuous Datastream BFXCS00 Future Index 
Denmark OMX-OMXC20CAP Index Continuous Index Datastream DCXCS04 Future Index 
Finland NA Datastream NA Future Index 
France MONEP-CAC 40 Index Continuous Datastream FCXCS00 Future Index 
Germany EUREX-DAX Index Continuous Datastream GDXCS00 Future Index 
Greece ADEX-FTSE / ASE-20 Continuous Datastream ASICS00 Future Index 
Ireland NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Italy Idem-FTSE MIB Continuous Index Datastream MSMCS04 Future Index 
Netherlands AEX-AEX Index Continuous Datastream ETICS00 Future Index 
Norway Oslo-OBX Index Continuous Datastream OSXCS00 Future Index 
Portugal BDP-PSI 20 Index Continuous Datastream PSXCS00 Future Index 
Spain MEFF-IBEX 35 Plus Index Continuous Datastream MBXCS00 Future Index 
Sweden OMX-OMXS30 Index Continuous Datastream OMFCS00 Future Index 
Switzerland EUREX-SMI Continuous Index Datastream NA Future Index 
UK LIFFE-FTSE 100 Index Continuous Datastream NA Future Index 
US CME-S&P 500 Index Continuous Datastream ISPCS00 Future Index 
Canada 
ME-S&P/TSX 60 Index Standard Futures (SXF) Continuous 
Index Datastream CDDCS04 Future Index 
Australia SFE-SPI 200 Index Continuous Datastream AAPCS00 Future Index 
Hong Kong HKFE-Hang Seng Index Continuous Datastream HSICS00 Future Index 
Japan TSE-TOPIX Index Continuous Datastream JSXCS00 Future Index 
New Zealand NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Singapore SGX DT-Straits Times Index Continuous Datastream SSTCS00 Future Index 
Israel Tase-TA25 Index Continuous Datastream TLVCS00 Future Index 
Brazil BMF-Bovespa Index Continuous Datastream BMICS00 Future Index 
Russia RTS-RTS Index Continuous Datastream RTSCS00 Future Index 
India NSE-S&P CNX Nifty Continuous Index Datastream INICS04 Future Index 
China CFFEX-CSI 300 Index Continuous Index Datastream CIFCS04 Future Index 
Argentina NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Chile NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Colombia NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Mexico Mexder-IPC Index Continuous Index Datastream MIECS04 Future Index 
Peru NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Bangladesh NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Indonesia SGX - MSCI Indonesia Index  Datastream SID1215 Future Index 
Malaysia Klse-KLCI Continuous Datastream KLCCS00 Future Index 
Pakistan NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Philippines NA Datastream NA Future Index 
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Country Full Name Source Code Asset Class 
South Korea KSE-KOSPI 200 Index Continuous Index Datastream KKXCS04 Future Index 
Taiwan TAIFEX-Taiwan 50 Index Continuous Index Datastream TFTCS04 Future Index 
Thailand SGX-MSCI Thailand Index Continuous Datastream NA Future Index 
Vietnam NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Egypt NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Kuwait NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Nigeria NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Poland WSE-WIG 40 Continuous Index Datastream WFOCS04 Future Index 
Qatar NA Datastream NA Future Index 
South Africa SAFEX-All Share 40 Index Continuous Index Datastream SALCS04 Future Index 
Saudi Arabia NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Turkey Turkdex-ISE 30 Continuous Datastream TRTCS00 Future Index 
UAE NA Datastream NA Future Index 
Austria JPM GBI Austria 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGOEEU$ Bond Index 
Belgium JPM GBI Belgium 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGBGEU$ Bond Index 
Denmark JPM GBI Denmark 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGDKEU$ Bond Index 
Finland JPM GBI Finland 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGFNEU$ Bond Index 
France JPM GBI France 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGFREU$ Bond Index 
Germany JPM GBI Germany 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JEBDEU$ Bond Index 
Greece JPM GBI Greece 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGGREU$ Bond Index 
Ireland JPM GBI Ireland 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGIREPE Bond Index 
Italy JPM GBI Italy 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGITEU$ Bond Index 
Netherlands JPM GBI Netherlands 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGNLEU$ Bond Index 
Norway 
Bank Of America Merrill Lynch Norway Government 1 - 10 
Years (United States Dollar) Datastream MLNW110 Bond Index 
     Portugal JPM GBI Portugal 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGPTEU$ Bond Index 
Spain JPM GBI Spain 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGESEU$ Bond Index 
Sweden JPM GBI Sweden 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGSDEU$ Bond Index 
Switzerland 
Bank Of America Merrill Lynch Swiss Government 1 - 10 
Years (United States Dollar) Datastream MLSF110 Bond Index 
UK JPM GBI United Kingdom 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGUKEU$ Bond Index 
US JPM GBI United States 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGUSEU$ Bond Index 
Canada JPM GBI Canada 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGCNEU$ Bond Index 
Australia JPM GBI Australia 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGAUEU$ Bond Index 
Hong Kong JPM GBI Hong Kong 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGHKEU$ Bond Index 
Japan JPM GBI Japan 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGJPEU$ Bond Index 
New Zealand JPM GBI New Zealand 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGNZEU$ Bond Index 
Singapore JPM GBI Singapore 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGSGEU$ Bond Index 
Israel JPM ELMI + Israel (United States Dollar) Datastream JGISEU$ Bond Index 
Brazil JPM EMBI Global Brazil Datastream JPMGBRA Bond Index 
Russia JPM EMBI Global Russia Datastream JPMGRUS Bond Index 
India 
JPM GBI-Emerging Markets Broad India (United States 
Dollar) Datastream JGE$BIN Bond Index 
China JPM EMBI Global China Datastream JPMGCHN Bond Index 
Argentina JPM EMBI Global Argentina Datastream JPMGARG Bond Index 
Chile JPM EMBI Global Chile Datastream JPMGCHI Bond Index 
Colombia JPM EMBI Global Colombia Datastream JPMGCOL Bond Index 
Mexico JPM GBI Mexico 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGMXEU$ Bond Index 
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Country Full Name Source Code Asset Class 
Peru JPM EMBI Global Peru Datastream JPMGPER Bond Index 
Bangladesh NA Datastream NA Bond Index 
Indonesia JPM EMBI Global Indonesia Datastream JPMGIND Bond Index 
Malaysia JPM EMBI Global Malaysia Datastream JPMGMAL Bond Index 
Pakistan JPM EMBI Global Pakistan Datastream JPMGPAK Bond Index 
Philippines JPM EMBI Global Philippines Datastream JPMGPHL Bond Index 
South Korea JPM GBI Korea 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGKREU$ Bond Index 
Taiwan JPM ELMI + Taiwan (United States Dollar) Datastream JPMPTA$ Bond Index 
Thailand JPM ELMI + Thailand (United States Dollar) Datastream JPMPTH$ Bond Index 
Vietnam JPM EMBI Global Vietnam Datastream JPMGVIE Bond Index 
Egypt JPM ELMI + Egypt (United States Dollar) Datastream JPMPEG$ Bond Index 
Kuwait NA Datastream NA Bond Index 
Nigeria JPM EMBI Global Nigeria Datastream JPMGNIG Bond Index 
Poland JPM GBI Poland 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGPOEU$ Bond Index 
Qatar Citigroup Emusdgbi Qatar Datastream CGESQAL Bond Index 
South Africa JPM GBI South Africa 1 - 10 Years (United States Dollar) Datastream JGSAEU$ Bond Index 
Saudi Arabia 
Bank Of America Merrill Lynch Saudi Riyal Spot Currency 
(United States Dollar) Datastream ML$SRY$ Bond Index 
Turkey JPM EMBI Global Turkey Datastream JPMGTUR Bond Index 
UAE 
Bank Of America Merrill Lynch Emerging Markets Corporate 
Plus UAE Issuers (United States Dollar) Datastream MLEAEZ$ Bond Index 
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Table 8.21 Definition of Macro-Economic Variables  
The table below provides description of the macro-economic variables including the abbreviations used 
in the panel data estimations and the full definitions of the variables. The data is retrieved from the IMF 
database. 
 
Variable Abbreviation Definition 
Gross domestic product, current 
prices (U.S. dollars) (in 
Billions) 
GDP Values are based upon GDP in national currency 
converted to U.S. dollars using market exchange rates 
(yearly average). Exchange rate projections are provided 
by country economists for the group of other emerging 
market and developing countries. Exchanges rates for 
advanced economies are established in the WEO 
assumptions for each WEO exercise. Expenditure-based 
GDP is total final expenditures at purchasers’ prices 
(including the f.o.b. value of exports of goods and 
services), less the f.o.b. value of imports of goods and 
services.  
Gross domestic product based 
on purchasing-power-parity 
(PPP) valuation of country GDP 
(Current international dollar) (in 
Billions) 
GDP based on PPP These data form the basis for the country weights used to 
generate the World Economic Outlook country group 
composites for the domestic economy.  
Implied PPP conversion rate 
(National currency per current 
international dollar) 
IMPLIED PPP Expressed in national currency per current international 
dollar. These data form the basis for the country weights 
used to generate the World Economic Outlook country 
group composites for the domestic economy.  
Inflation, average consumer 
prices (Index) 
INFLATION Expressed in averages for the year, not end-of-period 
data. A consumer price index (CPI) measures changes in 
the prices of goods and services that households 
consume. Such changes affect the real purchasing power 
of consumers’ incomes and their welfare. As the prices 
of different goods and services do not all change at the 
same rate, a price index can only reflect their average 
movement. A price index is typically assigned a value of 
unity, or 100, in some reference period and the values of 
the index for other periods of time are intended to 
indicate the average proportionate, or percentage, change 
in prices from this price reference period. Price indices 
can also be used to measure differences in price levels 
between different cities, regions or countries at the same 
point in time. [CPI Manual 2004, Introduction] For euro 
countries, consumer prices are calculated based on 
harmonized prices. For more information see 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS
-BE-04-001/EN/KS-BE-04-001-EN.PDF.] 
Volume of imports of goods 
and services (Percent change) 
VOLUME of IMPORTS Percent change of volume of imports refers to the 
aggregate change in the quantities of total imports whose 
characteristics are unchanged. The goods and services 
and their prices are held constant, therefore changes are 
due to changes in quantities only. [Export and Import 
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Variable Abbreviation Definition 
Price Index Manual: Theory and Practice, Glossary] 
Unemployment rate (Percent of 
total labor force) 
UNEMPLOYMENT Unemployment rate can be defined by either the national 
definition, the ILO harmonized definition, or the OECD 
harmonized definition. The OECD harmonized 
unemployment rate gives the number of unemployed 
persons as a percentage of the labor force (the total 
number of people employed plus unemployed). [OECD 
Main Economic Indicators, OECD, monthly] As defined 
by the International Labour Organization, unemployed 
workers are those who are currently not working but are 
willing and able to work for pay, currently available to 
work, and have actively searched for work. [ILO, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/res/index.ht
m] 
Current account balance (U.S. 
dollars) (in Billions) CURRENT BALANCE 
Current account is all transactions other than those in 
financial and capital items. The major classifications are 
goods and services, income and current transfers. The 
focus of the BOP is on transactions (between an 
economy and the rest of the world) in goods, services, 
and income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
